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ABSTRACT

Planning systems for economic development have been adopted by many
countries (in more or less sophisticated forms) as a means of formalising
national objectives, allocating scarce resources to achieve those
objectives, and judging the relative merits of development policies.
Recent literature in development economics stresses that 'economic
development' involves more than achieving a satisfactory growth of
conventionally measured per capita incomes:

it also requires a reduction

in unemployment and a reduction in the degree of inequality of income
distribution.

The challenge laid down to planners by the new development

economics is to incorporate explicit mechanisms for dealing with these
issues in their planning frameworks.

This thesis sets out to contribute

to this task by providing an analysis of certain key conceptual issues
and relationships involved in equity-oriented planning.

It is divided

into four parts.
The first part distils from international empirical evidence certain
key relationships commonly associated with economic development which
appear to affect income distribution in a systematic manner.

It is

argued that the significant relationships so identified can be built
into the design of a development planning framework for individual
countries in which concern for income distribution is given high priority.
Among the key relationships significantly affecting variations in inequality
across countries, two which stand out are the structural pattern of
employment (in particular, the proportion of the workforce engaged in
agriculture) and demographic factors (in particular, the fertility rate).
It has been argued in the past that rapid growth is inconsistent with
reducing the degree of income inequality.
not necessarily the case.

However, this is shown to be

What seems to be more important is the type

of growth generated and the distribution of the benefits.

In part two the patterns of demographic change and employment in the
case of Fiji are studied.

It is shown that the structure of employment

and underemployment in Fiji is such that a concerted effort to create new
employment opportunities in rural areas is required in order to achieve
significant progress towards reducing the overall degree of income inequality.
It is also shown that continuing efforts are required to reduce the rate
of population growth by lowering fertility rates, in order to reduce the
pressure of population on land in rural areas and limit the rate of growth
of the workforce to the growth of new employment opportunities.
In the third part the focus shifts to the criteria for judging the
relative merits of plans and evaluating their outcomes.

The value

judgements involved in defining an equality-preferring social welfare
function are discussed by drawing on modern welfare economics literature.
The status of the Gini index as an appropriate indicator of inequality is
examined with reference to an empirical estimation of inequality in Fiji.
It is reaffirmed that the nationwide degree of income inequality in Fiji
is primarily determined by large differences between average rural and
urban income levels.
In part four the problem of a potential conflict between the twin
objectives of growth and reduced inequality is addressed by using a static
semi-closed input-output model of the Fiji economy.

The model provides

consistent output and employment responses to alternative patterns of
consumer demand based upon alternative simulated income distribution
patterns.

A distinction is drawn between consistent solutions and feasible

solutions, the latter requiring the imposition of supply constraints which
are absent from the simulations reported in this analysis.

The results

indicate that a modest redistribution of income in Fiji, leading to a
more even income distribution, would be consistent with higher aggregate
employment, output and income levels, and need not reduce the rate of
growth of the national income.

(i)
PREFACE

When the foundations of the theory are discussed
in print, one gets the impression that the author is
impatient - impatient to get on with the job of reaching
ambiguous conclusions. A serious economist hardly likes
to be caught at the trivial occupation of discussing
foundations.
(Little (1950) pp.3-4).
It will be argued in this thesis that an important prerequisite to
the building of equity-oriented planning models is an assessment of the
fundamental conceptual issues involved.

The foundations of model building

consist firstly of the identification of the key relationships and how
they work, and secondly, of the identification of measurable attributes
of these key relationships and the processing of the data.

The study was

motivated by an interest in relationships associated with the effects of
economic growth on income distribution, and the effects of income
redistribution on economic growth.

The important conceptual problems

that affected the preparation of data are those associated with the
concept and measurement of employment and the degree of income inequality.
A number of authors have shown that it is possible to construct a planning
model within which known feasible policies can alter the distribution of
income among households with predictable effects upon employment
opportunities and output growth, and that in such models these effects
may in turn react upon income distribution and reinforce the initial
change.
(1973)).

One of the best examples of this is the BACHUE model (I.L.O.
Despite the thought which has gone into the building of such

models, the profession remains far from a consensus about the above
mentioned relationships and conceptual problems.

There is therefore a

useful contribution to be made in sorting out these fundamental issues.
The following provides a broad picture of the approach used and the
main conclusions.

Part I of the thesis, consisting of the first three

chapters, is an empirical study of the relationships between income
distribution and economic growth based upon international evidence.

The

setting of the problem is outlined in the introduction to Chapter One,
where it is established that conventional development theory suggests a
conflict between the goals of rapid economic growth and reduced income
inequality.

The empirical evidence analysed in Chapter Two suggests

that this is not necessarily the case.

On the contrary, rapid growth of

per capita income offers the potential for improving the income share of
the poor.

Aside from the rate of growth of per capita income there are

forces commonly associated with economic development in the long term
which are shown to have a significant effect on inequality of income
distribution.

Two of the most important influences on inequality are

found to operate through the structure of employment and through
demographic factors.

These and other conclusions from the empirical

study of international variations in inequality are explained in Chapter
Three.

It is argued that certain of these relationships which are

responsive to policy intervention in the long term should form the
cornerstone of development planning frameworks in individual countries
where distributional considerations have high priority.
Thereafter the empirical analysis is confined to the case of Fiji
with detailed studies of demographic change (Chapter Four), employment
structure (Chapter Six) and income distribution (Chapter Eight) in that
country.

Each of these chapters has an introduction and a summary

section to provide the reader with the essential features of the argument.
It is shown that income inequality in Fiji is primarily associated with
the wide gap between average income levels in urban areas on one hand
and rural areas on the other.

This rural-urban income gap, combined

with rapid growth of the workforce and consequent population pressure
on land in rural areas, has induced a high rate of rural-to-urban
migration.

Under such circumstances it is argued that an equity-oriented

planning framework would need to give considerable attention to the

(iii)

creation of new income-earning opportunities in rural areas.
Two fundamental theoretical problems had to be addressed before the
empirical analysis for Fiji could be satisfactorily interpreted.

The

first was the problem of the concept and measurement of employment and
underemployment in developing countries in general.
devoted to an analysis of this problem.

Chapter Five is

It is argued that the concept

of employment in developing countries is different from that in developed
countries and therefore requires different methods of analysis and
approaches to measurement.

This theoretical analysis forms the basis

of the empirical analysis of employment in Fiji in Chapter Six.
The second theoretical problem was associated with the measurement
of the degree of income inequality.

Indices of inequality are often

presented as measuring the degree of inequality in some objective sense.
Yet it has been shown that different indices register different
sensitivities to income transfers between rich and poor, and so certain
ethical judgements are embodied in any attempt to measure the degree of
income inequality.

Analysis of this problem leads naturally to the

evaluation of inequality in a social welfare function - that is, to
making these ethical judgements explicit for the purpose of ordering
alternative social states and ultimately of evaluating the outcomes of
alternative development plans.

These issues are the subject of Chapter

Seven which has an introduction and a summary section to draw together
the threads of this part of the argument.
The question of how income redistribution would affect the structure
and growth performance of an economy is largely an empirical one.
Different effects have been reported in case studies of different
countries, some on the basis of historical observations and some on the
basis of numerical simulations.

In Chapter Nine it is shown that the

simulated effects of income redistribution from rich to poor households

in the Fiji economy would result in a higher level of aggregate
employment, higher levels of industry outputs (particularly in industries
serving domestic consumer demand) and a higher level of household
disposable income.

In addition, it is suggested that this would not

necessarily reduce the rate of growth of national income.

The results

of the simulated redistributions are reported in detail from page 298.
It should be noted that there are important questions which remain
unanswered here and which limit the scope of the study.

These questions

relate to (i) specific policies to achieve the desired distribution of
income, (ii) inter-temporal consistency of the desired effects, and
(iii) the effects of supply constraints as a determinant of the technical
feasibility of redistributive policies.

The reason that these questions

are regarded as falling beyond the scope of this thesis is that they
relate primarily to technical (and also political) problems in the design
of an actual model, and not to the fundamental relationships which
equity-oriented plans ought to address and which I am trying to explain.
The design of an actual model depends very much on the specific uses to
which it will be put (i.e. on the questions asked of it) and on the
feasible policy alternatives that are open to particular governments.
My current work in the National Planning Office of Papua New Guinea is
providing me with a valuable opportunity to extend some of my earlier
research on the design of planning models, and in particular dynamic
input-output models, in response to specific problems based upon the
conceptual foundations which this thesis argues are very important.
In my analysis of the foundations of equity-oriented planning
frameworks I have used analytical techniques which for the most part
are conventional, but they have been applied in combinations which
support stronger conclusions than similar studies.

This is the case,

for instance, in Chapter Two which uses factor analysis as a preliminary

(V)

screening device to identify important relationships for study using
regression analysis.

Similarly, Chapter Four combines standard demographic

projection techniques with statistical analysis and empirical information
to identify variables in population forecasting which are important for
the thesis.

In Chapter Nine the solution to a static input-output

consistency model is appraised for macroeconomic feasibility with the
aid of a conventional resource-gap test.

For present purposes this

provides an adequate assessment of the direction and relative magnitude
of the potential effects of income redistribution on the Fiji economy.
Fiji had a number of attractions as a case study and as a basis for
the exposition of some general propositions.

Reduction of income

inequality is accorded a high priority by the Government of Fiji.

In

recent development plans the inequality problem in Fiji has been
identified as being primarily associated with differences in average
income levels between urban and rural areas.

The approach of the

Government to this problem is to direct resources into rural development
and I have argued that this is a sound approach, especially with regard
to the creation of new income earning opportunities in rural areas.
Many observers of the political economy of Fiji regard the income
distribution question in that country as being bound to the racial
distribution of economic opportunities between the indigenous Fijians,
Indo-Fijians (descendants of Indian immigrants), and the small European/
Chinese group.
The picture that emerges is roughly that of a threetier society in which the European/Chinese group
manages and operates the large corporations and
institutions, often on behalf of foreign owners. The
Indians own and operate most of the medium to smallscale enterprises, including most of the commercial
farming, whilst the Fijians own most of the land and
are still very heavily engaged in a non-monetary, but
affluent, subsistence sector. All are well off by
comparison with many similar groups in other lands of
the less-developed world.
(Fisk (1970) p.42).

(Vi)

I have sought to provide an analysis which is rather more general,
relating to differences between households only in respect of their
income levels.

As such it is hoped that the analysis will be useful

not only to planners and students in Fiji but also in other countries
where the organisation of society is different.
In the course of my research for this thesis I visited Fiji on two
occasions.

While there I was fortunate to have some discussions with

officials in the Central Planning Office and the Bureau of Statistics,
and to travel on the main island of Viti Levu.

My supervisor, Dr. Shamsher

Ali, himself a citizen of Fiji, provided valuable background information
in many interesting discussions.

I would like to thank these people for

broadening my understanding of Fiji.

I would also like to acknowledge

the assistance given to me by several people at the University of
Wollongong.

Professor K.A. Blakey, joint supervisor with Dr. S. Ali,

and Mr. R.G. Castle gave very valuable comments on earlier drafts of the
thesis.

I would like to record my appreciation to them for allowing me

the freedom to pursue my own interests and ideas.

I would also like to

thank Dr. A.M. McGregor for helpful comments on the regression analysis
in Chapter Two, and Professor M.G.A. Wilson for guidance with the
demographic analysis in Chapter Four.

Professor W.P. Hogan of Sydney

University suggested the data sensitivity test which resulted in the
Appendix to Chapter One and which enhanced the confidence in the results
of the regression analysis.

Subhan Ali provided assistance with the

mathematical proofs in the Appendix to Chapter Seven and had an important
influence on the development of my interest in mathematical approaches
to economic problems.

I owe an intellectual debt to the rich field of

research made available through the auspices of the International Labour
Organisation's World Employment Programme.

My early interest in this

subject was very much influenced by the reports of several I.L.O. country

(vii)

employment missions.

The discussion of the theoretical issues here

argued to be important has drawn particularly on work by Professor A.K.
Sen.

Muriel Inglis typed the text of the dissertation under difficult

conditions and to her I owe a special debt of gratitude.

I would also

like to thank my wife, Narelle, for typing some earlier papers and most
importantly for her unfailing encouragement during the course of my
studies.

Last but not least I would like to thank my parents for the

opportunities they have given me.

Any remaining errors are my own

responsibility.

J.F. Guest,
December, 1979.
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PART I
Income Distribution and Economic Development

1.

CHAPTER 1
Income Distribution Changes in the Course
of Economic Growth:

1.1

an Overview

Introduction
Modern theories of economic development for low-income

countries contain a clear implication that the degree of inequality
in the size distribution of income will increase in the early
stages of growth.1

For example, in the dual economy models of

Lewis (1955) and Fei and Ranis (1964) the process of growth
involves drawing factors of production away from the large
traditional sector v/here per capita income is near subsistence
and labour productivity is low, and employing them in the modern
sector where profits and labour productivity are relatively high.
The link between intersectoral disparities in average income per
head and the inequality in the nationwide size distribution of
income may be forged by considering the latter as a weighted
average of the degree of inequality in each sector.

Intrasectoral

inequality is assumed to be greater in the modern sector than in
the traditional sector.

Thus disparities between the two sectors

in average income per head, and the degree of inequality in the
nationwide size distribution of income, should both increase and
continue to do so until the productivity of labour in the
erstwhile traditional sector begins to rise towards that of the
modern sector.
The "stages of growth" thesis due to Rostow (1971) similarly
predicts increasing inequality as an expected consequence of
1 The terminologies of "economic development", "inequality in the
size distribution of income", "growth" are treated elsewhere in
the thesis in detail.

2.

growth.

He defines the "take-off" as a period in the economic

history of a country during which new industries expand rapidly,
generating profits which in large measure are reinvested, and
stimulating further expansion through multiplier effects (backward
and forward linkages).

The whole process of expansion in the

modern sector yields higher income in the hands of those who save
at high rates and place their savings at the disposal of
investment-oriented modern sector activities.
The fundamental importance of the processes of saving and
capital accumulation as the major determinants of the rate of
growth is common to both types of theories.

It is not difficult

to see why the mainstream of thought in development economics in
the 1950's and 1960's considered a relatively high degree of
income inequality to be an unavoidable feature of "successful"
development.

The argument was based on the supposition that rich

households tend to save a much higher proportion of their income
than do poor households, and that the household sector is
relatively more important in developing countries than in developed
countries (vis-a-vis the corporate and government sectors) as a
source of investible finance.

This;implies that the more skewed

is the household income distribution in favour of the rich, the
higher will be the savings rate for given levels of national
income, and the faster will be the rates of capital accumulation
and growth.
A high degree of overall inequality was not by itself thought
to be inconsistent with raising the standard of living of the
poorer groups.

On the contrary, most Western observers were

content with the conjecture that the poor would be better off in
the long run consuming a given proportion of a rapidly growing

3.

national income, and receiving certain "trickle-down" benefits.
In the dual economy models, for example, rapid growth of the high
productivity urban sector generates demand for rural products for
consumption and intermediate use, as well as employment
opportunities for an increasing flow of migrants.

Many economists

also took for granted the possibility of large-scale public
transfers to the poor by taxation of high urban incomes to provide
rural services such as health, education, transport and electrif
ication.

However, the conventional wisdom of the 1950's and

1960's failed to recognise that rapid rises in aggregate income
would have the potential to further entrench certain vested
interest groups, and to permit some governments with weak fiscal
and transfer systems only to pay lip service to redistribution to
the poor, and that the high savings of the rich may be in
unproductive forms, unhelpful for economic development.
The hypothesis that income distribution tends to become
more unequal in the early stages of growth was supported by such
empirical evidence as did exist in the 1960's.

This evidence was

primarily due to Kuznets' (1963) study in which he demonstrated
the appearance of an inverted-U-pattern in the degree of inequality
against the level of per capita national income from a cross
section sample of eighteen countries.

That is, that income

inequality, which is relatively low in low-income countries,
tends to rise as we scan the spectrum of developing countries with
successively higher per capita incomes, and becomes less unequal
only when we reach economies that are among the most advanced.
Several more recent studies using larger samples have
supported the generalised inverted-U-pattern.

Adelman and

4.

Morris (1973) analysed a sample of forty-three developing
countries and noted that their findings were broadly in line with
Kuznets' earlier hypothesis.

Paukert (1973) expanded the

Adelman-Morris sample to fifty-six countries and demonstrated a
similar pattern.

Ahluwalia (1976) used source data from a

compilation of income distributions by Jain (1975) for a sample of
sixty countries in a multivariate regression analysis and
demonstrated a statistically significant quadratic relationship
of inequality with per capita income level.
The first half of the 1970's also witnessed the publication
of many case studies of the determinants of changes in income
inequality for particular countries.

Among those for Latin

American countries one may list the studies by Weisskoff (1970),
E.C.L.A. (1971), Fishlow (1972), Langoni (1973), Foxley and
Munoz (1974), Wells (1974).

Studies of Asian countries include

Oshima (1970), Sundrum (1972), Alamgir (1974),
Arndt (1975), Wada (1975), Renaud (1976).

Almost all of these

studies cite intersectoral disparities in average income as being
a very important determinant of the overall degree of inequality.2
Different authors have indicated other influences which assumed
varying degrees of importance in particular cases.
2

These include

Very broadly, this means that if the difference in average per
capita income between traditional and modern sectors is not
very great, then the overall degree of inequality in the
nationwide size distribution of income tends to be low in
relation to countries where intersectoral disparities are great.
The issue is rather more complex than this, however, depending
inter alia upon the distribution of income and employment
opportunities between industries within the modern sector, upon
land reforms in the traditional agricultural sector, and so on.
These and other issues are considered later. Although it would
add little to the thesis to examine each case study in detail,
some pertinent remarks on these studies are found in the
literature survey by Cline (1975).

5.

demographic changes, shifts in the structure of production within
the modern sector, and changes in labour force characteristics
such as the distribution of education and skills.

These influences

will be treated in more detail in the next Chapter.
There are two features of this recent research which are
particularly important for the purposes of my study.

The first

concerns the wide variability in income distribution patterns
across countries which the inverted-U hypothesis alone does not
explain, but which may be better explained with additional
reference to the many other relationships which have been found to
be important.

In seeking to account for this observed variability

using multiple regression analysis, this study is similar in
method to that by Ahluwalia (1976), although there are some
important differences in the results.

Each of the literature

surveys by Reder (1969), Cline (1975) and Sahota (1978) shows that
no single adequate theoretical framework exists for analysing
the relationship between economic growth and the distribution of
income.

Cline (1975) concludes that an eclectic approach to

income distribution theory for developing countries is appropriate.
In the absence of a properly integrated theoretical framework, it
is necessary first of all, to consider certain very general
specifications of relationships which have been shown to be
important by various researchers, secondly to define measurable
variables that represent these relationships, and thirdly to
attempt to simplify the empirical data into sets of key relation
ships which are manageable and which provide the basis for
formulating more rigorous hypotheses.
of Chapter 2.

This is the main subject

6.

The second feature derives from the conclusion by Adelman
and Morris (1973), and echoed in certain case studies (notably
those for Brazil by Fishlow (1972) and Langoni (1973)), that not
only does the relative position of the poorer groups tend to
decline in the early and middle stages of growth, but their
absolute position also tends to deteriorate as a direct consequence
of a complex of structural changes that typically accompany
economic growth.

Adelman and Morris further concluded that there

is neither an automatic nor even a likely trickling down of the
benefits of economic growth to the poorest groups in developing
countries, and that only for the most socio-economically advanced
of these countries was the reduction in inequality from the
expected inverted-U-pattern significant.

Paukert (1973) has noted

that the particular method of analysis of variance used by
Adelman and Morris is not appropriate for analysing a non-linear
relationship between income inequality and the level of economic
development because it is aimed at assessing only the relative
importance of several different factors influencing inter-country
differences in income distribution.

Cline (1975) has similarly

criticised the Adelman-Morris study because of their "indirect
and misleading" methodology.

He noted that a more direct test of

the hypothesis would consider the regressions reported by Adelman
and Morris in an appendix to their book, none of which shows a
statistically significant decline in absolute income level for the
poorest groups as per capita national income rises.

Therefore

it is important to re-examine the available evidence on the
relationship between inequality and the complex of structural
changes that are typically associated with economic development.

7.

The use of cross-section data for these purposes is dictated
by the lack of sufficient time-series data on income distribution
in developing countries.

This may seem to imply a belief that

valuable generalisations can be derived from a dynamic interpret
ation of cross-section results:

that is, in the process of

growth, a typical developing country will share characteristics
with other countries at similar successive levels of development.
However, in order to avoid any excessively deterministic set of
presumptions it must be stressed that the generalisations which
are discussed in this chapter and the next should be regarded as
hypotheses that merit further investigation in the context of
individual country experiences.

While the cross-section results

show relationships which are important for developing countries
in general, particular results will have different degrees of
importance in different countries depending on the circumstances
of those individual countries.
Another difficulty arising from the lack of adequate timeseries data on income distribution (as well as some cross-section
data) can be described by drawing a distinction between, on one
hand, those changes in the size distribution of income which can
properly be attributed to shifts in the production structure that
typically accompany the economic growth process in developing
countries (say, over the past generation), and on the other hand,
those characteristics which are more appropriately attributable to
the organisation of institutional arrangements in developing
countries and to their historically determined patterns of wealth

8.

distribution and relative factor endowments.3

Clearly the latter

are important considerations in discussions of income inequality.
For example, Chenery et. al. (1975) have designed a model to
consider how both the lack of access to income-earning opportunities
and the lack of physical and human capital prevent the poorest
groups in developing countries from participating fully in the
growth process.

Because of lack of data, however, it was not

possible in this study to consider variables relating to the
organisation of institutional relationships or the distribution of
income-generating capital.

Accordingly the analysis concentrates

upon changes in income distribution associated with shifts in the
structure of production in the course of economic growth.

1.2

Income distribution data
The recent publication of a compendium of income distribution

estimates for eighty-one countries by Jain (1975) provides an
opportunity to examine international variations in income
inequality and to evaluate the hypothesis of a systematic
relationship between the distribution of income and forces which
typically accompany economic growth.

It is necessary first of all

to mention the caveats on the quality and comparability of such
data.

These problems are discussed by several researchers in this

field (Kravis (1960),

Kuznets (1963), Oshima (1970), Jain (1975),

Ahluwalia (1976)) but usually very little is done about them.
3

This distinction is made most succinctly by Sundrum (1974), but
was touched on by Kuznets (1963) in the introduction to his
paper.
It may be noted at this point that the paper by
Sundrum (1974) was very illuminating as a reference for
organising the aspects of inequality which are relevant to
this study.
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It is often suggested that sample surveys from which income
distribution data are drawn may be designed on the basis of an
inadequate sampling frame.

For example, if the most recent

national census is ten years old and there has been substantial
internal migration in the interim period, then a survey designed
on the basis of the census will not reflect the true population
distribution.

The concept of "income" is itself difficult to

define and measure, since high income groups typically understate
their true income because of fears of tax liabilities, and low
income groups in developing countries typically produce much of
their own consumption which is difficult to value.

Further,

different groups often face different prices for purchased
commodities so that money income differentials do not accurately
reflect real income differentials.

Different surveys solicit

information on the basis of a number of alternative accounting
units including, for example, households, income recipients,
members of the economically active population, and so on.

There

are important problems of portability of such definitions across
national borders.

Clearly the concept of a "household" is very

different in developed countries from the appropriate concept of
"household" in developing countries.

Similarly the difficulties of

conceptualising and enumerating the "economically active population"
in developing countries are attested by the vast literature on
the subject.
In the compilation of income distribution estimates used as
source data for this study (Jain (1975)) the unit of account varies
from survey to survey and from country to country.

At first a

group of thirty-five countries was selected based on the "household"
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as the unit of account, and twenty-six countries with distributions
based on "income recipients" - a total of sixty-one country income
distributions.

Of these, twelve countries had data based on both

units of account, and so the distributions for these countries
which permitted the least unexplained variation in the preliminary
regression runs (the basis of Chapter 2) were accepted:
accepted from each unit of account.

six were

A further six countries were

excluded because comparable data to measure the other variables in
the study (as discussed in Chapter 2) were not available.

The

final sample thus consisted of forty-three countries - thirty
developing countries and thirteen developed countries.
It was found that the range of values of each decile income
share was larger for income-recipient-based-distributions than for
household-based-distributions.

It was also found that the mean

income share of the richest decile was larger (and the mean income
share of the lower deciles correspondingly smaller) for incomerecipient-based-distributions than for household-based-distributions.
The sources of these differences can be explained by the occurrence
of more than one "income recipient" in many of the "households"
at the low end of the income scale which would, ceteris paribus,
tend to even out the degree of inequality otherwise observed on
the basis of individual income earners.

These differences have

been consistently ignored by other researchers in this field and
no attempt was made to improve the comparability of the
distributions on these grounds.

This may be justified by

recalling that the definitions of a "household" and of an "income
recipient" themselves vary from country to country, and from
time to time within any given country.

Correcting the raw data
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for such variations would be impracticable.

Moreover, anv

additional precision gained by considering only those distributions
based nominally upon one particular unit of account would be
trivial under such circumstances, and may even jeopardise the
drawing of statistical inferences by reducing the sample size.
It was decided, therefore, to make cautious use of the available
data.
There were also more fundamental welfare implications
involved in drawing international comparisons of income inequality.
For example, it is possible that two Lorenz curves for two
different countries may cross one another, yet still give the
same value of the Gini index:

one curve is closer to the

egalitarian line at the low end of the income scale, and the
other is closer to the egalitarian line at the high end of the
income scale.4

The difficulty in this problem is reduced in this

chapter and the next by considering explicitly the different
groupings that comprise the income scale (low, middle and high
income groups), and not an aggregative index of inequality.
The thirty developing countries and thirteen developed
countries chosen for the sample are ranked in Table 1.1 by the
level of per capita gross domestic income in the year of the
given distribution survey.

Gross domestic income (GDY) is a

national accounting aggregate taken from the World Bank (1976).
It is based upon the more familiar gross domestic product (GDP) in
4

This problem is discussed in Atkinson (1970), and is the subject
of a later chapter in the dissertation, where it is discussed in
terms of the relative aversion from inequality of a nation-state
and the relative weights attached to equal absolute income
transfers at different ends of the income scale.
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TABLE 1.1

SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME FOR 43 COUNTRIES RANKED BY PER CAPITA
GROSS DOMESTIC INCOME* IN THE YEAR OF THE DISTRIBUTION SURVEY
PER
CAPIT*
GDY $

PER
CAPIT**
GDP $

COUNTRY (YEAR)
Under $200
Indonesia (1971)
Malawi (1969)
Bangladesh (1967)
Tanzania (1967)
India (1964)
Sri Lanka (1970)
Thailand (1962)
Kenya (1969)
Pakistan (1970)
Egypt (1965)
Group I Average:

64
66
84
87
87
92
121
131
151
198
108

250
157

$201-$400
Rep. Korea (1970)
Philippines (1971)
Tunisia (1970)
Honduras (1968)
Ivory Coast (1970)
Colombia (1970)
Fiji (1968)
Malaysia (1970)
Turkey (1968)
Brazil (1970)
Group II Average:

229
238
264
270
294
332
336
353
362
396
308

$401-$1000
Costa Rica (1971)
Mexico (1969)
Gabon (1968)
Chile (1968)
Barbados (1970)
Uruguay (1967)
Panama (1970)
Spain (1965)
Argentina (1961)
Venezuela (1962)
Group III Average:
Over $1000
Finland (1962)
Netherlands (1967)
Norway (1963)
U.K. (1968)
Japan (1972)
France (1962)
New Zealand (1970)
Australia (1968)
Denmark (1966)
F.R. Germany (1970)
Canada (1965)
Sweden (1970)
U.S.A. (1970)
Group IV Average:

LOW
20%

LOW
40%

MID
40%

TOP
20%

GINI
RATIO

6..8
5. 7
7. 9
5..1
5.,5
6.,9
5. 7
3..9
8..0
4..6

■1

17..3
15..0
19,.6
13..5
15..5
17..8
13..2
9..5
20..2
14..1
15..6

30.,7
32..1
38..1
30..8
32..6
37..3
29..3
23..6
38..0
37..5
33..0

52.,0
52.,9
42.,3
55.,7
51.,9
44..9
57.,5
66..9
41..8
48..4
51..4

.4625
.4696
.3420
.5033
.4668
.3771
.5103
.6368
.3362
.4337
.4538

1018
520
320
444
340
755
668
692
763
800
632

7..1
3..9
4..2
1 ..6
3..9
2..9
4..0
3..3
2..9
2..8
3.

17..7
11..9
11..4
6,.4
10,.6
10..0
12,.1
11,.3
9,.4
8,.1
10,,9

37,.8
34..1
33,.1
28..3
30,.9
30,.5
35,.5
33,.5
30,.0
24,.6
31..8

44..5
54..0
55,.5
65..3
58,.5
59,.5
52,.4
55..2
60,.6
67,.3
57,.3

.3719
.4941
.5019
.6188
.5342
.5615
.4600
.5131
.5679
.6465
.5270

507
594
598
662
666
683
693
706
781
943
683

838
1158
791
1265
1110
1465
952
1280
1586
1679
1212

5,.4
4..2
3.,2
4.,8
6..8
4..4
4..1
6.,0
5.,1
3..3
4.

14,.6
10,.2
8,.5
13,.0
18..6
14,.2
13,.8
16,.5
14,.4
9,.6
13,.3

35,.0
26..6
24,.0
31,.2
37,.4
38,.3
36..9
38,.0
31,.4
31,.4
33,.0

50,.4
63,.2
67,.5
55,.8
44..0
47..5
49..3
45,,5
53..9
59,.0
53,.6

.4445
.5827
.6439
.5065
.3690
.4279
.4483
.3930
.4895
.5445
74850

1520
1891
1911
1949
1950
1955
2060
2254
2462
2574
2902
3737
4428
2430

2334
3161
2631
3592
2619
2449
3133
3837
3306
3255
4179
4006
5411
3378

2,.7
4,.0
4,.7
6 .6
8 .2
2,.3
4,.9
7..1
5 .4
5,.9
6,.7
5,.2
4,.8
5,.3

11,.7
13,.7
17 .1
18,.5
20 .9
10,.0
16 .7
20 .0
16 .9
16 .4
19 .0
16 .2
15,.3
16 .3

37,.9
37 .0
41 .9
41 .2
39,.8
35 .3
41,.3
41 .1
40,.9
38 .0
41 .0
39,.7
38 .9
39 .5

50,.4
49,.3
41,.0
40 .3
39,.3
54 .7
42 .0
38 .9
42 .2
45 .6
40 .0
44 .1
45 .8
44,.1

.4729
.4493
.3622
.3385
.3106
.5176
.3708
.3185
.3673
.3939
.3333
.3872
.4074
.3869

-

157
308
378
278
385
361
581
317

Source: Income shares for various percentiles are derived from Jain
with the exception of Fiji (1968) for which data is derived from a Lorenz
curve fitted to data from M. Ward The Role of Investment in the Development
of Fiji, Cambridge U.P., 1971. The Lorenz curve for Fiji was estimated
using the same technique as Jain uses (Kakwani-Podder method).
*Gross domestic income in $US (1967-69 prices).
from World Tables 1976

Conversion by exchange rates

**GDP predicted by physical indicators correlated with real per capita
product estimates obtained by repricing.
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national currency units, converted into U.S. dollars using official
exchange rates, corrected for variations in the terms of trade,
and expressed in constant prices of 1967-69.

The second column of

figures in Table 1.1 shows estimates of real per capita GDP which
were obtained using a technique described in the Appendix to this
chapter.

These figures are used in Chapter 2 to test the

sensitivity of the results to an alternative specification of
per capita purchasing power.

The remaining columns in Table 1.1

summarise relevant information on income distribution.

The shares

of income accruing to the poorest 20% of income earners (i.e. the
ninth and tenth deciles of the income distribution), the poorest
40% (i.e. the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth deciles), the
middle 40% (here taken to be the third, fourth, fifth and sixth
deciles), and the richest 20% (i.e. the first and second deciles)
of the income scale for each country are shown.

The Gini ratio is

also listed as a summary indicator of the overall degree of
inequality, but this is for illustrative purposes only and does
not enter the analysis later on.

As is well known by researchers

using Lorenz curves, it is difficult to measure sufficient
variation in the income share of the poorest decile in an income
distribution.

Analysing variations in the income share of the

poorest quintile is as close as we can come for providing
generalisations about those experiencing worst poverty.

There is

considerable variation at the top end of the distribution scale
(say, for the richest 5% of income recipients), but consideration
of the richest 20% is sufficient for present purposes.
The ll-pattern of inequality variation in the course of
development, postulated by Kuznets, may be revealed by dividing
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the developing countries in Table 1.1 into three groups of ten
countries each (by per capita gross domestic income:-

under $200,

$201-$400, $401-$1000), and letting the developed countries form
a fourth group, and then calculating the unweighted group averages
of each income share column.

In particular the information in

Table 1.1 shows :
(1)

The income shares accruing to the richest percentiles of the
population confirm Kuznets' hypothesis that the ineguality
in less developed countries is primarily associated with
concentration of income in the hands of the rich.

For

example, the top 20% of the population in very low income
countries (group 1) typically receive about 50% of the
national income.
In group II countries the richest quintile accounts for
much more than 50% and typically as much as 60% of income.
For group III countries the average share of the top
quintile is still high at about 54%.

The average for the

developed countries of group IV is 44% and for some of these
the top quintile receives less than 40% of national income.
(2)

This pattern is mirror-reversed when one considers the
lowest percentiles of the distributions.

For example, the

lowest 40% of income earners receive on average 15.6% of
income in group I countries, 10.9% in group II, 13.3% in
group III, and 16.3% in group IV.

Kuznets, however, thought

that there was not much difference in relative income shares
at the low end of the scale, and the information in Table 1.1
would appear to be at variance with this.

Rather it would

seem to be the case that both the high and the low income
groups conform to the U-pattern of change overall.

(3)

The group averages for the share of the middle 40% of income
recipients in Table l.T confirm Kuznets' findings of no
significant difference for the developing countries at either
early or middle levels of development.

Typically the middle

40% accounts for only 30% of the total income in developing
countries, but for very close to 40% of total income in the
developed countries.
The overall patterns evident in Table 1.1 should not be
permitted to distract our attention from the wide variations in
inequality between countries at similar levels of development.
For instance, within group I, contrast the extremely high degree
of inequality of Kenya and Tanzania on one hand, with the low
inequality of Pakistan and Sri Lanka on the other.

South Korea

appears to be very much out of place in group II, and among
developing countries generally, with her remarkably low degree of
inequality.

Conversely, France appears to be an exception in

group IV with her relatively high degree of inequality.

The

inverted-U-pattern does not explain all of the variation in the
degree of inequality occurring during the course of economic
development.

The following chapter assesses the relative strength

of additional aspects of the nexus between income distribution
and development.
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APPENDIX:

Per capita income comparisons:

'

In the previous section it was noted that the measurement
error associated with international comparisons of economic
phenomena is not trivial and that most researchers simply state
the appropriate caveats on their results in view of this problem.
It has been noted in section 1.1 that the U-shaped relationship
between inequality and economic development is widely acknowledged,
and the level of per capita income is often taken as a fair
indicator of the level of development of a country.

It is

therefore necessary to take the problems associated with
international comparisons of per capita income levels very
seriously.

In particular the conversion of per capita GDP by

official exchange rates has been criticised as methodologically
unsound for certain purposes (Barlow (1977)).

Fortunately it is

possible to consider the sensitivity of the results presented below
to different estimates of per capita income.
Conceptually the best method for comparing real per capita
product levels in different countries is the technique of
repricing developed by Gilbert and Kravis (1954) and Kravis (1976).
Because of the extensive work required in the collection of data,
repricing estimates are not available for most countries.
Beckerman and Bacon (1966) have shown that very high cross-section
correlations may be obtained between repricing estimates of real
per capita product on one hand, and various non-monetary
indicators of output on the other (e.g. energy consumption, cement
production).

The regression equations based on such physical

indicators may then be used to predict real per capita product for
those countries and years for which the repricing estimate is not
available.

This approach has been shown by Barlow (1977) to be a
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desirable "second-best" procedure and unbiased as compared with
exchange conversion.

Barlow showed that GDP conversions lo U.S.

dollars using official exchange rates are almost always less than
the appropriate repricing estimates, and that the mean error of
estimation using exchange conversion is twenty-five percent.
On the other hand, as regards the predicted real output from
physical indicators, half of those estimates were above the
appropriate repricing estimate and half were below it, with a
mean absolute error of sixteen percent.
Those countries for which comparable repricing estimates of
real per capita GDP are available for 1970 are listed in Table A.l.
The indices (U.S.A. = 100) shown for the developed countries and
for India and Kenya are given by Kravis (1976).

The inclusion of

the indices for the Latin American countries provided by
Salazar-Carillo (1977) means that the data are more representative
of the complete income range than were any earlier studies based
only on developed countries.
Table A.2 lists a selection of non-monetary indicators which
have been used as explanatory variables in a regression analysis
using repricing GDP estimates as the dependent variable.

The

first six physical indicators are flow variables and the remainder
are stock variables.

Ordinary least squares regressions were

calculated for many different combinations of the physical
indicators, in a search for that combination leaving the least
unexplained variation in real per capita GDP data listed in
Table A.l

(i.e. maximum adjusted R2 ) but subject to the condition

that the regression coefficients be statistically significant
at the 5% level.

Both the linear and the double-logarithmic

(constant elasticity) functional forms were tested.
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TABLE A.1
REAL PER CAPITA PRODUCT FOR 21 COUNTRIES (1970)
ESTIMATED BY REPRICING (INDEX: U.S.A. = 100)
COUNTRY

INDEX

Kenya
India
Bolivia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Brazi1
Colombia
Peru
Chi 1e
Mexico
Uruguay
Venezuela
Argentina
Italy
United Kingdom
Japan
Belgium
Netherlands
France
West Germany
United States

6
7
8
12
12
16
16
17
29
29
31
31
35
46
60
62
72
72
75
75
100

ESTIMATED REAL GDP
PER CAPITA ($US)
293
341
390
585
585
780
780
829
1415
1415
1512
1512
1707
2244
2927
3024
3512
3512
3659
3659
4878

Sources: Kravis (1976), Salazar-Carillo 0977)

TABLE A.2
LIST OF NON-MONETARY INDICATORS USED AS EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
IN REGRESSIONS ON REAL PER CAPITA PRODUCT ESTIMATES OBTAINED
BY REPRICING (21 COUNTRIES, 1970)
XI
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
X7
X8
X9
X10
Xll
X12
X13

Per capita energy consumption in kilograms of coal equivalent per year
H
"
protein supply in grams per day
II
II
electricity consumption in kilowatt hours per year
11
"
newsprint consumption in kilograms per year
H
"
steel consumption in kilograms per year
11 cement production in tonnes per year
"
Per 1000 population - number of doctors
"
11
"
number of hospital beds
11 II
"
number of radio receivers
II
"
"
number of passenger cars
II
11
"
number of telephones
"
"
"
number of commercial vehicles
II
"
number of motor vehicles (X10 + X12)

Data Sources:
Note:

World Bank (1976)

XI and X3 were not both included in the same test equation; similarly
X7 and X8; similarly X10, X12, X13.

TABLE A.3
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PHYSICAL INDICATORS OF GDP
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: REAL PER CAPITA PRODUCT ESTIMATED
BY REPRICING (21 COUNTRIES; 1970)
4(a)

Linear form - standardised coefficients only

GDP = 0.450X1
(5.2)

0.203X2
(3.4)
+

0.222X2
(3.1)

GDP =

4(b)

+

0.347X4
(3.7)

(R2 )

+

0.421X5
(4.8)

(.959)

+

0.508X5
(5.2)

(.941)

Double logarithmic form - standardised coefficients only

(R2 )

log GDP =

0.1951ogX2
(2.7)

+

0.5751ogX4
(5.6)

+

0.2921og X5
(3.3)

(.948)

log GDP =

0.6231ogX1 +
(5.6)

0.1361ogX2
(2.4)

+

0.2731ogX4
(2.5)

(.970)

Note:

t =0.05 (17 d.f.) = 1 .74
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The most satisfactory predictors of real per capita product
for the twenty-one countries listed in Table A.l were XI (energy
consumption), X2 (protein supply), X4 (newsprint consumption) and
X5 (steel consumption).

That is to say, these variables taken

together in certain combinations provided statistically significant
regression coefficients and least unexplained variation in the
dependent variable.
Table A.3.

The best regression results are shown in

Only standardised regression coefficients (sometimes

called "beta weights") are shown with their associated t values
in brackets underneath.

Beta weights facilitate the comparison of

the effects of variables that have different units of measurement
(e.g. kilograms per year, grams per day).

Regression results that

are not statistically significant are not reported here, neither
are they reported in Chapter 2 unless the qualitative
interpretation of the relationships is altered.

Note that the

intercept term in equations expressed in standardised coefficients
is redundant, although the unstandardised regression coefficients
with the intercept term were used to calculate predicted real
per capita income.

The last equation in Table A.3, the double

logarithmic form using XI, X2 and X4 (energy consumption, protein
supply, and newsprint consumption) as explanatory variables, was
the equation used to calculate real per capita product estimates
for the forty-two countries shown in the second column of Table 1.1.
These estimates were in turn used as an alternative approximation
of GDP to the estimates obtained by official exchange conversions
in regressions on income shares (Chapter 2).
The above procedure does not remove all of the measurement
error associated with estimates of per capita income levels.
The conceptual problems, sampling problems and response problems

20.

mentioned in section 1.2 remain as caveats on the data.

If the

appropriate repricing estimates of real per capita GDP were
available for all countries and for each year then the known
downward bias introduced into international comparisons of per
capita GDP by official exchange rate conversion to U.S. dollars
could be removed.

However, in the absence of the appropriate

repricing estimates of real per capita GDP, the above procedure is
an apparently acceptable and desirable "second best" approach to
removing some of the error of international comparisons using
exchange rate conversion.

The high adjusted R 2 (0.970), and the

satisfactory statistical significance of the coefficients in the
predicting equation in Table A.3, are indeed encouraging in this
respect.
It will be shown later that the regression results explaining
variation in income shares (Chapter 2) are not greatly affected by
using alternative estimates of real per capita income (and also of
the growth rate of per capita income).

It will then be argued that

the use of the procedure outlined in this Appendix as a sensitivity
test on the regression results is justified by reducing the force
of criticism directed at the database of this study.
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CHAPTER 2
Econometric Analysis of International Variations in
Income Distribution
2.1

Selection of variables
In the previous chapter it was shown that there is a

considerable amount of variation between countries in observed
income inequality.

It is possible to account for a large

proportion of this variation using multivariate techniques with
variables chosen to reflect aspects of the inequality problem
about which economists have speculated in recent years.

In addition

to the inverted-U hypothesis, these include the effects of
demographic transition, changes in the pattern of education, and
shifts in the structure of employment and production associated
with dualism . 1

The selected variables are shown in italics in this

section and are listed on the left of Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
The level of development can be approximated in a global sense
by the logarithm of real per capita i n c o m e , with a quadratic term
in this variable being introduced to accommodate the inverted-U
hypothesis.

The logarithmic transformation implies the additional

hypothesis that increments of income share accruing to a particular
group are linearly related to successive proportional increases in
per capita income, not to absolute dollar increases in average
income level.

It thus serves also to collapse the high range of

incomes in the sample, which includes developed countries with
nominal per capita incomes twenty times as high as the low income
countries.
1 These aspects of income inequality in developing countries are

discussed succinctly by Sundrum (1974). A more detailed
appreciation of their effects in particular circumstances has been
gleaned from examination of the case studies listed in Chapter 1 ,
as well as other references cited there.
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The rate of growth of real per capita income over the ten
gears preceeding each country's income distribution observation

is included as an explanatory variable in the regressions, in
order to indicate whether the speed of growth (as opposed to the
level of development) has any significant effect on observed
inequality.

In the regressions using the level of per capita

income estimated by exchange rate conversion (that is,
equations (a), (b), (d) and (e) in each of Tables 2.3-2.6), the
ten-year growth rate variable was calculated as the average annual
growth of real per capita gross domestic income in 1967-69 prices
by exchange rate conversion.

However, in those equations using real

per capita income predicted from physical indicators (that is,
equations (c) and (f) in each of Tables 2.3-2.6) the ten-year
growth rate variable was calculated from real per capita GDP series
in the currency of each country.

This provides an additional test

of sensitivity to alternative data specifications which is
consistent with the alternative estimates of the level of real
per capita income as discussed in the Appendix to Chapter 1.
It should also be noted that since income distribution observations
are recorded for different years for different countries in the
sample, the fixed ten-year growth effect will be complicated by
a variety of international cyclical effects for different
countries.
Two other variables were included in view of the importance
of the processes of saving and capital accumulation to economic
growth as noted in Chapter 1.

These were the investment r a t e ,

calculated as the share in GDP of gross domestic investment
averaged over the period 1965-1973, and the savings rate,
calculated as the national average savings rate in the year of
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the distribution survey.
Demographic influences would also seem to be important in
discussions of income inequality.

The aggregate growth rate of

total population should be positively associated with increased
inequality because a higher rate of growth of the labour force
implies a slower rise (or even a decline) in the productivity of
labour, the most important income source for low income groups
that typically own little capital.

It has also been suggested

that the "demographic transition" in the course of development
affects different groups at different stages.

In particular,

reduced birth rates occur last in poorest groups of the population,
so that income per capita in poor households responds very slowly
to income transfers to such households because of population
pressure.

High dependency ratios also have implications for the

sources of national savings and for capital accumulation.

When

high birth rates result in a relatively large proportion of the
population being too young to join the workforce, the labour income
accruing directly to the services of the working-age population
must satisfy higher aggregate consumption than otherwise.

If this

effect falls more than proportionately upon the low income groups,
their potential for accumulation of assets to raise their income
level would be reduced, thus perpetuating a large degree of
inequality.

The demographic variables used in the analysis are

the population growth r a t e , the crude birth r a t e , and the
non-working-age population as a proportion of total population

(i.e. population aged 0-15 years and over 65 years), all estimated
for the year of the income distribution survey.
Education, on the other hand, is expected to have implications
for inequality almost diametrically opposed to those of population
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growth.

In particular the extent and quality of education is an

important determinant of the skills in the workforce.

Greater

access to education is expected to reduce those income differentials
that derive from skill differentials (i.e. within labour's share
of national income), as well as improving overall labour
productivity and the total wage share of national income (which
is more evenly distributed than capital income).

Data on the

educational attainments of the working age population are not
readily available except for estimates of the adult literacy r a t e .
Two other education related variables, current primary school
enrolment r a t i o , and secondary school enrolment r a t i o , are

introduced as indicators of the ease of access to education at
the respective levels in each country.
Several variables reflecting different aspects of the
production structure were also considered.

The income distribution

within the agricultural sector is generally thought

to be more

egalitarian than that in the non-agricultural sector.

Since the

nationwide distribution is a composite of both these sectoral
distributions, variations in the relative share of agricultural
output in gross domestic product might be expected to account for

some of the variation in inequality in the sample.
is averaged over the period 1968-1973.

This variable

Other relevant aspects of

dualism are measured by the proportion of total population living
in urban a r e a s , and the share of total workforce engaged in
a g r i c u l t u r e , both estimated in the year of the distribution survey.

If the government sector is a significant contributor to total
current consumption expenditure, this is likely to reflect high
levels of social services, education and public health funding,
which might tend to promote lower inequality.

A suitable indicator
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of the extent of government activity in the economy is the share of
government sector final consumption expenditure in G D P , averaged

over the period 1965-1973.

Finally, many developing economies are

dominated by a few primary exporting industries.

This aspect of

production structure is estimated for the sample by the product of
two ratios:

the share of GDP accounted for by commodity exports,

and the share of total commodity exports accounted for by the
largest three export items.

This gives a measure of the extent to

which a developing economy is dominated by the commodity
concentration of a country's e x p o r t s , and is averaged over the

period 1965-1973.

2.2

Factor Analysis
Like multiple regression analysis, factor analysis begins

with the computation of a matrix of correlation coefficients for
the set of variables considered relevant to the study . 2

However,

there is no "dependent variable" or "explanatory variables" in
a factor analysis - the correlations between variables are simply
interpreted as associations without specifying the direction of
causation.

Accordingly, the income distribution shares accruing

to different groups are not included in the factor analysis
because it is variations in these that are to be "explained".
2 This section discusses the approach of factor analysis in some

detail, particularly as compared with regression analysis,
because economists typically are unfamiliar with factor analysis
and the results of this section depend on an appreciation of
its methodological purpose. It is assumed that no such
discussion is necessary for regression analysis.
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Two factor analyses were conducted, one for the sample of thirty
developing countries, and the other for the combined sample of
forty-three developing and advanced countries.

The results are

shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 respectively.
Initial factors were extracted using the principal factoring
method with iteration.

This involves "reducing" the set of

relevant variables to a smaller set of independent factors by
replacing the main diagonal of the correlation matrix with
estimates of the proportion of total common variance in the
sample accounted for by each variable.

That is, we assume that

only some portion of a variable is involved in the patterning of
variables into the common factors, and that if we remove the
common source of variation the remaining correlations between
variables will vanish.

The estimates of common variance accounted

for are known as the "communality" of a variable (analogous to R 2
in regression analysis) and may be improved upon by an iterative
process before the extraction of principal factors.

The "factors"

may therefore be interpreted as "source variables" accounting for
many of the observed inter-relations in the data.
The relative importance of each factor may be ascertained
by adding up the squared factor loadings of each variable and
dividing by the number of variables.

This gives the proportion

of total variance in the sample accounted for by each respective
factor . 3

The criterion adopted for selecting the number of

3 Since all the variables are normalised in computations, the

variance of each variable is one. Thus the total variance in
the data equals the number of variables in the set. The
variance accounted for by each factor is the sum of squared
factor loadings in the initial factor matrix (equal to the
respective eigenvalues of the vector factor). Thus the
proportion of total variance accounted for by each factor is
obtained by dividing its eigenvalue by the number of variables.
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TABLE 2.1
FACTOR ANALYSIS (30 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES)
FI
Log of per cap. income
Urban population
Agric. workforce
Agric. value added
Primary enrolment
Secondary enrolment
Adult literacy rate
Population growth
Crude birth rate
Non-working age pop.
Income growth 10 yrs.
Investment rate
Savings rate
Export concentration
Govt, expenditure
of variance
Cumulative % var.

PRINCIPAL FACTORS
F2
F3

.90
.70
-.89
-.87
.73
.73
.79
-.40
-.82
-.60
.30
.32
.32
.16
.10
41.6
41.6

%

.30
.36
.07
-.28
.14
-.34
.03
.77
.43
.45
.07
.40
.58
.16
-.15
14.7
56.3

.07
-.56
.27
-.07
.16
.04
-.20
-.19
-.02
.04
.49
.55
-.03
.58
.35
13.1
69.3

F4
.01
-.10
-.25
.00
.01
.37
.28
.23
.03
.65
-.05
-.04
-.46
.02
.26

VARIMAX ROTATED FACTORS
FI
F2
F3
F4
.77
-.95
-.77
.61
.72
.86
rT65]
-.24
.11
.15
.18
.00
.06

-.12
.00
.21
.13
-.18
-.30
-.09
T8t>
.63
.92
-.15
.09
.03
.00
-.03

.42
.19
.02
.41
.39
.12
.04
.05
.12
.02
.72

.28
OsT
TSF
-.26
.12
-.39
-.02
.31
.14
-.29
-.03
.15
r

m

rS7*
-.37

COMM
hi*
.900
.937
.938
.839
.570
.777
.748
.847
.864
.992
.341
.574
.656
.385
.221

3.5
77.8

TABLE 2.2
FACTOR ANALYSIS (43 COUNTRIES DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING)
FI
Log of per cap. income
Urban population
Agric. workforce
Agric. value added
Primary enrolment
Secondary enrolment
Adult literacy rate
Population growth
Crude birth rate
Non-working age pop.
Income growth 10 yrs.
Investment rate
Savings rate
Export concentration
Govt, expenditure
of variance
Cumulative % var.

%

PRINCIPAL FACTORS
F2
F3

.95
.75
-.93
-.91
.64
.88
.83
-.71
-.94
-.85
.36
.59
.68
-.25
.32
56.2
56.2

.00
-.20
.25
-.04
.14
-.14
-.09
.17
.15
.01
.47
.74
.40
.36
-.22
10.7
66.8

.14
.44
-.17
-.22
.18
-.13
.20
.59
.23
.30
-.21
-.05
.11
.04
-.19
8.7
75.6

F4
.10
-.18
-.07
-.17
.29
-.01
.02
-.04
-.05
.18
-.05
-.10
-.27
.68
.40

VARIMAX ROTATED FACTORS
FI
F2
F3
F4
.82
.85
-.85
-.84
.61
.60
.77
-.20
-.43
.05
.28
.48
-.13
.21

-.40
-.06
.44
.32
-.21
K59J
-.30
TSF
.70
.61

.34
.08
-.10
-.31
.27
.26
.21
-.26
-.28
-.44

-.06
-.05
.09
-.49

.91
.66
-.12

-.04
-.31
.14 ‘
-.05
.24
-.20
-.12
.18
.16
.32
.04
.07
-.21
I -79Ì
T7T

COMM
hi2
.939
.837
.955
.911
.545
.819
.746
.833
.956
.844
.392
.909
.713
.648
.347

8.0
83.5

factors to be extracted was that each principal factor account
for at least as much of the variance as one variable, in this
case 6 .6 6 % .

In Table 2.1 the first factor FI accounts for 41.6% of

total variance, the second factor F2 for 14.7%, the third factor
F3 for 13.1% and the fourth factor F4 accounts for only 8.5% of the
variance.

Together the four principal factors in Table 2.1 account

for almost 78% of the total variance in the data for the developing
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countries.

On the other hand, in Table 2.2, the four principal

factors account for 83.5% of the total variance in the data on the
same variables for the combined sample of developed and developing
countries.

The first principal factor FI accounts for 56% of the

total variance alone, with the other three factors contributing
11%, 9% and 8 % respectively.
However, these principal factors alone are rarely useful in
the search for a simpler structure with which to interpret the
observed variability in the data.

To this end the factors are

rotated into a terminal solution.

The rotated factor matrices

shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are mathematically equivalent to their
corresponding principal factors, but they provide a solution which
is much more informative.
which may be used.

There are several methods of rotation

The most appropriate for present purposes

(and also the most widely used) is called "varimax" rotation.
This method emphasises the simplification of the description of a
factor in terms of the original variables so that the rotated
factors are statistically independent of one another (i.e. there
is no problem of multicollinearity among the rotated factors).
The factor loadings in a varimax rotated factor matrix are
the correlation coefficients between each variable and each factor,
and can be used to describe the composition of each variable in
terms of the hypothetical factors.

For example, referring to

Table 2.1, the communality (h^-2 ) of the variable logarithm of per
capita income is the sum of the squared factor loadings.

h2 (log per cap. income) = (.80)2 + (-.12)2

+ (.42)2 + (.28)2 = .900
(with small error due to rounding).

The most important factor for
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this variable is Factor 1 which accounts for 64% of the variation
in per capita income level in the sample of developing countries.
The other factors are not regarded as significant for per capita
income level since their factor loadings are less than . 4 5 (they
account for less than twenty percent of the variance of the
variable).

Each of the other variables may be interpreted

similarly.

Those that load significantly on only one factor are

said to have a "factoral complexity of one" (i.e. they are
regarded as being "factor pure").

However, the interpretation of

variables that load significantly on more than one factor in a
rotated solution is more complicated because such variables are
regarded as measuring more than one theoretical dimension.
Since the direction of causation in a factor analysis is
not specified, the factor loadings in a varimax rotated factor
matrix may also be used to describe the composition of each (as
yet unnamed) factor in terms of the variables with which it
associates significantly.

In this respect the rotated factors

in Table 2.1 are broadly similar to those in Table 2.2, although
there are some differences in detail.
Thus, Factor 1 may be designated the "dualism and education
factor" with strong negative factor loadings on the agricultural
workforce and agricultural value added variables (alSO the
crude birth rate - a complex variable) as well as strong positive

factor loadings on the logarithm of per capita i n c o m e , the urban
population share, primary and secondary school enrolment rates

and the adult literacy rate.

This indicates that it is more

difficult statistically to separate the effects of dualism from
those of education than it is to separate (say) demographic
influences or growth rate influences from either of the former two
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(although too much should not be made of this because the first
factor tends to load heavily on several variables in any factor
analysis).
Factor 2 is clearly interpreted as the "demographic factor",
with high positive loadings on the population growth r a t e , the
crude birth r a t e , and the non-working age p o p u l a t i o n .

For the

case of Table 2.2 which includes developed countries, the emergence
of the secondary school enrolment rate as a complex variable with
a significant negative loading on the demographic factor may be
explained with reference to the known effects of education in the
spread of birth control programmes.
Factor 3 may be interpreted as the "growth factor" with
significant positive loadings on the investment rate and on the
income growth rate in both Tables 2.1 and 2.2.

For the developing

country case (Table 2.1), the export concentration ratio would
appear to be significantly associated with the rate of economic
growth;

whereas in Table 2.2 including developed countries the

export concentration ratio is relegated to the least important

factor and the savings rate is associated significantly with the
rates of investment and growth.

Intuitive reasons for this switch

are not difficult to construct, but once again too much should
not be made of shifting coalitions of variables between minor
factors.

Government expenditure does not appear to be statistically

significant in accounting for the variance in the data in Table 2.1.
Its weak association in Table 2.2 with the demographic factor
might be explained in terms of higher education and health
funding in developed countries.
It is sometimes useful to extend this use of factor analysis
by computing factor scores for each observation in the sample.
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The factor scores are composite variables which by definition are
independent (not subject to problems of multi collinearity) and
which may be used as explanatory variables in a regression
analysis - in this case to predict changes in income shares
accruing to different groups in the income distribution.

This

procedure yielded results which were generally not significant and
which are not reported here.

The reason for the poor results in

the regressions using factor scores may be traced to the complexity
of the varimax rotated factors shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.

It is

more useful to apply regression analysis to sets of well-defined
variables, and this is done in the next section.
Statistically significant associations between particular
variables may be deduced from judicious scanning of the correlation
matrix.

The use of factor analysis has strengthened our hand in

this respect by establishing statistically the associations of
certain variables into common factors in the development process,
as well as establishing the statistical independence of some of
these factors from the others.

For instance, the influence of

the rate of growth may be considered as being separable in a
statistical sense from that of demographic transition in the
course of development, and this in turn may be separable from the
dualistic structure of production.

The confidence with which the

regression analysis is approached is in this respect considerably
enhanced by the factor analysis results.

32

2.3

.

Multiple Regression Analysis

2.3.1

Regressions for low income groups:

In this section the income shares accruing to the low income
groups are treated as dependent variables whose variation across
a sample of countries may be accounted for by particular
explanatory variables chosen from the list in the previous section.
Many of the variables used in the factor analysis are highly
correlated, measuring aspects of the development process that
typically go hand in hand.

This is obvious for variables used to

measure different aspects of the same factor.

In order to reduce

as much as possible the problems of multicollinearity in the
explanatory variables, therefore, the first step is to select one
variable to represent each of the key relationships previously
identified (not necessarily one for each factor), and to find
the combination which explains the maximum variation in the income
shares for each group.
Five variables were found to be the most significant set for
the poorest 20% and the poorest 40% (called LOW 20 and LOW 40,
respectively, for convenience) - these were:

the logarithm of

per capita i n c o m e , the proportion of workforce engaged in
a g r i c u l t u r e , the growth r a t e , the crude birth rate, and the
primary school enrolment rate.

The regression results for these

five variables on each of the two low income groups are shown in
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 respectively.

In each equation shown in

these tables the first row of coefficients are standardised
coefficients (beta weights) which facilitate the comparison of
variables with different units of measurement.

Non-standardised

regression coefficients are shown in the second row, with their
associated t-values in brackets below them.

The tables also
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show values for R2 (adjusted for degrees of freedom) and F-values
for the equation as a whole on the right hand side . 4
Consider equations 3(a) and 4(a).

These show the regression

results of the five above mentioned explanatory variables on the
income shares of the low income groups (LOW 20 and LOW 40
respectively) for the sample of thirty developing countries from
Table 1.1, where the logarithm of per capita income is computed
from the exchange rate conversion to $U.S. of gross domestic
income, and where the average annual growth rate is computed from
a ten year series of gross domestic income by exchange conversion.
Qualitatively the results shown in equations 3(a) and 4(a) are
the same, with quantitative differences in the size of the
standardised coefficients being quite small.

Equations 3(a) and

4(a) indicate that some 64°/ and 71% respectively of the variation
in income shares LOW 20 and LOW 40 for the developing countries
is accounted for by the five explanatory variables chosen.

Each

of the coefficients is statistically significant, with very strong
negative influences exerted by the logarithm of p er capita income
( 3 # - 1.1

in both equations) and the agricultural workforce share

( 3 = -0.77 in equation 3(a) and 3 = -0.87 in equation 4(a)).

The crude birth rate and the primary school enrolment rate both
exert equally strong negative influences as each other with beta
weights on both variables being -0.34 in equation 3(a) on
LOW 20, and -0.43 in equation 4(a) on LOW 40.
The negative coefficients on the logarithm of per capita
i n c o m e , agricultural workforce share, and crude birth rate,
4 The critical t-value from Student's t-distribution at the 5%
level for (N-6 ) degrees of freedom is 1.71 for the sample of

developing countries, and 1.69 for the combined sample (onetail tests). The critical F-value for the equation as a whole
at the 1% level for (k=5, N-k-1) degrees of freedom is 3.90 for
the sample of developing countries, and 3.56 for the combined
sample.
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TABLE 2.3
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR POOREST 20%
DEPENDENT VARIABLE LOW 20 (DECILES 9+10)
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
CRUDE AGRIC.
GROWTH BIRTH WORK
RATE
RATE
FORCE

PRIM.
SCHOOL
ENROL.

3(a) 30 developing cou ntries
$US exchange GDY per cap.
Beta weight
-1.170
Coefficient
23.467
-2.270
(t value)
(5.1)

0.434 -0.344
41.012 -0.061
(3.5) (2.0)

-0.774
-0.058
(3.4)

-0.340
-0.018
(2.1)

3(b) 30 developing countries
$US exchanqe GDY per cap.
Beta weight
-3.532
Coefficient
34.944
-6.855
(t value)
(1.8)

0.439 -0.330
41.487 -0.058
(3.5) (2.0)

-0.703
-0.053
(3.0)

-0.267
-0.014
(1.6)

3(c) 29 developing countries
Physical indicators of GDP
Beta weight
-0.957
Coefficient
26.050
-2.174
(t value)
(3.0)

0.397 -0.453
37.267 -0.075
(2.5) (2.2)

-0.822
-0.059
(2.5)

3(d) 43 countries
$US exchange GDY per cap.
Beta weight
-1.128
Coefficient
20.823
-1.504
(t value)
(3.8)

0.372 -0.498
34.036 -0.066
(3.0) (2.1)

3(e) 43 countries
$US exchanqe GDY per cap.
Beta weight
-5.503
Coefficient
36.402
-7.334
(t value)
(3.8)
3(f) 42 countries
Physical indicators of GDP
Beta weight
-5.257
-3.485
Coefficient
44.687
(t value)
(2.3)

CONSTANT

LOG OF
PER CAP.
INCOME

(LOG OF F
(PER CAP.)
(INCOME )

02

F

.638

11.2

.645

9.8

-0.568
-0.029
(3.1)

.448

5.5

-0.947
-0.058
(3.1)

-0.527
-0.031
(3.5)

.448

7.8

0.456 -0.252
41.760 -0.034
(3.9) (1.1)

-1.085
-0.067
(3.9)

-0.262
-0.015
(1.6)

4.278
0.455
(3.1)

.549

9.5

0.423 -0.289
39.612 -0.338
(3.1) (1.1)

-1.145
-0.069
(3.0)

-0.436
-0.025
(2.4)

4.216
0.493
(1.9)

.392

5.4

2.381
0.420
(1.2)

TABLE 2. 4
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR POOREST 40%
DEPENDENT VARIABLE LOW 40 (DECILES 7+8+9+10)

CONSTANT

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
CRUDE AGRIC.
LOG OF
BIRTH WORK
PER CAP. GROWTH
FORCE
RATE
RATE
INCOME

PRIM.
SCHOOL
ENROL.

(LOG OF V
(PER CAP.)
(INCOME )

R2

F

.715

15.6

.710

12.0

4(a) 30 developing countries
$US exchange GDY per cap.
-1.122
Beta weight
-4.872
Coefficient
57.418
(5.6)
(t value)

0.370
78.342
(3.3)

-0.432 -0.869
-0.170 -0.146
(2.9) (4.3)

-0.435
-0.052
(3.1)

h(b) 30 developing countries
$US exchanqe GDY per cap.
-2.405
Beta weight
Coefficient
71.354 -10.440
(1.4)
(t value)

0.373
78.919
(3.3)

-0.424 -0.830
-0.167 -0.140
(2.8) (3.9)

-0.355
-0.047
(2.6)

tf(c) 29 developing countries
Physical indicators of GDP
0.363
-1.001
Beta weight
78.269
-5.152
Coefficient
66.353
(2.7)
(3.7)
(t value)

-0.535 -0.980
-0.201 -0.158
(3.0) (3.5)

-Ü.640
-U.075
(4.1)

.602

U(d) 43 countries
$US exchanqe GDY per cap.
-0.922
Beta weight
-2.804
Coefficient
49.844
(3.4)
(t value)

0.253
52.929
(2.3)

-0.683 -0.915
-0.208 -0.129
(3.3) (3.4)

-0.605
-0.080
(4.5)

•56l

11.7

l*(e) 43 countries
$US exchange GDY per cap.
-4.835
Beta weight
Coefficient
81.655 -14.708
(3.7)
(t value)

0.329
68.701
(3.2)

-Xj.462 -1.038
-0.141 -0.146
(2.3) (4.2)

-0.368
-u.049
(2.5)

3.827
0.930
(3.0)

.641

13.5

if.(f) 42 countries
Physical indicators of GDP
0.316
-4.541
Beta weight
68.573
Coefficient
98.603 -16.991
(2.7)
(2.3)
(t value)

-0.504 -1.096
-Û.152 -0.153
(2.2) (3.4)

-0.504
-0.068
(3.3)

3.659
0.992
(1.9)

.557

9.6

1.292
0.510
(0.7)
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confirm the previous hypothesis that there are strong secular
forces typical of the growth process in developing countries that
tend to reduce the income shares of the poorer groups.

The

negative association Of the primary school enrolment rate with
the income shares of the poor may be similarly interpreted since
education is typically expanded in the course of development.

An

alternative hypothesis that is not inconsistent with the
regression results is that, in developing countries, high primary
school enrolment rates may generate (after a short lag) intense
competition among young school leavers for modern sector jobs,
even to the extent that school leavers are willing to be
unemployed for long periods in the hope of getting a wage job in
urban areas.
Finally, in equation 3(a) and 4(a), the speed of economic
growth indicated by growth rate shows an important positive
association with the income shares of the poor ( 3 = .43 for LOW 20,
and 3 = .37 for LOW 40).

These positive coefficients are

statistically very significant and certainly do not support the
hypothesis that rapid growth tends to make the poor both
relatively and absolutely worse off by exacerbating the growthrelated influences.

On the contrary, the speed of these changes

would appear to provide a useful parameter for policy
manipulation in order to generate resources for redistribution
towards the low income groups.

An alternative interpretation may

be that those underdeveloped countries in the sample which do have
relatively low degrees of inequality also happen to have
experienced rapid growth.

In either case, the regression results

indicate that rapid growth in the short term, as contrasted with
factors that typically accompany secular development, is not in
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itself inimical to raising the income shares of the poorer groups.
It was not possible to improve the adjusted R 2 for either of
these equations representing the poorest 2 0 % and poorest 40% of
income recipients by adding variables from the list used in the
factor analysis.

The other variables introduced in test runs had

low beta weights and were quite insignificant.

Moreover, there

was no variation in qualitative interpretation of the results of
equations 3(a) and 4(a) in such tests . 5
In equations 3(b) and 4(b), a quadratic term in per capita
income is added to test the inverted-U hypothesis for the sample
of thirty developing countries.

Although the sign on the

quadratic term is positive, it is not statistically significant.
There is a change in the coefficient on the "linear" term in
income from the corresponding equations 3(a) and 4(a), which is to
be expected because of the high collinearity between it and the
introduced quadratic term.

However, the size and significance

levels of the other coefficients are not affected and it may be
concluded that the quadratic term logarithm of per capita income
(squared)

is an irrelevant variable for the sample of thirty

developing countries.

The sample data thus provides no evidence

of "trickle down" effects for developing countries.
Next consider equations 3(a) and 3(c).

The difference

5 The variables shown in equation 3(a) and 4(a) were consistently

significant explanatory variables in all tests, except of course
when other variables highly correlated with one of the chosen
five but not themselves significant, were introduced, thus
creating problems of multicollinearity with what were
statistically irrelevant variables. As previously noted,
results which are not significant are not reported, however
readers are welcome to peruse the computer printouts if they
desi re.
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between equations 3(a) and 3(c) is that the observations on
l o g a r i t h m of p e r capita income in the latter equation were

calculated from the method outlined in the Appendix to Chapter 1 that is, they were predicted on the basis of physical indicators
of real per capita product.

Also the average annual growth rate

was calculated from a ten year series of per capita G.D.P. in the
currency of the selected country (without conversion to $U.S .).
The overall fit of equation 3(c) is worse than that of equation
3(a) - adjusted R 2 falls from .64 to .45, and the F statistic
falls from 11.2 to 5.5 (still significant at the 1% level).
Despite this, each of the coefficients in equation 3 (c) is still
significant at the 5% level and, what is most important for the
sensitivity test, the general order of magnitude of each of the
regression coefficients is substantially unchanged by the
alternative method of measurement of two explanatory variables.
The same holds true in comparing equations 4(a) and 4(c) for
dependent variable LOW 40.

The overall fit is worse in equation

4(c) as R 2 falls from .71 to .60, but the size and significance
of the regression coefficients is not very different . 6

The

fact that the coefficients are fairly robust under alternative data
systems is encouraging.

Although there is a considerable amount

of unexplained variation in income shares of the poor in developing
countries, the significance of the relationships that are
included in the equations is made more difficult to deny by the
results of the sensitivity test.
When the sample of countries is expanded by the addition
6 As was the case for equations 3(a) and 4(a), the addition of

other variables from the list used in the factor analysis did
not result in any improvement in the fit of equations 3(c) and
4(c).
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of thirteen developed countries there are some notable differences
in the results.

Equation 3(d) shows that the same explanatory

variables still provide the most significant explanation of
variations in LOW 20 with each coefficient being significant at the
5%

level.

The adjusted R 2 is only .45, considerably less than

the .64 in equation 3(a).

On the other hand, the introduction

of a quadratic term in per capita income (shown in equation 3 (e))
improves the adjusted R 2 to .55 as well as increasing the F
statistic from 7.8 to 9.5.

The coefficient on the quadratic

income term is statistically significant indicating a strong
quadratic relationship in income share of the poorest 2 0 % with
the logarithm of per capita income.

Simple calculus applied to

equation 3(e) reveals that, for given levels of the other
variables, the turning point of the quadratic function is
predicted to occur at a level of per capita gross domestic income
of $U.S. 3163 (by exchange conversion) which is at the very
high end of the income range for the sample (see column 1 in
Table 1.1 ) . 7

In equation 3(f) use is made of the physical

indicators prediction of per capita income in a quadratic
relation for the sample including developed and developing
countries.

Again the overall fit of the equation using this

data is worse than that using exchange conversion of per capita
income, yet the size and significance of each of the coefficients
on logarithm of per capita i n c o m e , growth r a t e , agricultural
workforce share and crude birth rate is not very different from

7 Found by setting the first partial derivative of LOW 20 with

respect to logarithm of per capita income equal to zero and
solving for the level of per capita income. The second order
condition shows the quadratic function to be concave upwards.
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equation 3(e).

.

Note that the coefficient on the latter variable

is not significant in either of equations 3(e) and 3(f).

The

coefficient on p r i m a r y school enrolment rate is not significant
in equation 3(e) but regains its significance in equation 3(f).
The coefficient on the quadratic income term in equation 3(f)
is not as strongly significant as in equation 3 (e), but similar
application of calculus reveals that, for given levels of the other
variables, the turning point of the quadratic function estimated
in 3(f) is predicted to occur at a level of real per capita G.D.P.
of SU.S.5461 (a repricing estimate), again at the very high end
of the income range for the sample (see column 2 in Table 1.1).
The discussion relating to equations 3(d), 3(e) and 3(f) may
be carried over almost verbatim for equations 4 (d), 4 (e) and 4 (f)
where the dependent variable is the income share of the poorest
40% (LOW 40) and the sample includes thirteen developed countries.
In particular the significance of the quadratic relationship of
LOW 40 with per capita income is demonstrated, and is reinforced
by the sensitivity test on the data as before.

Note that the

crude b i rth rate regains its statistical significance, and that

the predicted turning points of the quadratic functions occur a
little earlier in the income scale for LOW 40 than was the case
for LOW 20 - the turning points occur at $U.S .2718 (by exchange
conversion) for equation 4(e), and at $U.S.5240 (by repricing
estimates) for equation 4(f).

These results indicate support for

the hypothesis that the income shares of the poor tend to decline
in the early and middle stages of development, and to improve
again only when countries reach a level of development comparable
to that of the most advanced countries.
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2.3.2

Regressions for the middle income groups:

Regression results for the middle 40% of the income
distribution (deciles 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 , called MID 40 for convenience)
are shown in Table 2.5 which has a similar format to Tables 2.3 and
2.4.

Equation 5(a) shows that, of the five explanatory variables

found to be significant for the low income groups, only the crude
b irth r a t e f agricultural workforce s h a r e , and primary school
enrolment rate are statistically significant as explanatory

variables for the income share of the middle income groups (all
being negatively related to MID 40).

Moreover, with the adjusted

R 2 of only .41 there is a considerable amount of unexplained
variation in MID 40.

It was possible to improve this adjusted R 2

to .53 by adding the share of agriculture in G.D.P. and the share
o f government consumption expenditure in final demand to the

explanatory variables.
5(b).

The results of this are shown in equation

No other variables from the list used in the factor analysis

had statistically significant coefficients relating them to MID 40
for the sample of developing countries . 8

There is a small

reduction in the size and significance of the coefficients for the
crude birth rate and the primary school enrolment rate in moving

from equation 5(a) to 5(b), and an increase in the size and
significance Of the coefficient for agricultural workforce share.
the latter change is very interesting.

The proportion of the

workforce engaged in agriculture is highly positively correlated
with the share of agricultural output in total G.D.P.

However,

in equation 5 (b) the effect of increases in agricultural workforce
8 No significant quadratic relationship with the level of per

capita income was discernable in any regressions involving MID 40.
Indeed, none was expected in view of the data shown in Table 1.1.
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TABLE 2.5

REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MIDDLE 40%
DEPENDENT VARIABLE MID 40 (DECILES 3+4+5+6)

CONSTANT

LOG OF
PER CAP.
INCOME

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
CRUDE AGRIC. PRIM.
GROWTH
BIRTH WORK
SCHOOL
RATE
RATE
FORCE
ENROL.

AGRIC.
VALUE
ADDED

GOVT.
CURRENT
EXPEND.

INVEST
RATE

R2

F

.410

5.0

.534

5.7

5.8

5(a) 30 developing countries
$US exchange GDY per cap.
Beta weight
-0.468
Coefficient 68.841
-2.496
(t value)
(1.6)

0.107
27.925
(0.7)

-0.503
-0.244
(2.3)

-0.613
-0.127
(2.1)

-0.528
-0.078
(2.6)

5(b) 30 developing countries
$US exchange GDY per cap.
Beta weight
0.103
Coefficient 38.497
0.551
(t value)
(0.3)

0.132
34.221
(0.9)

-0.388
-0.188
(2.0)

-0.799
-0.165
(3.0)

-0.401 0.847
-0.059 0.285
(2.2) (2.6)

5(c) 29 developing countries
Physical indicators of GDP
Beta weight
-0.618
Coefficient 82.449
-4.025
(t value)
(2.0)

0.229
61.500
(1.4)

-0.522
-0.248
(2.5)

-0.842
-0.172
(2.6)

-0.572
-0.085
(3.1)

.460

5(d) 43 countries
$US exchange GDY per cap.
3eta weight
-0.186
Coefficient 61.805
-0.763
(t value)
(0.7)

-0.003
-0.935
(0.0)

-0.729
-0.299
(3.7)

-0.483
-0.092
(1.9)

-0.521
-0.093
(4.1)

.614 14.4

5(e) 43 countries
$ US exchange GDY per cap.
Beta weight
0.055
Coefficient 37.007
0.223
(t value)
(0.2)

-0.051
-14.235
(0.5)

-0.403
-0.165
(2.0)

-1.033
-0.196
(3.7)

-0.372 0.858
-0.067 0.284
(3.0) (3.2)

5 ( f) 42 countries
Physical indicators of GDP
Beta weight
-0.241
Coefficient 65.062
-1.242
(t value)
(0.8)

0.061
18.097
(0.6)

-0.698
-0.289
(3.6)

-0.573
-0.110
(2.0)

-0.490
-0.091
(4.1)

0.225
0.261
(1.7)

0.230
0.288
(2.2)

0.308
0.300
(2.2)

.701 13.3

.636 15.3

share is shown to reduce the share of income accruing to the

middle income group, while increases in agricultural value added
share increase the share of income accruing to the middle income

group.

The beta weights for these two explanatory variables

indicate that the effects are of almost equal relative strength
( 3 r -0.80 for agricultural workforce s h a r e , and 3 t 0.85 for

agricultural value added share).

A reasonable hypothesis to

explain the opposite signs of those two variables might recognise
that the agricultural sector is the low income sector in developing
countries and also that the middle income groups derive much of
their income from "middle-man" activities such as transport and
distribution mark-ups on agricultural products for urban consumption
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or for export.

Then increases in employment in low-productivity

agriculture may reduce the surplus available for middle (and high)
income groups to appropriate, while increases in agricultural
output may promote higher levels of activity in transport and
distribution of this output and hence higher MID 40.
In equation 5(c) the logarithm of per capita income is
computed from physical indicators of real G.D.P., and in this case
its coefficient is statistically significant in contrast to that
in equation 5(a).

The effect of the growth rate ÌS al SO

strengthened in the alternative data test but is still not
statistically significant.

The effects of both agricultural

workforce share and primary school enrolment rate are also

strengthened, and the adjusted R2 increases to .46.

Half of the

variation in MID 40 across developing countries remains unexplained
by the variables in this study.
The proportion of explained variation in MID 40 is
considerably increased by the addition of the thirteen developed
countries to the sample.

For instance, comparing equations 5(a)

with 5(d), the adjusted R2 increases from .41 to .61, and there is
an improvement from 5.0 to 14.4 in the F statistic.

This supports

Kuznets' observations that there is not much variation in income
share of the middle income groups across developing countries, but
there is a significant change between them and the developed
countries.

The coefficients on the logarithm of per capita income

and the growth rate remain insignificant, and those on the crude
birth rate and the primary school enrolment rate are Strengthened.

Comparison of equation 5(d) with 5(f) shows no significant differ
ence, which is of course expected since the variables which were
re-estimated with alternative data were not found to be significant

as explanatory variables for MID 40.
In equation 5(e) it is shown that the addition of three more
significant explanatory variables improves the adjusted R 2
further to .70 - these are the share o f agriculture in G.D.P., the
s h are o f gove r n m e n t current expenditure in final d e m a n d , and the
s h are o f gross d o m e s t i c investment in final demand (each of these

three is positively related to MID 40).
The opposite signs on agricultural workforce (3 t -1.03) and
agricultural value a d ded ( 3 t

equation 5(e).

0.86) again is demonstrated in

The negative influence of the crude b irth rate

and the p r i m a r y school enrolment rate indicate that the effects Of
these on low income groups as discussed in section 2.3.1 also
extend to the detriment of the middle income groups.

Interestingly,

an increasing share of government current expenditure in final
demand appears to benefit the middle income groups with a
significant positive coefficient in both equations 5(b) and 5(e),
whereas this had no discernible influence one way or the other on
the income shares of the low income groups.

The investment rate

also has a significant positive coefficient in equation 5(e)
whereas it was not significant for the developing country sample
(in equations 5(a) and 5(b)).

This may be partly a reflection of

higher investment rates in developed countries than in developing
countries, but in order to explain the positive association of the
investment rate with MID 40 (when there was no statistically

significant relationship with LOW 20 or LOW 40) one might
hypothesise that this variable is capturing part of the influence
of ownership of productive capital by middle income groups (but
see the discussion of this in the next section for TOP 20 also).
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2.3.3

Regressions for the high income groups:

Regression results for the richest 20% of the income
distribution (deciles 1 + 2, called TOP 20 for convenience) are
shown in Table 2 .6 , which has a similar format to Tables 2 .3 , 2 . 4
and 2.5.
In equation 6 (a) one additional variable to the five that
were found significant for the low income groups enters to account
for variation in TOP 20 across developing countries.

That variable

is the agricultural value added share which has a Significant
negative coefficient (3 4= -0 .6 ).

Explanation of why this

coefficient has the opposite sign to that on agricultural workforce
share was commented on in section 2.3.2 for MID 40.

No other

variable from the list used in the factor analysis was significant
for the sample of developing countries.

The positive signs on

logarithm of p e r capita income, crude birth rate, agricultural
workforce share and primary school enrolment rate in equation 6 (a)

may be contrasted with the negative relationships between these
explanatory variables and the income shares of the low income
groups, as well as the middle income groups (equations 3(a), 4(a),
5(a)).
There is an identity relationship between the income share
groups:
LOW 40 + MID 40 + TOP 20 e 1
Together they account for total income, and increases in the share
of one income group can only be obtained by reducing the income
share of other groups.
here.

This fact supports the regression results

The influences typically associated with economic

development that were previously argued to reduce the income
share of the low income groups (recall section 2.3.1) are found to

TABLE 2 . 6

REGRESSION RESULTS FOR RICHEST 20%
DEPENDENT VARIABLE TOP 20 (DECILES 1+2)

CONSTANT

LOG OF
PER CAP.
INCOME

GROWTH
RATE

CRUDE
BIRTH
RATE

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
AGRIC. PRIM.
(LOG OF ) z
WORKSCHOOL (PER CAP.)
FORCE
ENROL. (INCOME )

AGRIC.
VALUE
ADDED

LIT.
RATE

POP.
GROWTH

F

-0.594
-0.340
(2.1)

.645

9.8

-0.561
-0.321
(1.9)

.635

8.2

.665

10.3

.703

10.9

. CbL

i t- , J

.689

10.1

0.861
0.304
(3.7)

0.462
0.116
(2.9)

6(b) 30 developing countries
$US exchange GDY per cap.
Beta weight
'
-0.266 0.494
-0.853
Coefficient
32.617 -7.740 -117.652 0.4C6
(t value)
(0.4)
(2.1) (2.9)

0.894
0.314
(3.7)

0.504
C.126
(2.9)

6(c) 29 developing countries
Physical indicators of GDP
Beta weight
0.556 " -0.341 0.506
Coefficient
-13.694
6.052 -153.112 0.402
(t value)
(2.0)
(2.7) (3.1)

1.097
0.375
(4.2)

0.543
0.136
(3.6)

-0.502
-0.304
(2.3)

6(d) 43 countries
$ US exchange GDY per cap.
Beta weight
0.777
Coefficient
-15.046
5.226
(t value)
(2.1)

-0.008 0.972
-3.673 0.654
(0.1) (2.9)

1.235
0.385
(3.6)

0.405
0.119
(3.2)

-0.413
-0.224
(1.4)

6(e) 43 countries
$ US exchange GDY per cap.
Beta weight
1.599
-0.168 0.591
Coefficient
-12.432 10.758
-77.782 0.398
(t value)
(1.2)
(1.7) (3.0)

0.909
0.283
(3.6)

0.416
0.122
(2.9)

6(f) 42 countries
Physical indicators of GDP
Beta weight
-0.082 0.965
0.630
Coefficient
-17.510
5.279
-40.022 0.649
(t value)
(0.7) (2.7)
(1.7)

1.175
0.368
(3.2)

0.451
0.136
(3.6)

-1.429
-0.768
(1.1)

INVEST.
RATE

R2

6(a) 30 developing countries
$US exchange GDY per c ap.
Beta weight
0.374
-0.271 0.485
Coefficient
5.989
3.395 -119.600 0.399
(t value)
(2.2) (2.9)
(1.2)

1.261
1.041
(0.6)

SECOND.
SCHOOL
ENROL.

cn

-0.467
-0.140
(2.0)

-0.272
-0.435
(1.8)

0.563
0.157
(2.1)

-0.362
-3.093
(1.7)

-0.566
-0.308
(1.9)

-0.476
-0.276
(1.8)

-P»

-0.369
-0.110
(1.6)

-0.166
-0.274
(1.2)

0.329
0.095
(1.3)

-0.353
-2.984
(1.6)

46.

be systematically increasing the income share of the high income
group.

This statement is qualified by noting that the coefficient

on the l o g a r i t h m o f p e r capita income is not significant at the
6 % level

(but is weakly significant at the 15% level).

The

coefficients on the growth r a t e , crude b i rth r a t e , agricultural
w o r k f o r c e and p r i m a r y school enrolment rate are all significant

at the 5% level and have signs opposite to their counterparts for
the low income groups, indicating the effect of the identity
mentioned above.
In equation 6 (h), the quadratic term logarithm of pe r capita
in c o m e

(squared)

is added to the relationship of 6 (a).

The result

indicates that no statistically significant quadratic relationship
of TOP 2Ji with per capita income is discernible for developing
countries.

In equation 6 (c) the logarithm o f pe r capita income

and the g r owth rat e were calculated from the alternative data
described in the Appendix to Chapter 1.

The effect of both of

these on TOP 20 is strengthened by using the alternative data and
there is a marginal improvement in the overall fit of the equation
compared with equation 6 (a).

Again the qualitative nature of the

results is found to be quite stable under the data sensitivity
test.
Increasing the sample of countries by the addition of
thirteen developed countries causes some important statistical
changes in the estimated equation accounting for variation in
TOP 2?.

In equation 6 (d) five other variables were found to be

statistically significant.

There are significant negative

coefficients on agricultural value a d d e d , secondary school
e n r o lment r a t e , and popul a t i o n growth r a t e , and there is a

significant positive association between TOP 20 and the adult
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liter a c y rate.

However, the introduction of these additional

variables requires rather more careful interpretation.

Some

provide evidence of interesting hypotheses, but others constitute
a deliberate specification error which was committed in order to
draw out stronger versions of hypotheses already discussed.

This

point will become more obvious in the following discussion of
equation 6 (d).
The significant positive coefficients on logarithm o f per
capita i n c o m e , crude birth r a t e , agricultural workforce share,

and p r i m a r y school enrolment rate support the identity relation
between income shares discussed above.

Similarly, the negative

sign on agricultural value added share supports the earlier
discussion from section 2.3.2, although in this case its coefficient
is only weakly significant at the 1 0 % level and its beta weight
is considerably smaller in relation to agricultural workforce
s h are than in previous equations.

The growth rate variable loses all of its influence in the
expanded equation 6 (d).

It is likely that this influence has

been simply transferred to the investment r a t e , which has a
significant negative coefficient, and a beta weight of the same
order of magnitude as that of the growth rate in equation 6 (a).
Recall that in the factor analysis of Section 2.1, the growth rate
and the investment rate were both associated with the same
theoretical dimension of the development process.

One may argue

therefore that the shift in significance from one to the other is
simply a reflection of higher rates of investment in developed
countries included in the expanded sample.

Showing both

variables in equation 6 (d) thus amounts to a form of specification
error, for which no apology is made.

The negative association of
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this effect with TOP 20 can be explained in terms of the identity
relation of income shares mentioned above, and in view of the
significant positive association of the growth rate with the
income shares of the poor.

It thus provides an interesting twist

to the earlier result, which could not be explored in section 2 .3 . 1
because the investment rate did not emerge there as a significant
explanatory variable.
Next consider the emergence of the p o p ulation growth rate as
a statistically significant explanatory variable in equation 6 (d)
when it was not significant in equation 6 (a), and also the fact
that it has an opposite sign to the variable crude b i rth rate with
which it is positively correlated (as shown in the factor analysis).
Firstly, recall the result in section 2.3.1 which showed that
increases in the birth rate were associated with decreases in the
income share of the poor.

By the identity relation of income

shares this is expected to increase the income shares of the high
income groups, so the positive sign on the crude birth rate is
easy to explain by itself.

Secondly, note that the beta weight on

crude b i r t h rate is 0.485 in equation 6 (a) and is 0.972 in

equation 6 (d).

Here is another example of specification error

which provides an interesting twist to an established result.

The

error occurs because the population growth rate is defined as the
difference between the birth rate and the death rate;

including

it in the same equation as the crude birth rate is simply
double-counting the birth rate (as shown by the doubling of the
beta weight) and the negative coefficient appearing on population
gr o w t h rate is in reality capturing only the expected effect of

the death rate on income shares.

This in turn reflects the

relationship previously discussed between the crude birth rate
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and income shares - a discussion which was not possible in
section 2.3.1 because the population growth rate did not emerge as
a significant explanatory variable.
The significant positive coefficient on the adult literacy
rate is probably a reinforcement of the effect exerted by primary
school enrolment rate which has been previously discussed.

That

is, that increasing access to basic education creates aspirations
for particular forms of employment in young school leavers who are
prepared to remain unemployed (or underemployed) for long periods.
This increases the population counted in low income groups thus
reducing the income share of the poorest (say) 40% of income
earners and, ceteris p a r i b u s , increasing the income share of the
high income groups.

Alternatively one may argue that an educated

workforce provides labour input of higher quality which will
raise the productivity of existing capital employed and also
facilitate the introduction of capital embodying higher technology.
It is known that the distribution of capital income is more highly
concentrated than that of labour income and hence a high proportion
of income accruing to the richest 2 0 % of the distribution will be
returns to capital.

Then higher productivity of capital in general

will raise the income share of TOP 20.

Wider access to secondary

schooling also indicates an increasingly educated workforce which
should raise the productivity of capital as argued above.

However,

it may reasonably be argued that the negative coefficient on
secondary school enrolment rate in equation 6 (d) is not necessarily

at variance with the capital income hypothesis.

Wider access to

education beyond the basic level will result in increased
competition in the labour market for the highly paid occupations,
thus reducing the component of TOP 20 due to returns to highly
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skilled labour, and this is possibly the effect captured by the
negative coefficient on secondary school enrolment rate.

The fact

that this effect emerges only when the sample of countries is
expanded to include developed countries, with higher levels of
secondary and further education, would also support this labour
market hypothesis.
Equation 6(f) uses the same explanatory variables as were
shown in equation 6(d).

The l o g arithm o f p e r capita income and

the g rowth rate were calculated from the alternative data
described in the Appendix to chapter 1.
virtually the same as for equation 6(d).

However, the results are
Since the latter has been

exhaustively discussed, we simply note the insensitivity of the
equation to the alternative data.
Equation 6(e) uses the same explanatory variables as were
shown in equation 6(b) to test the significance of the expected
inverted-U relation of TOP 20 with per capita income level.

The

sign on the quadratic term is negative (b t -1.43) but the
coefficient is only weakly significant at the 15% level.

Similar

application of calculus to equation 6(e) as was done to find
the turning point of the quadratic functions fitted in Tables 3
and 4 reveals that, for given levels of the other explanatory
variables, the turning point for TOP 20 occurs at a level of
per capita gross domestic income of SlJ.S.llOO (by exchange
conversion).

This is evidence of a turning point in the income

share TOP 20 at a considerably lower average income level than
was found for the low income groups.

CHAPTER 3

Summary of International Evidence

3•1

Conclusions from the regression analyses
In order to place the results of the regression analyses in

oerspective, it is useful to reiterate a distinction made in
Chapter 1 between the historical pattern of inequalities on one
hand, and changes that have occurred in this generation on the
other.

There is little doubt that to a considerable extent

present levels of inequality are due to the persistence of
historically determined patterns of wealth distribution and factor
endowments which have varied greatly from country to country.
Because of the paucity of data it is not possible to quantify the
importance of these influences on inter-country variations in
income distribution.

Nevertheless, seen in this perspective it is

encouraging that over half of the variations in income shares can
be explained without this information entering the analysis
exp!icitly.
The regression results indicate support for the hypothesis
that there exists a complex of structural changes, which typically
accompany economic development, which do tend to lower the income
share of the poor and raise the income share of the rich.

In

general terms the level of development is approximated by the
level of per capita income.

For regressions based on a sample of

developing countries only, a strong inverse linear relationship
exists between the logarithmic transform of per capita income and
the income shares of the low income groups.

This relationship

develops a distinct non-1inearity when countries representative
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of the whole range of development are included in the sample.
That is, the rate of decrease in the income share of the poor
slows over the range of incomes and is arrested only when a level
of per capita income comparable to the most advanced countries
is reached.

The income share accruing to the high income groups

displays an inverted-U pattern with the logarithm of per capita
income - it increases throughout the range of incomes of the
developing countries and decreases thereafter.

The results

indicate that if there is any "trickle-down" of benefits in the
course of growth, these benefits take a very long time to reach
the low income groups - they are appropriated by the middle
income groups in countries in the middle range of development and
significantly arrest the rate of decline in income share of
the poor only at an advanced level of development.
Several specific aspects of this general relationship are
discernible, including dualism in the employment patterns of the
workforce, access to basic education, and the differential effects
of demographic transition.
most important.

The first of these aspects is the

The variable measuring the share of the workforce

engaged in agriculture consistently affects observed inequality in
each of the cross-sectional regressions, with a relative influence
roughly twice as great (by the standardised coefficient) as that
of access to primary schooling or the crude birth rate.

High

primary school enrolment rates are shown to work against
improvements in income distribution, being negatively associated
with the income shares of the low and middle income groups.

This

supports the hypothesis that primary education induces aspirations
for modern sector employment in young school leavers, who may
swell the ranks of the unemployed or underemployed for long periods
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in the hope of satisfying such aspirations.

This increases the

proportion of the population with low income levels thereby
(ceteris paribus)

increasing the degree of inequality.

Similarly,

high birth rates are shown to increase the degree of inequality or,
put another way, reductions in the crude birth rate are shown to
improve the income share of the low and middle income groups at
the expense of the high income groups.
An interesting result associated with the breakdown of
dualism in the course of development arose in the regression
analysis for the middle income group.

Two aspects of dualism -

the proportion of the workforce engaged in agriculture, and the
share of value added from agriculture - have opposite effects on
the income share of the middle income group.

Recognising that the

agricultural sector is the low income sector in developing
countries, and that the greatest proportion of their workforce is
engaged in agricultural activity, it is clear that increases in
the proportion of the workforce engaged in agriculture will
(ceteris paribus) reduce the share of income accruing to the low

and middle income groups.

Observations in several developing

countries of the activities of the more prosperous agricultural
workers reveals a tendency to diversify their activities into
transport and distribution services for agricultural products.
To the extent that these mark-ups provide an important income
source for the middle income groups, an increase in the share of
agricultural output in value added (to satisfy higher urban
consumption or export markets) will raise the income share of the
middle income groups.

The middle income group is also the main

beneficiary of government activity in the economy at all levels of
development.

This is the only group for which the share of
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government current expenditure in total final demand is a
significant explanatory variable in the regressions, the positive
coefficient indicating that a direct relationship exists.
Finally, although there are strong forces associated with
development that tend to lower the income share of the low income
groups, the speed of this development (measured by the average
annual rate of growth of per capita income over ten years preceding
the income distribution observation) is shown to be independent of
the nature of these forces.

Moreover, there is a strong and

significant positive association between the rate of growth of
per capita income and the income share of the low income group.
This indicates that rapid growth in per capita income may be
regarded as a potentially valuable source of improvement in the
relative (and absolute) position of the poor in developing
countries.
p e r se

There is thus no necessary conflict between growth

and a reduction in the degree of inequality in the course

of development.

This is an important result, which seems to be

stable under a variety of regression tests, and which, because it
is remarkably different to the expectations held by some economists,
may bear further investigation.

This is attempted briefly in

section 3.3 below.

3.2

Postscript on the results of Adelman-Morris (1973) and
Ahluwalia (1976)
Several researchers have criticised the Adelman-Morris study,

arguing that the technique employed by them is inappropriate and
that the conclusions reached on the basis of that technique are
suspect (see Chapter 1).

Here I wish to consider the regression
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results presented by Adelman and Morris as an appendix to their
book.

They maintain that these support their other results but

that they have only a low degree of confidence in the regression
results, because
...Regression analysis is more dependent on and
more sensitive to the accuracy of data inputs than
is hierarchical analysis, since it requires that
measurements be cardinal, (p.220)
In my view this is a plus for regression analysis if it is
done properly;

and I have shown above that the regression results

may very well be insensitive to alternative data specifications
when the relationships one is purporting to measure are in fact
quite robust and fundamental to the processes of interest.
Their technique of hierarchical analysis indicates that five
of the most important variables associated with inter-country
differences in patterns of income distribution are:

(i) an index

of equality of access to secondary and university education
(favoring equality);

(ii) natural resource abundance (favoring

concentration at the top);

(iii) the government share in

investment (with a large share shifting income from the top to the
middle class);

(iv) the extent of dualism (with greater dualism

associated with greater concentration);
capita G.D.P.

and (v) the level of per

In their regressions they use a quadratic term in

G.D.P., but not the logarithmic transformation which I have argued
is reasonable;

and they note a statistically significant inverted-U

pattern in support of Kuznets hypothesis, although the degree of
explanation is very low.

Their variable measuring the rate of

improvement in human resources ((i) above) is a better conceptual
measure than I have used;

however, their interpretation of its

relationship with G.D.P. is not correct:
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...With the addition of rate of improvement of
human resources as a second independent variable,
the relationship between income of the poor and
averaae G.D.P. shifts from a positive to a net
negative one. The shift is understandable
statistically, since per capita G.D.P. and rate of
improvement of human resources are significantly
correlated. We interpret the shift to have
substantive meaning in part because of its
consistency with the results of the hierarchical
analyses,
(p.224)
In fact the coefficient on per capita G.D.P. is not
significantly different from zero in the equations to which they
refer, neither before nor after the addition of the rate of
improvement of human resources.

The shift in sign is statistically

meaningless.
Variables to capture the effects of natural resource endowment
and of dualism are not included in their regression analysis,
although they recognise the importance of these effects in the
main analysis.

Lack of suitable data prevented me from including

natural resource endowment as an explanatory variable in my
regressions.

The effect of dualism has been shown to be of prime

importance in this chapter, particularly dualism in the labour
force structure.

The importance which Adelman and Morris attach

to the economic role of the government is also overdone - it has
a significant negative effect on income of the high income groups
in their regressions, but no significant effect on the low income
groups (i.e. it benefits only the middle income group).
Finally, they state that short-term growth rates are not
significantly related to income shares in any of the regression
equations, neither are they important in their hierarchical
analyses.

However, they measure the rate of growth of per capita

G.D.P. "...for the longest available period prior to the year of
the income distribution data" (p.233).

This is surely a less
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consistent measure than the fixed ten year growth effect I have
used, and found to be associated significantly with reductions in
equality.

In a more recent paper, Adelman (1975) qualified the

conclusions of Adelman-Morris (1973), stating that high growth
rates in per capita income (greater than 5.5% per annum) are a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for substantial
improvements in the income share of the poor.

The sufficiency

conditions she stated required a human-resource-intensive
development strategy in which broad-based massive investment in
education is combined with labour intensive production on a large
scale.

Such a conclusion should be tested for individual countries

and can not be evaluated on the basis of the cross-country results
presented in the previous chapter.

Indeed, Adelman's conclusions

seem to be strongly influenced by her experience with economic
development planning in the Republic of Korea.

My study is methodologically very close to that by Ahluwalia
(1976) being based upon multiple regression analysis, and we have
drawn our data from the same source reference (Jain (1975)).

The

actual income distributions for the various countries selected by
Ahluwalia for his sample are different from those which I have
selected, and his choice of explanatory variables is also different.
Ahluwalia's explanatory variables account for a higher
proportion of variation in income shares of the middle income
group than is the case in my Table 2.5 above, but for the other
income shares the overall fit of our respective results are very
similar.

He has included a dummy variable for socialist countries

in his analysis (my sample excludes socialist countries) which is
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highly significant, and I would argue that this "explains" much of
the explained variation in income shares in his study.

His result

in this respect is to be expected in view of the importance of the
initial distribution of capital ownership for income distribution
(mentioned earlier).

My results are therefore even more

encouraging in view of the statistical significance attained
without recourse to this acknowledged determinant of inequality.
The three main aspects of the development process which
Ahluwalia finds systematically related to the degree of inequality
are:
(1)

Intersectoral shifts involving a relative
decline of the traditional agricultural sector
and a parallel shift of population to the
urban sector.

(2)

Expansion in the educational and skill
characteristics of the population.

(3)

The 'demographic transition' involving a
reduction in the rate of growth of population,
(p.314).

He uses agricultural value added and urban population to
measure the first aspect, the literacy rate and secondary school
enrolment rate to measure the second aspect, and the population
growth rate to measure the third aspect.

All of these are

different to the variables I have used to measure similar aspects
of the development process.

The method of deducing the explanatory

variables which provide the most stable and significant relation
ships in both studies is "...essentially a heuristic exploration
of alternative patterns",

(p.315).

I have considered the reasons

why the particular variables used in chapter two appear to provide
slightly better results, reasons which are discussed in the text
above.
Ahluwalia found no statistically significant relationship
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between the rate of qrowth averaged over ten years and the income
shares of the poor, and concluded that this does not support the
hypothesis that faster growth exacerbates the longer-term forces
outlined above.

This conclusion is true, and my results have

shown a significant positive effect of growth in per capita income
with the income share of the poor.
In a footnote on page 313 Ahluwalia recognises the bias
involved in making international comparisons of G.N.P. by official
exchange conversions.

I have been able to test the regression

results for sensitivity to alternative estimation of per capita
income.

Finally, Ahluwalia's conception of the appropriate

methodological standpoint involved in this type of study is very
well expressed in the following words:
It is self-evident that the relationships thus
identified are primarily associational. They do
not necessarily establish the nature of the
underlying causal mechanism at work for the simple
reason that quite different causal mechanisms might
generate the same observed relationship between
selected variables. Such alternative mechanisms
(or hypotheses) are observationally equivalent in
the sense that our estimated equations do not
always permit us to choose between them,
(p.308)

3.3

Short-term growth and income distribution revisited
One of the most interesting results to emerge from the

previous analysis is the significant positive effect exerted by
the aggregate growth rate on income shares of the poor.

This is

so despite the observed tendency for secular forces that are
typically associated with long term development to work against
the poorer groups in under-developed countries.

Moreover, since

this result for aggregate income growth appears to challenge the
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expectations held by some economists over the postwar period, it
may be useful to consider the question from a slightly different
point of view.

In the absence of time series data for most

countries, it is again necessary to approach the problem using
cross-country data from Jain (1975).

This time, however, we

consider only those countries for which distribution estimates are
listed for two separate points in time.

Provided that the estimates

for a given country are derived from reasonably comparable
sources1, they can be combined with aggregate per capita income
estimates for both points in time to yield estimates of income
accruing to various percentiles of the population.

It is then a

simple matter to compute the implied average annual rate of growth
of income accruing to (say) the poorest 40% of the population, and
to compare this with the average annual growth of total income per
capita over the same period.

Table 3.1 lists the 15 developing

countries and 11 developed countries for which two reasonably
comparable distributions were available (for at least five years
apart).

Each country is given a number to simplify plotting of

the results.
Figure 3.1 plots the average annual rate of growth of real per
capita gross domestic income on the horizontal axis, and the
estimated annual growth in income of the poorest 40% of the
1 Strict comparability is probably impossible, even if the data is
presented by the same researcher or institution. The judgement
about comparability of different distributions for the same
country is to this extent arbitrary. However, in many cases it
was possible to cross-check the apparent distributional change
between the two chosen observations with source references or
other country-specific information and, since we are again
concerned mainly with broad patterns, we can be reasonably
confident in the results presented here. Once again the
methodology has been suggested by Ahluwalia (in Chenery et.al.
(1975)) but again the chosen observations are quite different.

61

.

population over the same period on the vertical axis.

The scatter

of points are numbered for each country in Table 3.1, and changes
in relative inequality can be inferred for each country by
considering its position in relation to the 45° line.

Countries

above the 45° line are those in which the income of the lowest 40%
grew more rapidly than total income (i.e. the poor have benefited
from growth).

In those countries below the 45° line, the lowest

40% of income recipients have not shared in the overall growth of
the country as much as the higher groups.

Once again, because of

the nature of the data, too much credence should not be placed in
small quantum differences between points in Figure 3.1;

rather we

wish to consider the general area of the plot occupied by each
country.
Statistical analysis of the results presented in Figure 3.1
is indeterminate in the following respect.

Let X be the percentage

growth rate of per capita aggregate income, and let Y be the
percentage growth rate of income accruing to the poorest 40%.
A line fitted by O.L.S. to the 26 observations in Figure 3.1 is
given by:
Y = 0.59 + 0.92X (r2 = .47)
(SE = .20)
The slope estimate (0.92) is not significantly different from
unity, neither is the intercept term (0.59) significantly
different from zero (even at the 20% level).

Therefore the

estimated line is not significantly different in the statistical
sense from the 45° line.
Similarly, fitting an O.L.S. line only to the 14 developing
countries in the sample (excluding Yugoslavia) gives:
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TABLE 3.1
S A M P L E OF 26 C O U N T R I E S FOR E X A M I N A T I O N OF S H O R T - R U N E F F E C T S
OF G R O W T H ON INCOME S H A R E S A C C R U I N G TO P O O R E S T 4 0 % OF P O P U L A T I O N
COUNTRY

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Brazil
Canada
Colombia
C o s t a Rica
Denmark
F i j i (a )
Finland
France
G e r m a n y (Fed.
India
Japan
Korea(b)

Rep.)

Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Phi 1 i ppi nes
Sri L anka
Sweden
Taiwan
United Kingdom
United States
Yugoslavia

Notes:

- 1968 data from Ward

YEAR 1

YEAR 2

1960(1)
1961(1)
1964(3)
1961(1)
1955(2)
1968
1952(1)
1956(1)
1955(1)
1955(1)
1962(2)
1960
1960(2)
1963(2)
1962(1)
1957(1)
1964(1)
1960(1)
1961(2)
1961(2)
1963(1)
1963(1)
1964(3)
1960(2)
1960(1)
1963(1)

1970(5)
1965(1)
1970(6)
1971(2)
1966(2)
1973
1962(1)
1962(1)
1964(1)
1965(4)
1971(2)
1970
1970(2)
1968(4)
1967(2)
1963(1)
1970(4)
1970(3)
1971(4)
1971(4)
1973(4)
1970(2)
1972(4)
1968(2)
1970(3)
1968(2)

(a)

Fiji

(b)

- 1 9 7 3 d a t a f r o m Fiji U n e m p l o y m e n t S u r v e y (1973)
K o r e a - d a t a f r o m R e n a u d (19 7 6 ) ( C h a e ' s e s t i m a t e s )

(197 1 )

N u m b e r s in p a r e n t h e s e s a f t e r y e a r s in t a b l e r e f e r to
n u m b e r e d s o u r c e s in J a i n ' s c o m p i l a t i o n .
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= 0.55 + 1.114X'

(r2 = .55)

(SE = .29)
(where the prime on X and Y indicates the different sample).
Again the estimated line is not significantly different from the
45° line.
Therefore, it is not possible to draw any generalised
conclusion from Figure 3.1 about the positive or negative effects
of short-to-medium-term growth on the income of the poorest 40% of
the population.

For the developing countries, eight of them lie

above the 45° line - that is, positive redistribution to the poor
has accompanied growth.

These eight countries are:

3.

Colombia (1964-70)

4.

Costa Rica (1961-71)

6.

Fi ji (1968-73)

12.

Korea (1960-70)

13.

Malaysia (1960-70)

17.

Pakistan (1964-70)

21.

Sri Lanka (1963-73)

23.

Taiwan (1964-72)

Four of the countries which have enjoyed less inequality have
also experienced rapid aggregate growth (Fiji, Korea, Pakistan and
Taiwan), which would tend to suggest that it is possible under
certain conditions for some developing countries to improve the
distribution of income in general, and the lot of the poor in
particular, while still maintaining rapid aggregate growth.
On the other hand there are four developing countries below
the 45° line in Figure 3.1 - that is, growth of the national
economy in these countries has left the poorest 40% of the
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population behind.
1.

These are:

Brazil (1960-70)

10.

India (1955-65)

14.

Mexico (1963-68)

19.

Peru (1961-71)

Thus we cannot deny the existence of immisensing growth for many
developing countries, and most notably for the populous countries
such as India and Brazil.

Of course, the critical questions

relate to the type of growth required, and how it is generated,
as well as who receives the benefits.

These questions cannot be

answered with the type of cross-section regression analysis used
in this section and the previous chapter.

In fact all of the

findings discussed above should be treated as generalised results
which may be useful for organising hypotheses to be examined in
the context of individual countries' situations and experiences.
In subsequent chapters of this dissertation I have examined the
relationships here shown to be generally important, for the
particular case of Fiji.

PART I I

Patterns of Demography and Employment
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CHAPTER 4
Analysis of Population Growth and Forecasting for Fiji

4.1

Introduction
In the econometric analysis of chapter two the variable which

most consistently affected the income shares accruing to
particular groups was that relating to employment patterns in the
workforce.

Any planning framework designed to promote reductions

in income inequality would have to give careful consideration to
the creation of employment opportunities for a growing workforce.
In doing so it would take as part of the given initial conditions
the size, age structure, location and rate of growth of the
country's population, these being the primary determinants of the
size of the workforce now and in the future.

Demographic changes

are not easily predictable, however, and it is necessary to
recognise this explicitly before proceeding to the analysis of
employment problems in a planning situation.

The empirical

analysis of chapter two also showed that demographic changes
themselves have an important influence upon the distribution of
income through changes in the birthrate.

It was suggested that

this affects family size and hence savings and consumption
behaviour of families at different income levels.

For each of

these reasons the planning framework with which we are concerned
will require a demographic subsystem as one of its building
blocks.
This chapter examines the age/sex composition of Fiji's
population and considers techniques for projecting it into the
future according to a set of strict accounting identities.

This

projection method uses standard demographic techniques as described
in Keyfitz and Flieger (1971).
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Certain modifications to the accounting framework are considered
with a view to changing the projections into forecasts, then
statistical confidence intervals are estimated for the forecast
results.

The procedure is applied to available data on demographic

change in Fiji between the 1966 and 1976 Censuses.
of forecasts

was

The first set

based upon the 1966 Census and was

prepared

before the 1976 Census and 1974 Fertility Survey were published.
The degree of accuracy with which the size and age structure of
the 1976 population is predicted constitutes a validation test of
the forecasts.

The chapter also contains population projections

for Fiji to the end of this century under a range of assumptions
about changes in the birthrate.

Finally there is a section

analysing available data on rural-to-urban migration in Fiji
over the 1966-76 intercensal period.
The demographic changes studied in this chapter are not
derived from an economic-demographic modelling process (for
example, Coaleand Hoover (1958), I.L.O. (1973), Denton and
Spencer (1975)).

They may be assumed to occur in response to

many different social and economic conditions which for the most
part remain unspecified here.

The primary purpose is to quantify

demographic changes which have occurred in Fiji in recent years,
from which certain social and economic implications may be seen
to emerge, the most important for my purposes being the demand
for employment opportunities.

An associated goal is to assess

the relative sensitivity of the population forecasting model to
variations in patterns of fertility, mortality and net migration
(both internal and overseas migration).

From this point of view

the accuracy of the population forecasts per se is not so
important as the sensitivity tests.

These will provide an
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appreciation of the key variables of interest to the planner who
is concerned with income distribution and employment patterns.

4.2

Historical patterns of population growth in Fiji
The markedly different patterns of population growth exhibited

by the two major racial groups in Fiji (Fijians and Indians) have
been important in a historical context.

Table 4.1 indicates how

the two groups have grown over the past century.

Before 1921 the

number of indigenous Fijians had been declining due to their
susceptibility to diseases brought in by immigrant races (primarily
measles, and also influenza).

Indentured labourers were brought

from India between 1879 and 1916 and few returned after their
indenture period expired.

At this time there were nearly twice

as many Indian males as Indian females, and their natural growth
was consequently slow.
Since 1921 the Fijian population has grown at an increasing
rate, and the Indian population at a rapid rate, until the
mid-1960's.

The introduction of a family planning programme in

1962 has reduced the rates of growth of both major racial groups,
the impact in the Indian community being relatively greater than
that among Fijians.

In 1976, Indians were 49.8% of the total

population, Fijians were 44.2% and other races made up 6% of the
population.
An examination of very recent trends in birth and death
rates for the two main component populations reveals a striking
convergence in performance.

For example, consider Figure 4.1

which shows a three-year moving average of general fertility
rates for Indians and Fijians from 1957 to 1974.
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Table 4.1
Population of Fiji (in thousands)

4.4.1881
5.4.1891
31.3.1901
2.4.1911
24.4.1921
26.4.1936
2.10.1946
26.9.1956
12.9.1966
13.9.1976
(Source:

(Census)

Fijian

Indian

115
106
94
87
84
98
118
148
202
260

1
7
17
40
61
85
121
169
241
293

Other
11
8
9
13
12
16
21
28
34
35

Total
127
121
120
140
157
199
260
345
477
588

1976 Census)

Table 4.2
Average annual exponential growth rates (%)
Period

Fij ian

Indian

Total

1921-1936

0.97

2.25

1.55

1936-1946

1.90

3.48

2.69

1946-1956

2.27

3.41

2.86

1956-1966

3.11

3.52

3.21

1966-1976

2.51

1.95

2.10

The general fertility rate (G.F.R.) is given by:
P F R
- Number of births occuring in a calendar year x 1000
* * ‘ ~ Mid-year estimate of fertile-age females (15-44 years)
This is a better measure of fertility than the crude birth rate
used as an explanatory variable in chapter two.

Since 1965 the

G.F.R.'s of both Indian and Fijian women have been falling at the
same rates.

Similarly, in 1972 the crude birth rate of Fijians

and Indians alike was about 28 per thousand of population, and
their crude death rates were about 4.9 per thousand of population
(Sahib (1973)).

Births per thousand
women aged 15-44

Fiqure 4.1

GENERAL FERTILITY RATES FOR FIJIANS AND INDIANS 1957-1973
(3-YEAR MOVING AVERAGES)
(Source: Registrar-General)
(Redrawn from 1974 Fiji Fertility Survey p.8)

250

100

1956

1957

1958 1959 1960

1961 1962

1963 1964 1965

1966 1967

1968 1969

i
1970 1971

1972

1973
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In view of this convergence in vital rates among the two
major racial groups it was decided to ignore racial differentials
in the population projection methodology applied in this chapter
for the period 1966-76.

Moreover, since the planning framework

envisaged is not concerned explicitly with a division of interest
along racial lines, then it is reasonable to assume for the
present that the vital rates of the component populations do not
deviate significantly from those of the total population.

This

does not rule out the possibility of important differences between
the two groups in the future.

The following comment from the

1974 Fiji Fertility Survey is an appropriate warning on this point:
Indeed, one of the most striking findings of the
survey is the close similarity between Fijian and
Indian marriage cohort fertility. This
correspondence appears to be unstable for, unless
new trends are initiated, it is probable that
Fijian marriage and birth cohort fertility will
soon emerge as higher than the corresponding
measures of Indian fertility.
In other words, the
similarity evident from the survey (and other
contemporary data) may represent only a passing
moment in the demographic history of Fiji. This
prognosis is further strengthened by the balance
of survey data on attitudes, which suggest that
Fijians want slightly larger families than
Indians,
(p.96).

4.3

The life table and its interpretation.
A fundamental model in demographic analysis is the life

table.

The life table for Fiji 1966 shown in Table 4.4 was

computed from a methodology given by Keyfitz and Flieger (1971).
Their method requires data in five-year age cohorts for:
(i)

population, by age and sex;

(ii)

deaths, by age and sex;

(iii) births, by age of mother.
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Data on the age and sex structure of the population is available
from Census enumerations - the initial reference point for this
analysis is the 1966 Census.

Data on births and deaths are

published in the United Nations Demographic Yearbook and these
are from the Fiji Registrar-General.

These registrations are

known to be incomplete and inaccurate as a guide to levels of
fertility and mortality and have been adjusted before computing
the life tables.

The data input to computation of the Fiji 1966

life table is shown in Table 4.3 - the adjustments to the data
are discussed below.
To illustrate those concepts shown in the life table which
are important for the discussion which follows, we can treat the
probabilities as applying to all individuals observed in a given
cohort at a particular point in time.

The fundamental column is

Q(X) n where X refers to the initial age which identifies a
cohort, the subscript N denotes the number of years in the cohort
(one year for the first row, four years for the second row, and
five years for each subsequent row), and Q refers to the
probability1 of a person dying before reaching the next cohort
(X+N).

Conversely, the chances of living through the age range

of a given cohort is l-Q(X).

This is represented by the

"survivorship ratio" L(X)/L(X-N).

The absolute values of the

L(X) have no intrinsic meaning so, by convention, L(0) is set
1 The accuracy of the last three digits in these six digit
probabilities should not be taken seriously. They are included
merely for conformity with the other columns of the table,
e.g., the L (X ) column which is standardised on 100,000 births.
Readers are referred to Keyfitz and Flieger (1971) for
explanation of the other columns of the life table and for
discussion of the simplifying assumptions made in its
compilation.

Table 4.3
Fiji 1966

(Total Population)

Population data from 1966 Census with age groups 75 and over aggregated.
Population of unknown age included with 75 and over group.
Births from Census 0-1 years plus infant deaths in 1966.
Distribution of births averaged over 1964-1968 registrations.
Distribution of deaths averaged over 1964-1968 registrations
Infant deaths inflated to account for assumed 10% underregistration.
All other deaths inflated for assumed 5% underregistration.

Male
8574
33344
39372
31892
25473
20677
17060
14054
11957
9675
8819
7091
4689
3527
2372
1666
2505

Population
Female
8215
32330
37951
31061
25438
21128
17247
13399
11455
9093
8072
6205
4147
3111
1981
1344
1803

242747

233980

Age
0
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
Total

Births

Age

Deaths

0
0
0
0
1689
6036
4693
2583
1564
690
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Male
253
101
40
33
32
38
35
37
45
51
79
92
102
118
107
118
273

Female
213
94
42
27
32
37
29
32
37
37
42
54
53
75
54
67
163

17255

1554

1088

0
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75

Table 4.4
Life Table for Males 1966
Age
0
1
5
10
15

20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75

Age
0
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75

PP
8574
33344
39372
31892
25473
20677
17060
14054
11957
9675
8819
7091
4689
3527
2372
1666
2505

M(X)
.029508
.003029
.001016
.001036
.001261
.001844
.002056
.002643
.003782
.005299
.008989
.013067
.021923
.033650
.045336
.070828
.046276

DD

Q(X)

253

.028761
.012025
.005067
.005165
.006287
.009181
.010230
.013134
.018741
.026172
.044018
.063406
.104230
.155555
.204076
.301372

101
40
33
32
38
35
37
45
51
79
92

102
118
107
118
273

1 .000000

A (X )

TT(X)

.120
1.500
2.500
2.547
2.630
2.586
2.576
2.629
2.638
2.689
2.660
2.669
2.643
2.575
2.557
2.528
9.176

6496947
6399477
6013902
5535337
5059198
4585730
4115924
3650678
3190778
2738118
2295394
1867970
1463095
1091540
767924
501822
301621

L(X)

D(X)

LL(X)

100000

2876
1168
486
493
597
867
957
1216
1712
2346
3842
5291
8146
10890
12064
14180
32871

97469
385576
478564
476139
473468
469806
465246
459900
452660
442724
427424
404876
371555
323616
266102
200201
301621

E(X)

MM(X)

64.969
65.890
62.674
57.980
53.268
48.588
44.014
39.443
34.933
30.549
26.298
22.387
18.722
15.592
12.990
10.665
9.176

.029508
.003029
.001016
.001035
.001256
.001838
.002052
.002633
.003763
.005271
.008958
.012974
.021753
.033456
.045110
.070828
.108982

97124
95956
95470
94977
94380
93513
92556
91341
89629
87283
83441
78150
70005
59115
47051
32871

R(X)
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0326
.0400
.0392
.0380
.0337
.0349
.0283
.0193
.0400
.0400
.0358
.0355
.0000
.0000
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Table 4.4 (cont.)
Life Table for Females 1966
Age
0
1
5
10
15

20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75

Age
0
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75

pp
8215
32330
37951
31061
25438
21128
17247
13399
11455
9093
8072
6205
4147
3111
1981
1344
1803

M(X)
.025928
.002908
.001107
.000869
.001264
.001755
.001684
.002400
.003242
.004081
.005229
.008766
.012886
.024282
.027378
.049851
.033032

Q(X)
213
94
42
27
32
37
29
32
37
37
42
54
53
75
54
67
163

A(X)
.114
1.500
2.500
2.535
2.643
2.547
2.575
2.630
2.601
2.592
2.671
2.662
2.708
2.585
2.605
2.628
11.061

.025346
.011546
.005518
.004336
.006300
.008738
.008384
.011932
.016086
.020207
.025830
.042951
.062582
.114686
.128465
.222895
1.000000

TT(X)
6961668
6863914
6476866
5996494
5518476
5042928
4571000
4103092
3639848
3183080
2734570
2296145
1872526
1470659
1104299
782066
514463

L(X)

D(X)

LL(X )

100000
97465
96340
95808
95393
94792
93964
93176
92064
90583
88753
86460
82747
77568
68672
59850
46510

2535
1125
532
415
601
828
788
1112
1481
1830
2293
3714
5178
8896
8822
13340
46510

97755
387048
480371
478018
475548
471928
467908
463244
456768
448509
438425
423619
401867
366360
322232
267603
514463

R(X)

E(X)

MM (X )

69.617
70.424
67.229
62.588
57.850
53.200
48.646
44.036
39.536
35.140
30.811
26.557
22.630
18.960
16.081
13.067
11.061

.025928
.002908
.001107
.000869
.001258
.001751
.001681
.002388
.003230
.004069
.005203
.008703
.012780
.024108
.027259
.049851
.090405

.0000
.0000
.0000
.0297
.0353
.0360
.0400
.0391
.0369
.0316
.0302
.0400
.0400
.0400
.0400
.0000
.0000
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equal to 100,000 and the relevant probabilities of surviving to
the next cohort are the ratios between the L(X)'s.

For example,

of 100,000 hypothetical male births in Fiji 97,124 are expected
to see their first birthday - the male survivorship ratio for
L(0) is thus 0.97124.
The computed life tables for Fiji in 1966 show a life
expectancy at birth (E(0)) of almost 65 years for males and 69
years for females.

This appears to compare favourably with life

expectancies in more advanced countries.

For example, Australian

males born in 1967 could expect 68 years of life on average and
females 74 years (from the life table for Australia 1967 in
Keyfitz and Flieger (1971)).

By way of contrast, life expectancy

for males and females born in Mexico in 1966 was 59 years and
63 years respectively (Keyfitz and Flieger (1971)).
Comparisons of infant mortality rates are similarly very
favourable for Fiji.

The male infant mortality rate in Fiji

from Table 4.4 (M(0)) is shown as about 29.5 per thousand live
births;

in Australia in 1967 it was 21 per thousand, but in

Mexico in 1966 it was 76 per thousand.

For females the

corresponding infant mortality figures are Fiji 26 per thousand,
Australia 16 per thousand and Mexico 63 per thousand.
There are two main reasons for exercising a good deal of
caution in interpreting these results.

The first relates to

the unreliability of data in developing countries in general.
In many developing countries a large number of infants born in
remote areas who die in the first weeks of life are not reported
as a birth or a death (Stoeckel and Chowdhury (1972)).

This

may also occur in Fiji because a significant proportion of the
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population lives in areas far from well equipped hospitals and
far from centres of registration of vital events.2

Although one

may be skeptical about the apparent closeness of Fiji's infant
mortality rate and general mortality to that of Australia, the
results listed above would nevertheless not belie the relative
differences in mortality.

Health and nutrition levels in Fiji are

undoubtedly high by world standards.
The second important issue for interpreting the calculated life
table is that a very high proportion of Fiji's population is in the
young age groups.

In 1966 over 40% of Fiji's population was under

15 years of age and 57% was under 20 years of age.

This wide base

of the population pyramid is a common demographic characteristic of
developing countries today.

For example, in Mexico 1966, 46% of

the population was under 15 years of age and 56% was under
20 years.

By way of contrast, only 29% of Australia's 1967

population was under 15 years and 38% was under 20 years.

It is

possible to compute birth and death rates that are standardised
on the age distribution of another country.

The standardisation

2 In 1972 total births reported by the district health nursing
service numbered 15825, while official registrations only
enumerated 15160 - a difference of 665 or 4.2%. The number
of deaths reported by nurses in 1972 was 2812 whereas official
registrations were 2680 - a difference of 132 or 4.9%
(Sahib (1973)). Even the higher figures of the health nurses
have not accounted for all vital events.
It is known that
the Medical Department improved its data collection techniques
in 1973, the results of which are shown by comparing reported
deaths in the Demographic Yearbook of 1976 with that of 1973.
The latest figures show infant deaths twice the number as
in 1973 and other-age deaths about 50% higher than in 1973,
yet real mortality has not increased in Fiji on this scale.
This new data became available only recently and would seem
to indicate that my adjustments for underregistration are
conservative.
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procedure used by Keyfitz and Flieger (1971) gives the following
standardised death rates for Fiji (1966), Australia (1967),
and Mexico (1966):

Table 4.5
Standard countries

Standardised Death Rates
Fiji
(1966)

Australia
(1967)

Mexico
(1966)

10.18

11.34

15.30

United States (1960)

8.55

9.24

13.33

Mexico (1960)

5.26

4.73

9.18

England & Wales (1961)

A high proportion of the population in the young age groups
will yield a low death rate simply because of lower age-specific
mortality rates in young age groups generally.

It should also be

noted that a high proportion of the population in the young age
groups ten years ago means, inter alia, that there will be strong
pressure for expansion of employment opportunities in the coming
decade and beyond.

Further, as these young people marry and have

families of their own, the base of the population pyramid will
continue to widen and the absolute numbers of new entrants to
the labour market will still increase rapidly for a generation
or more.

This is the basis of our concern for population growth

as it influences the planning system for Fiji.

4.4

Population projections and modified forecasts:

1966-1976

In order to consider the size and age structure of Fiji's
expected future population we need a methodology for moving a
given population structure according to expected age-specific
birth and death rates.

One such methodology was developed by
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Leslie (1945), (1948).

His technique involves taking the given

population distribution as a vector, and premultiplying it by a
matrix operator (the "Leslie matrix") which contains mostly zeros
with the exception of the first row and sub-diagonal.

The first

row contains age-specific fertility rates and the sub-diagonal
contains survivorship ratios.

The number of persons in a given

five-year age cohort is multiplied by the appropriate survivorship
ratio to yield the number of persons surviving to the next cohort
in the subsequent five-year period.

The whole population structure

progresses by following survivors down cohort lines in this manner.
At each five-year stage the number in the 0-4 years age group is
created by the first row of the matrix operator.

The identification

of age-specific birth and death rates in the Leslie matrix allows
us to separate the effects of long-run birth and death rates from
short-term fluctuations in a given age distribution.

Further it

allows us to make the assumptions used in forecasting (as opposed
to projections) quite explicit - for instance, the effects of
family-planning campaigns or rural health schemes.
Leslie matrices for Fiji in 1966 were computed for both
females and males3 because the mortality rates are different for
the two sexes and because the distribution of births by age of
father is different to the distribution of births by age of
mother.

These 1966 Leslie matrices are shown in Tables 4.6 and

4.7 for females and males respectively.

When the observed 1966

age distribution for females (or males) is premultiplied by its
appropriate matrix operator, the result is a vector of projected
age structure of Fiji's 1971 female (or male) population.
3 The computation method is explained in Keyfitz and Flieger
(1971) Chapter 8.

Table 4.6

Age
group
0- 4
5- 9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75+

Females
Females 1971
5 yrs Females
1966
Proj- Adjust 1971
Leslie Matrix for Females 1966
Census ected •ment Forecast
.0000 .0000 .0782 .4143 .6577 .5481 .3876 .2499 .0898 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 40545 45190
6020 * 39170
.9909
295
39881
37951 40176
.9951
37525
240
31061 37765
.9948
25438 30899
456
30443
.9924
24544
701
21128 25245
.9915
20372
576
17247 20948
.9900
16694
13399 17075
381
.9860
11455 = 13211
332 = 12879
.9819
11088
9093 11248
160
.9775
8072
136
8752
8888
.9662
6205
7799
74
7725
.9487
4147
64
5887
5823
.9116
3111
3780
48
3732
.8796
1981
2736
24
2712
.8305
1344
1645
8
1637
.5992t
1803
1886
8
1878
233980 274378

*

9523**264855

241 net emigration + 5779 change in fertility (all other cells in column are net emigration)

** 3744 net emigration + 5779 change in fertility
t

Calculated as ratio of survival terminal age group 75 and over to terminal age group 80 and over (from United Nations (1974)).

Table 4.7
Age
group Leslie Matrix for Males 1966
0- 4 .0000 .0000 .0204 .1851 .5747 .7749 .6030 .4086 .2418 .0726 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
5- 9 .9907
10-14
.9949
15-19
.9944
20-24
.9923
25-29
.9903
30-34
.9885
35-39
.9843
40-44
.9781
45-49
.9654
50-54
.9472
55-59
.9177
60-64
.8710
65-69
.8223
70-74
.7523
75+
.6044+

Males
1971 5 yrs Males
Proj- Adjust 1971
ected -merit Forecast

Males
1966
Census
41918
39372
31892
25473
20677
17060
14054
11957
9675
8819
7091
4689
3527
2372
1666
2505

=

46808 5943* 40865
320 41208
41528
260 38911
39171
494 31219
31713
760 24517
25277
624 19852
20476
412 16452
16864
13833 - 359 = 13474
173 11522
11695
148
9192
9340
80
8273
8353
70
6437
6507
52
4032
4084
25
2875
2900
9
1775
1784
2521
9
2512

242747 282854
*

261 net emigration + 5682 change in fertility (all other cells in column are net emigration)

** 4056 net emigration + 5682 change in fertility
t

Calculated as ratio of survival 75 and over to 80 and over (from United Nations (1974)).

iZ3fl*273.116L*

Table 4.8
Age

*

857 net emigration + 4326 change in fertility

** 13300 net emigration + 4326 change in fertility
t

As for Table 4.6

Females
1971
Forecast
.0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000

.

.9412
.9087
.8741
.8058
.5992+

39170
39881
37525
30443
24544
20372
16694
12879
11088
8752
7725
5823
3732
2712
1637
1878

=

Females
1976
5 yrs
Females
Proj- Adjust 1976
ected -merit
Forecast
42311
38857
39702
37304
30172
24306
20158
16420
12601
10796
8368
7271
5291
3262
2185
2106

264855 301110

-

5183 lr
1049
854
1621
2491
2047
1353
1178 =
568
484
263
229
172
84
29

21
17626*

*

37128
37808
38848
35683
27681
22259
18805
15242
12033
10312
8105
7042
5119
3178
2156
2085

283484

Table 4.9
Age

*

927 Net emigration + 4392 change in fertility

** 14400 net emigration + 4392 change in fertility
t

As for Table 4.7.

Males
1976
Projected

Males
1971
Forecast
.0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000

♦

.9028
.8536
.7943
.6896
.6044+

40865
41208
38911
31219
24517
19852
16452
13474
11522
9192
8273
6437
4032
2875
1775
2512

=

44189
40469
40990
38643
30860
24179
19570
16111
13040
10945
8498
7469
5495
3203
1983
2591

273116 308235

5 yrs Males
Adjust 1976
-ment Forecast

-

5319 k
1136
924
1755
2697
2216
1464
1276
615
524
285
248
186
91
32
24

=

38870
39333
40066
36888
28163
21963
18106
14835
12425
10421
8213
7221
5309
3112
1951
2567

18792** 289443
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Successive pre-multiplication of female and male population
distributions by their corresponding matrix operators as shown
in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 would generate projections of the age and
sex structure of the population for any desired number of fiveyearly periods after 1966.

This projection technique constitutes

the accounting identities mentioned in the introductory section.
Given age-specific birth rates and death rates the population in
a given year is projected to a later year in much the same way
that accounts are balanced after a period by the recording of
inflows and outflows.

Such projections cannot be interpreted as

predictions of actual numbers however, because the age-specific
rates of inflow and outflow are usually not constant.

The effect

of the family planning campaign in reducing the general fertility
rate since the mid-1960's has already been mentioned.

The G.F.R.

will vary with the number of women in child-bearing age groups and
this is endogenous to the projection method;

but the numerator

(number of births) has been declining much more rapidly with the
result that the general fertility rate has fallen.

There has also

been a differential change in the fertility of women at different
ages, partly because of the readier acceptance of birth control
methods by women over thirty years of age, and partly because of
social changes leading to later age of marriage for young women
(notably the effects of increasing education, urbanisation and
workforce participation of young women).
The crude death rate will vary endogenously with the
projection method as a direct function of the average age of the
population.

On the other hand, exogenous influences on the death

rate such as improvements in health conditions of the population
will cause the death rate to change in a manner which is not
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accounted for in the projection method.

Certain stochastic

influences may also be considered to affect the future population,
the most important being net migration of people overseas.
Since the projection method moves the population in fiveyearly intervals, the first task is to estimate the actual
population structure in 1971 from the benchmark 1966 Census and
to explain the variation observed between the estimated and the
projected figures on the basis of adjustments made in fertility,
mortality and net migration.

The second stage repeats the process

using the forecast 1971 population as a base from which to
estimate the 1976 population.

Second stage forecasts are shown

in tables 4.8 and 4.9, for females and males, respectively.
Fertility:

The best methodology for analysing changes in the level and
age-pattern of fertility over time would be to estimate the net
maternity function and to predict changes in the number of births
occurring over time on the basis of known (or assumed) changes in
the mean, variance and amplitude of this function.

Adequate

estimation of the net maternity function requires source data in
which the analyst has a high degree of confidence, and this is
not the case for Fiji.11 Therefore it was decided to base estimates4
*
4 The problem of underregistration has already been mentioned.
The reported distributions of births by age of mother are also
unreliable because data are published by year of registration
and not by year of occurrence and the lag between these two
reference points may often be quite long. This aggrevates the
significant variability in the reported distribution of births
from year to year. Mention may be made of interesting work by
p. Cerone, graduate student in Mathematics at the University of
Wollongong, who has developed a method for analysing the
^
implication of changes in the parameters of the net maternity
function over continuous time. Unfortunately it was not
possible to make use of Cerone's work here.

85.

of changes in fertility on given rates of change in the general
fertility rate (but not the reported levels of G.F.R. shown in
figure 4.1, which are subject to the same underregistration
problem).

After adjusting the 1966 Census enumeration of

fertile-age females to obtain a mid-year estimate, and correcting
the number of births in the year for underregistration, the G.F.R.
for 1966 was estimated to be approximately 178.

Using data from

the district health nursing service on the number of births in
1972, and adjusting the 1971 forecast of fertile-age females for
changes in mortality and net emigration (discussed below), gave
an estimated G.F.R. in 1972 of approximately 133.

Births in the

intervening years 1976-1971 were then calculated by assuming a
constant exponential rate of growth of fertile-age female
population and a linear decline in the G.F.R.
It is possible to estimate the end-period (1976) number of
births and the G.F.R. using the 1976 Census data for population
aged 0-1 years, together with an estimate of infant deaths in
1976, but my purpose is to test the sensitivity of a forecasting
procedure for use in the absence of adequate data.

Therefore, it

was simply assumed that the G.F.R. in 1976 would fall to about
125.00 and that the number of fertile-age females would grow
evenly between 1972 and 1976 according to the second stage of the
forecasting method.

Although the fall in G.F.R. over the 1960's

was rapid, this decline is not expected to be as dramatic during
the 1970's and beyond.

There are several reasons to support this

view:
Firstly, the family planning programme is likely to
encounter increasing resistance in reducing births
still further. Secondly, certain structural factors
which may have helped reduce the birth rate in the
latter half of the 1960's may not continue to
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exert a similar influence in the future.
It is
probable that delayed marriage by Indian women was
a factor in the rapid fall of the birth rate in
the 1960's. Thirdly, the number of women entering
the fertile age group will increase rapidly.
(Sahib (1973) pp.58-59).
Provided there is some reasonable justification for the
assumed change in G.F.R. we may proceed for the time being
confident in the expectation that the validation procedure in the
next section will indicate the magnitude of any error in judgement.
Mortality:

It has been stated previously that registrations of deaths in
Fiji are known to be inaccurate.

They are also distorted by

"historical accidents" of the age distributions of deaths and of
total population which may not apply to the future.

Under these

circumstances an attempt was made to generalise the agedistribution of deaths by averaging the registrations over five
calendar years centred on the life-table calculations (for both
1966 and 1971) and also to make some correction for under
registration of deaths.
An alternative approach is to use survival ratios computed
from model life tables published by the United Nations (for
example, U.N. (1974) pp.124-125), which are based upon world-wide
averages about mid-20th century.5

The sensitivity of the population

projections to this alternative specification of survivorship is
5 Our calculated life expectancy in Fiji would tend to lead us to
adopt level 90 of the U.N. estimates as model survivorship
ratios. There is a close correspondence between the U.N.
level 90 model survivorship ratios and those calculated from
the Fiji 1966 life-table for age cohorts 5-9 years through
40-44 years, whereas those cohorts aged 45-49 years and older
tend to correspond to lower level models (i.e. have lower
survivorship ratios than the level 90 model).
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very low indeed.
Table 4.10.

.

Details of this sensitivity test are shown in

The difference in male population is +173, female

population -99 and total population +74.

This is quite

insignificant (but note the higher relative sensitivity for the
over 50 years old population).

It was therefore decided to base

the mortality aspect of the population forecasting upon the
adjusted data from Fiji and not on the generalised U.N. model.

Table 4.10
Sensitivity of 1971 projection to alternative survivorship ratios
(from model life tables)

1971 Projected Population
Computed
Survivorship
Ratios

U.N. Level 90
Model Survivorship
Ratios [21]

Anp
n
yc
Group

Males

Females

Males

Females

0- 4
5- 9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75+

46808
41528
39171
31713
25277
20476
16864
13833
11695
9340
3353
6507
4084
2900
1784
2521

45190
40176
37765
30399
25245
20948
17075
13211
11248
8888
7799
5887
3780
2736
1645
1886

46808
41155
39124
31662
25200
20414
16831
13842
11727
9412
8463
6666
4266
3047
1889
2521

45190
39912
37754
30878
25219
20908
17047
13222
11273
8900
7830
5938
3878
2791
1653
1886

Total

282854

274378

283027

274279

(Note:

0-4 yrs assumed identical to computed projection;
70-74 yrs survivorship ratio identical to computed projection)
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Migration:

There has been net emigration of Fiji residents each year
since 1966.

The estimated annual levels of net emigration of

residents (i.e. citizens and permit holders) from 1966 to 1976
are:6

1966

-

800

1972

-

2800

1967

-

1100

1973

-

4900

1968

-

1300

1974

-

6500

1969

-

1300

1975

-

7500

1970

-

1800

1976

-

6000

1971

-

2300

Net emigration has been much greater during the second stage
of the forecasting period than the first.

Table 4.11 shows the

age distribution of net emigration derived from monthly migration
figures for the financial year 1973/74, as well as the total
number of males and females.

Unfortunately there is no published

data showing distribution of net migration by both age and sex,
and the 1973/74 monthly migration statistics were the only ones
available to me at the time of writing.

Applying the proportionate

distributions of 1973/74, first by sex, then by age group, to the
aggregate net emigration figures is the best possible approximation
in view of the lack of accurate data.

6 Total estimates of annual net emigration for 1966 to 1973 are
from Bartsch (1974). Those for 1974 to 1976 were derived from
monthly statistics of migration supplied by the Bureau of
Statistics. The figures relate to net emigration of "residents",
which includes both Fiji citizens as well as permit holders and
other exempted persons.
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Table 4.11
Net Emigration (1973/74) Citizens and Permit Holders
Age group
0- 4
5- 9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75+

Total Numbers

(50

345
423
344
653
1004
825
545
475
229
195
106
92
69
34
12
8

6.44
7.89
6.42
12.19
18.73
15.39
10.17
8.86
4.27
3.64
1.98
1.72
1.29
.63
.22
.15

69.61%
6Ï

5359

Net Emigration (1973/74) Citizens and Permit Holders

Source:

Males

Females

2723
(52%)

2518
(48%)

Total
5241

Fiji Bureau of Statistics

This completes the description of the changes made to the
projection method in order to generate population forecasts.
The sequence of working began with the computation of a life
table for males and females in 1966, then used the stationary
age distribution as well as observed fertility patterns to
calculate Leslie projection matrices for males and females.

The

1971 projections were adjusted for known changes in fertility and

90.

net emigration, and were tested for sensitivity to alternative
survivorship rates.

Then a new life table for 1971 was calculated

using the estimated age and sex distribution of population, births
and deaths for that year, and 1976 projections were generated
using updated Leslie matrices.

Again the projections were

modified to account for assumed changes in fertility and for net
emigration to yield a forecast of the age and sex structure of
Fiji's population in 1976.

These adjustments are shown alongside

the projection method in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 (for 1971 forecasts)
and Tables 4.8 and 4.9 (for 1976 forecasts).

The differences

between the forecasts and the projections are summarised below:
1971:

Males

Females

Total

Projection

282854

274378

557232

Forecast

273116

264855

537971

9738

9523

19261

due to change
in fertility:

5682

5779

11461

due to net
emigration:

4056

3744

7800

Difference
Of which:

Males

Females

Total

Projection

308235

301110

609345

Forecast

289443

283484

572927

18792

17626

36418

4392

4326

8718

14400

13300

27700

1976:

Di fference
Of which:

due to change
in fertility:
due to net
emigration :

For 1971, 60% of the difference between the Leslie projection
and the adjusted forecast is attributable to the falling fertility
over the previous five-year period, and 40% is due to net
emigration (both of which are ignored in the projection method).
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There was no alteration in assumed survival ratios between
the two methods.
For 1972-1976, when migration had been more than in the
preceeding five years and the rate of fertility reduction somewhat
less, assumed fertility change accounted for 24% of the difference
between the projected total population and the adjusted forecast,
while assumed net emigration accounted for 76%.

Again mortality

assumptions were invariant between the two methods.

4.5

Validation of the forecasts 1966-1976
Even if all of the assumptions made in the previous section

did happen to accurately reflect actual behaviour, some random
error in prediction would still remain.

The columns of the life

tables used refer to expected values, and even if the probabilities
do apply to individuals in the course of natural growth, any
actual cohort will vary by chance from the expected value because
of random disturbances in the current period (affecting current
deaths) and in previous periods (affecting the given age
distribution).

In this section statistical confidence limits

on such random errors are calculated.

Then the forecast 1976

population (by age and sex) is compared with the 1976 Census
enumeration.

Differences between the two distributions that

exceed the random error bounds may then be attributed to errors
in the forecasting procedure.

The calculation of statistical

confidence limits on random projection errors is not discussed in
Keyfitz and Flieger (1971) although they do refer to the existence
of such errors.

The validation procedure in this section takes

these errors into account and provides a basis for identifying the
important demographic variables of interest to this study.
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Consider first of all the relation between the error, the
risk and the sample size for proportions (Yamane (1973) pp.205-207).
The statistical question is:

what sample size must be drawn so

as to keep the error within (say)

2%

with a risk of 0.05?

Assuming a normal distribution, this is illustrated as:

The standard error of p is given by

viPF

.. (,)

1

Without knowing the value of

tt,

we may note the relation
................( 2 )

Solving for n, we have
n

Z 2 tt( 1 - tt)

= Q-96)2
(0.02)2

IT ( 1 —TT )

(3)
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Now, if we can find a value of tt that maximises (3), then n will
be large enough to be sure (at least 95% sure) that the random
error is within ±2% of the estimate.
maximising

ttO

This is the same thing as

which is given by solving

- tt) ,

¿ 7 (""T2 ) = 0

. * .

TT

= 0.5

Substituting into (3), the desired sample size is

n

11-96^2

=

. (0 .25 )

(0 .02)2
= 2400
The formula for sample size can now be generalised with the
inclusion of

tt(

I - tt)

n =

= 0.25 as follows:
0.25 z2

(4)

Re-arranging (4) to make e the subject of the formula gives
e = / 0.25 z2

V — S........

........ ( 5)

We are now able to compute error bounds for the population
forecasts.

Firstly, values must be assigned to n and z.

As

regards n, the size of each estimated age/sex cohort as a sample
estimate is supposed to be the same as that of the population
(i.e. my forecasts should ideally correspond with the Census at
that date).

As the sample size approaches the population, the

probability that the estimate is a consistent estimate approaches
unity.

Therefore, the acceptable risk may be set as low as

possible - say 0.001.

The value of z will then be 3.09 and the

percentage errors will be given by solving
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e

0.25 (3.09)2
n

2.387025
n

]/■

where n is the estimated cohort size.

Table 4.12 shows the

calculated random error range (+ or - the value shown) for my
1976 forecasts of male and female population by five-year age
groups.

These calculations indicate that we are almost (99.999%)

certain that the random errors of the population distribution will
be within the bounds shown.
Table 4.12 also shows the difference between my forecast
results for 1976 and the 1976 Census enumeration;
labelled "estimation error".

this is

Any excess of the estimation error

over the random error (in absolute value terms) may confidently be
attributed to inappropriate assumptions in the forecasting
procedure.

Put another way, if for any cohort the estimation

error is less than the random error bound, we cannot be sure
that the estimation error is not simply due to random processes.
This condition appears to be satisfied only for males aged
15-19 years, for some older age males, and for females in the
45-54 age range.

We are now in a position to evaluate the

assumptions used in the forecasting procedure.
The total estimation error of 15000 persons is shared fairly
evenly between males and females.

There appears to be some

consistent overestimation of the older male and female populations
(aged over 55 years).

This might be partly due to a failure to

account adequately for overseas migration in these older age
groups but, in view of the earlier comments on underregistration
of deaths, it is more likely to be due to the conservatism with
which I have approached mortality rates in Fiji.

Table 4.10

demonstrates that the numbers in these older age groups are

Table 4.12

Validation of 1976 Population Forecast
MALES
Forecast

Random
Error
%
Value

Estimation
Error

Census

0- 4
5- 9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75+

38870
39333
40066
36888
28163
21963
18106
14835
12425
10421
8213
7221
5309
3112
1951
2567

0.78
0.78
0.77
0.80
0.92
1.04
1.15
1.27
1.39
1.51
1.70
1.82
2.12
2.77
3.50
3.05

305
306
309
297
259
229
208
188
172
158
140
131
113
86
68
78

- 2672
- 386
- 1520
+
59
+ 330
- 472
- 647
- 1096
- 766
- 406
- 444
+ 107
+
82
+ 178
+
62
+
84

41542
39719
41586
36829
27833
22435
18753
15931
13191
10827
8657
7114
5227
2934
1889
2483

TOTAL

289443

0.29

831

- 7507

296950

FEMALES
Random
Error
Value
%
37128
37808
38848
35683
27681
22259
18805
15242
12033
10312
8105
7042
5119
3178
2156
2085

0.80
0.79
0.78
0.82
0.93
1.03
1.13
1.25
1.41
1.52
1.72
1.84
2.16
2.74
3.32
3.38

298
300
305
292
257
231
212
191
169
157
139
130
110
87
72
71

0.29

823

Estimation
Error _______ Census
2636
441
2146
656
1294
385
238
821
558
74
118
432
403
252
307
373

39764
38249
40994
36339
28975
22644
18567
16063
12591
10386
7987
6610
4716
2926
1849
2458

- 7634

291118

-

+
-

+
+
+
+
+
-

vo
cxi
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sensitive to variations in assumed survival ratios because of
their relatively small size and because their age-specific
mortality rates are higher than those for younger age groups.
Variation in mortality will tell only a minor part of the
story for the population under 45 years old.

This is because the

size of the younger cohorts is relatively large and, for at
least the 5-9 to 30-34 years cohorts, their survival ratios are
very close to unity as a general rule.

With the exception of

20-24 year old males and 30-34 year old females, there is
consistent underestimation of the population under 45 years.
Consider the population in the age range characteristic of female
reproductive age, viz:

15-44 years.

(Females in this age range

are the denominator of the fertility rate so it is important to
estimate their numbers accurately for future projection purposes).
Clearly the estimates of net emigration were too high for both
males and females in the 15-44 years age groups.

Part of this

error is undoubtedly due to the assumption which was made
concerning the age/sex composition of net emigration (i.e. using
the observed composition by sex and by age in 1973/74 for all
years in the forecasting period).

Taken as a whole, the

estimation error for the 15-44 years age group is approximately
6000 persons.

It may be that not all residents departing Fiji

who list themselves as emigrants are permanent emigrants, but
are only temporarily so.

Net emigration would appear not to be

quite as serious as was formerly feared (but see the comment
below by the Statistician on errors in estimating population).
Finally, consider the forecasts for children.

The

underestimation of the child population in 1976 is primarily due
to erroneous assumptions about fertility variations in the two
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five-year periods 1967-71 and 1972-76, although clearly much worse
for the latter period.

These errors are more serious when it is

remembered that the fertile-age female population was also
underestimated, and when new evidence regarding extremely high
underregistration of infant deaths before 1975 is considered.
This means that the divergence between the assumed fertility
and the actual fertility rate is even larger than is
indicated by estimation errors in the child population, this being
only a reflection of the numerator.

For example, if it had been

assumed that the G.F.R. was nearly constant after 1972 at
approximately 130.00 instead of falling to 125.00, and that births
were recalculated on this basis with no other changes, then forty
percent of the estimation error in the 0-4 years age group would
disappear.

If the new evidence on infant mortality had been

published earlier, the higher number of infant deaths would
increase the error by twenty per cent.

Much of the remaining

error is attributable to inaccurate estimation of the population
of fertile-age females.
In demographic analysis it is usual to accept the census
enumerations as accurate, and this has been the approach adopted
in this chapter.

However, there is good evidence in this case

that some of the estimation error observed in my forecasts is
attributable to some degree of underenumeration at the 1966 census,
the basis for my forecasts.

This evidence was presented in the

1976 census report, where the Statistician commented on the census
coverage:
The total of 588068 persons compares with an
estimate of 581324 persons for census night. The
estimate is based on the 1966 census, registration
of births and deaths and on migration statistics
and when it is adjusted to allow for incomplete
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registration, the possibility of underenumeration
at the (1966) census is suggested. Obviously no
conclusions could be made as to the degree of
error until the data had been processed and the
whole of the evidence had been assessed, but on any
reasonable assumptions about the 1966 base and the
completeness of registration it was clear that the
error was not unduly large,
(p.15).
The Statistician's estimation error was only half as great as
mine, but this is of little consequence as my purpose has been to
assess the relative sensitivity of population forecasting to
assumptions concerning different aspects of demographic change.
This would not have been as clear if my forecasts had just
happened to be accurate.7

4.6

Population projection:

1976-2001

A life table for 1976 was calculated using the 1976 census
enumeration by age and sex as the base.

Data on the distribution

of deaths in 1976 was not available, so the 1975 data was used as
a proxy with some slight adjustments to overcome obvious
irregularities in the age distribution of registered deaths in
that year.

The total number of female deaths was increased

slightly, but there was no systematic attempt to account for
underregistration of deaths.

This is because the registrations

for 1975 are believed to be far more accurate than was the case
in earlier years (as noted in footnote 2) - in particular, infant
7 The Statistician seems to be hinting that his estimation error
of 6744 may largely be due to underenumeration at the base 1966
census. There is close correspondence between this figure and
the amount of error which I have previously attributed to
inappropriate emigration data and it might be argued that the
latter data is not greatly in error. The evidence is inadequate
to permit this line of argument to be accepted. The sensitivity
of working-age population estimates in Fiji to net emigration
assumptions as demonstrated in the text still remains as the
pertinent conclusion (rather than the accuracy of those
assumptions p e r s e ) .
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mortality is believed to be more fairly represented in the more
recent data.

The total number of births was obtained by adding

infant deaths to the observed 1976 census enumeration of 0-1 year
old population.

This gave an estimate of 17714 births for 1976

and, with the population of fertile-age females at the census
being 135177, the estimated general fertility rate for 1976 was
approximately 131.

The distribution of births by age of mother

was only slightly different to that used in the 1966-based methods,
the main effect being to reduce the proportion of births occurring
to women over thirty years of age.
The data input to the 1976-based computations is listed in
Table 4.13 and the life tables for males and females are shown
in Table 4.14.

The mortality rates are higher in the 1976 life

tables than in the 1966 life tables, and the survival rates used
in the projection will therefore be lower.

Life expectancy at

birth is estimated at 61 years for males and almost 67 years for
females.8

Infant mortality rates are 43 and 39 per thousand

male and female births respectively.*
I

8 Population projections used by the Fiji Central Planning
Office in preparation for Fiji's Seventh Development Plan
1976-1980 (D.P. 7) were based upon the 1966 Census and
adjusted in the light of subsequent medical and other data:
" ___ they imply a life expectancy at birth for
Fijians of 59.3 years (males) and 62.4 years
(females), and for Indians of 58.1 years (males)
and 61.3 years (females)." (D.P. 7, p .259)
These life expectancies are significantly less than those which
I have computed. Yet within D.P. 7 there is some inconsistency
which states on page 190 that:
" ___ life expectancy rates are comparable to
those in more developed countries".
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Table 4.13
Fiji 1976 (Total Population)

Population data from 1976 Census with age groups 75+ aggregated
Population of unknown age included with 75 and over age group
Deaths based on 1975 registrations - some adjustment to smooth
distribution
Births from 1976 Census 0-1 yrs plus infant deaths estimate
Distribution of births averaged over 1969-1973

Age

0
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75

Population
Male
Female

Births
Male

Deaths
Female

8582
32960
39719
41586
36829
27833
22435
18753
15931
13191
10827
8657
7114
5227
2934
1889
2483

8439
31325
38249
40994
36339
28973
22644
18567
16063
12591
10386
7987
6610
4716
2926
1849
2460

0
0
0
0
1718
6643
5084
2462
1311
496
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

367
156
61
50
52
59
54
58
70
77
122
141
157
180
165
180
417

326
140
64
42
49
57
46
49
56
57
65
82
81
115
82
103
250

Total 296950

291118

17714

2366

1664

Age

0
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75

The 1976 population was projected to the year 2001 using a
projection technique similar to the Leslie matrix multipliers
described in section 4.4.

At first it was assumed that the rates

of fertility and mortality would remain constant at their 1976
levels, and that no net emigration would occur.

The results

are shown in Table 4.15 which indicates an average exponential
growth rate of approximately 2.4% per annum for total population,
2.7% for the population over 15 years old, and 2.0% for the
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Table 4.14
Life Table for Males 1976

DD

0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75

8582
32960
39719
41586
36829
27833
22435
18753
15931
13191
10827
8657
7114
5227
2934
1889
2483

367
156
61
50
52
59
54
58
70
77
122
141
157
180
165
180
417

Age

M( X)

0
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75

.042764
.004733
.001536
.001202
.001417
.002128
.002413
.003105
.004411
.005874
.011340
.016349
.022148
.034701
.056719
.095289
.098721

1

A(X)
.143
1.500
2.500
2.476
2.632
2.594
2.579
2.626
2.621
2.725
2.668
2.602
2.615
2.619
2.582
2.516
5.954

X

PP

O'

Age

.041252
.018711
.007650
.005993
.007060
.010588
.011995
.015411
.021827
.028984
.055241
.078659
.105186
.160264
.249393
.385247
1.000000

TT(X)
6102872
6006409
5627394
5158789
4693395
4230937
3772552
3319345
2872254
2433413
2005366
1595025
1212111
863880
560849
318587
151385

L(X)
100000
95875
94081
93361
92802
92147
91171
90077
88689
86753
84239
79585
73325
65613
55097
41356
25424

R(X)
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0288
.0400
.0391
.0333
.0312
.0317
.0322
.0273
.0241
.0400
.0400
.0000
.0000

D(X)

LL(X)

4125
1794
720
560
655
976
1094
1388
1936
2514
4653
6260
7713
10515
13741
15932
25424

96463
379015
468606
465394
462457
458385
453207
447092
438841
428047
410341
382914
348231
303030
242262
167202
151385

E(X)
61.029
62.648
59.814
55.256
50.574
45.915
41.379
36.850
32.386
28.050
23.806
20.042
16.531
13.166
10.179
7.703
5.954

MM(X)
.042764
.004733
.001536
.001202
.001412
.002120
.002407
.003093
.004394
.005837
.011268
.016287
.022069
.034437
.056237
.095289
.167942
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Table 4.14

.

(c o n t.)

Life Table for Females 1976

Age

PP

DD

0
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75

8439
31325
38249
40994
36339
28973
22644
18567
16063
12591
10386
7987
6610
4716
2926
1849
2460

326
140
64
42
49
57
46
49
56
57
65
82
81
115
82
103
250

Age

M(X)

0
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75

.038630
.004469
.001673
.001025
.001353
.001974
.002035
.002648
.003499
.004547
.006299
.010319
.012332
.024574
.028167
.055706
.040820

Q(X)

L(X)

.037382
.017680
.008331
.005109
.006742
.009821
.010123
.013159
.017349
.022490
.031041
.050348
.059957
.116014
.132021
.246017
1.000000

100000
96262
94560
93772
93293
92664
91754
90825
89630
88075
86094
83422
79222
74472
65832
57141
43083

A( X)

TT (X)

R(X)

.136
1.500
2.500
2.431
2.643
2.569
2.564
2.609
2.605
2.618
2.673
2.603
2.695
2.595
2.630
2.628
9.840

6682852
6586083
6205291
5734461
5266831
4801848
4340741
3884234
3432966
2988539
2552884
2128632
1721591
1336433
984853
676292
423938

.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0235
.0400
.0400
.0332
.0341
.0377
.0392
.0360
.0372
.0400
.0400
.0000
.0000

D(X)

LL(X)

3738
1702
788
479
629
910
929
1195
1555
1981
2672
4200
4750
8640
8691
14058
43083

96769
380793
470830
467630
464982
461107
456507
451268
444426
435656
424252
407041
385158
351580
308560
252354
423938

E(X)
66.829
68.418
65.623
61.153
56.455
51.820
47.308
42.766
38.302
33.932
29.652
25.517
21.731
17.946
14.960
11.836
9.840

MM(X)
.038630
.004469
.001673
.001025
.001348
.001967
.002031
.002639
.003486
.004527
.006258
.010267
.012254
.024385
.028025
.055706
.101626
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under-15 years population.

The dependency ratio (i.e. the

proportion of population under 15 years old)9 is projected to
decline from 41.1% in 1976 to 36.6% in 2001 under the constant
fertility/mortality and no migration scenario.
In order to transform this projection shown in Table 4.15
into a forecast it is necessary to make some assumptions about
changes in fertility, mortality, and net overseas migration.
The rate of net emigration which would have to occur to hold total
population growth at 2.1% per annum (the average 1966-76 rate) is
approximately 3000 persons per year.

This would still imply a

total population of one million at the end of the century with
constant fertility and mortality.

However, any forecast of net

emigration is really only conjecture and none was made for this
chapter.

Changes in mortality may occur over the period due to

improving health conditions and expanded rural medical facilities;
but the general level of mortality in Fiji is already quite low so
such improvements would have only a marginal impact on the
population projection (although their effect on infant mortality
would probably be significant).

It was shown previously that

projections of total population tend to be rather insensitive
to reasonable alternative survivorship regimes.

Accordingly it is

9 In developed countries where wage labour is the dominant mode of
employment and a formal retirement age is institutionally
regulated (say 65 years), the dependency burden is often
expressed as the ratio of the population under-fifteen years and
over-sixty-five years to population aged between fifteen and
sixty-five.
In Fiji self-employment is so prevalent that the
specification of a formal retirement age would not be relevant
(see chapter 6). Therefore the definition of dependency burdens
used here is quite different to that commonly used. Hereafter
the "working-age population" refers to the population aged
fifteen years and over.
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Table 4.15
Population Projection 1976-2001 by Sex and Five-year Age Group

Males
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
TM

1976

1981

1986

1991

1996

2001

41542
39719
41586
36829
27833
22435
18753
15931
13191
10827
8657
7114
5227
2934
1889
2483

47350
40942
39447
41324
36505
27519
22132
18407
15539
12645
10103
7873
6191
4179
2025
1710

56497
46666
40661
39198
40960
36092
27147
21724
17954
14896
11800
9188
6851
4949
2884
1833

63103
55680
46346
40404
38853
40497
35605
26646
21190
17212
13901
10731
7996
5477
3416
2611

66830
62191,
55298
46054
40049
38414
39951
34948
25991
20313
16061
12642
9338
6392
3780
3093

71124
65864
61765
54949
45648
39596
37895
39213
34089
24916
18955
14606
11001
7466
4412
3423

296950

333890

379301

429668

481344

534923

55578
45924
38937
37774
40422
35677
28355
22045
17925
15334
11764
9429
6899
5295
3385
4020

62076
54794
45611
38717
37459
40019
35267
27925
21610
17455
14712
11132
8607
6055
4331
5687

65743
61201
54422
45353
38394
37085
39560
34733
27374
21044
16747
13921
10161
7554
4952
7276

69967
64816
60785
54114
44975
38011
36660
38960
34047
26657
20190
15847
12707
8918
6178
8319

Females
0
39764
5
38249
10
40994
36339
15
20
28973
25
22644
30
18567
35
16063
12591
40
10386
45
7987
50
6610
55
4716
60
2926
65
1849
70
2460
75

46580
39203
37989
40762
36036
28684
22384
18285
15746
12261
9965
7558
6034
4139
2393
3106.

TF

291118

331126

378761

431456

485519

541151

T

588068

665016

758062

861124

966863

1076073
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suggested that the population projection for age cohorts already
born in 1976 will not be seriously in error if used as a forecast
of survivors.
The same is not true of the population yet to be born.

Changes

in fertility behaviour are likely to occur - in particular, it
was suggested earlier that fertility of Fijian women may rise in
the late 1970‘s and 1980's.

However, the magnitude of future

changes in fertility has generally defied accurate estimation.
In order to indicate what the effects of a dynamic fertility
regime might be, it was decided to generate two additional
population projections with, in one case, fertility continually
rising from its 1976 level and, in the other case, fertility
continually declining from its 1976 level.
multipliers were used for this purpose.

Leslie matrix

At each five yearly

interval between 1976 and 2001 the multipliers were adjusted to
simulate, in one case, a continuous increase in the general
fertility rate of one point each year for twenty-five years
(from 131 in 1976 to 156 in 2001), and in the other case a
continuous decrease of one point each year for twenty-five years
(from 131 in 1976 to 106 in 2001).

These essentially arbitrary

adjustments to fertility are well within the bounds of possibility
- figure 4.1 shows that the G.F.R. may vary much more than this
in a shorter space of time.

The purpose of these "high" and

"low" fertility projections is to highlight the cost of increasing
fertility, and the benefits of reducing fertility, in terms of
variations of the growth in demand for employment opportunities
and in terms of variations in the dependency burden.

The

implication for income inequality may then be inferred from
arguments listed previously is shown in Table 4.16.

Table 4.16

Population projections for the year 2001
(Base year 1976, constant mortality, zero net emigration).

Total

Under
15 yrs

Annual Growth Rate (%)

Over
15 yrs

Total

Under
15 yrs

Over
15 yrs

Dependency
Ratio

Fertility rising

1140762

454098

686664

2.65

2.52

2.74

39.8

Fertility constant

1076073

394321

681752

2.41

1.95

2.71

36.6

Fertility falling

1007753

338359

669394

2.15

1.34

2.64

33.6

106.

Population in 2001
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The results of Table 4.16 imply that variations in the
general fertility rate affect the size of the working-age
population only after a considerable lag (at least fifteen years),
and even then the impact is not large over twenty-five years.

A

constantly falling fertility rate has a slightly larger downward
effect on the growth of working-age population than does a
constantly rising fertility rate in the opposite direction.
This is because the decline in fertility directly reduces the
number of potential mothers in the age range 15-24 years for the
end of the century.

From the projections of population

under-!5 years old it can be seen that fertility changes directly
affect this group, and hence the dependency burden also, and
the impact after twenty-five years is quite large.

A fertility

rate continually rising at the rate postulated above would
generate an additional sixty thousand persons aged less than
15 years by the year 2001.

If the fertility rate fell continually

as indicated there would be fifty-six thousand fewer persons aged
less than 15 years by the year 2001 than there would be if the
fertility rate was constant.
A further simulation of the effect of variations in fertility
was made by changing the distribution of births by age of mother.
This simulation was prompted by the fact that in the 1974 Fiji
Fertility Survey the distribution of births by age of mother was
estimated to be significantly different to that based on
registrations.

The most obvious difference was a higher

proportion of births occuring to women in the 15-19 years age
group in the Fertility Survey, as shown below:10___________________
10 It should be noted that these two distributions are not strictly
comparable because one is based upon an institutionally
organised system of continuous recording and the other is
deduced from a small sample of households drawn at one point in
time. The test is of methodological interest only and nothing
is implied about which distribution is the more accurate.
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Age of mother

Distributi
Registrations

15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44

of Births (%)
Fertility Survey

9.7
37.5
28.7
13.9
7.4

14.2
33.4
27.9
15.1
7.0
2.4

2.8

100.0

100.0

In order to test the sensitivity of the post-1976 population
projection to an alternative fertility distribution, the general
fertility rate was held constant but the number of births was
assumed to be distributed across age cohorts of mothers as in the
1974 Fertility Survey.

This would not alter the life table

calculation for 1976, but one would expect some difference in the
population projection because births would be occurring at
different rates to the several cohorts of mothers.

In fact the

total projected population for the year 2001 is only 3340 less
under the alternative fertility regime.

Total population growth

would still occur at 2.4% per annum and the under-15 years
population would grow at 1.92% per annum.

Clearly changes in the

distribution of births by age of mother are of little significance
by themselves when compared with changes in the general fertility
rate.
The implications of limiting the rate of growth of population
through fertility reductions are reasonably clear as regards the
average level of per capita income.

The Fiji government has a

general policy of limiting population growth to 2% per annum
(D.P. 7, p.10).

Actual population growth between 1966 and 1976

was close to this target at 2.1% per annum but this was achieved
with a high level of emigration.

Many of the emigrants possessed
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skills which would be useful to the economy, and the implications
of limiting population growth through net emigration are not
clear.

The projections of population beyond 1976 indicate that

it would be possible to keep the population growth rate close to
the target 2% per annum in the absence of net emigration if
strong and sustained efforts are made to reduce the birthrate.
It has also been suggested that there may be a differential
dependency burden among income groups.

If this is so then a

reduction in fertility would also have a direct effect upon the
distribution of income, as discussed in chapter 1.

4.7

Rural-to-urban migration:

1966-1976

Previous sections of this chapter have concentrated upon
accounting for changes in the age and sex composition of the
total population and on its overall rate of growth.

Another aspect

of demographic change which is important for the planning
framework aimed at promoting employment opportunities and reducing
income inequality is that associated with the location of
population in rural and urban areas.

In this section the extent

of urbanisation of Fiji's population is considered and an attempt
is made to measure the rates of net rural-to-urban migration by
age and sex cohorts.
Rapid urbanisation in many developing countries in recent
times is accompanied by severe unemployment and bitter social and
economic distress.

Strategies to promote employment in developing

countries under such circumstances may be classified into one of
two broadly opposing viewpoints.

On the one hand, there is the

view that modernisation, industrialisation and urbanisation are
processes which appear to have occurred concurrently in history
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and are necessary for the achievement of development goals:
We are witnessing an historical transformation in
which great forces are at work, rending and
remaking the whole social pattern; these forces
are operating over a long period, and the concept
of crisis is inappropriate.
It is an unbalanced
transformation... Yet urbanisation is, for better
or worse, at the core of the process of development.
(Westebbe (1970), p.2).
M
On the other hand, the view is that policies to facilitate
rapid urbanisation are, if not entirely misplaced, then at least
premature:
...if as much as sixty to ninety percent of the
population depends on "traditional" activities agriculture in particular - then the economic
upgrading of these activities must form the
cornerstone of any strategy for solving the
unemployment problem.
(Turnham (1970), p.8).
There is a paradox involved for the planning framework in
that, while urbanisation is essential to the development of a
sophisticated modern economy, it is at the root of tendencies
towards increasing regional inequalities in income distribution
(see, for instance, McKee and Leahy (1970)).

This is because the

modern economic structure has located in and around urban areas
primarily in response to the trading function of towns and
cities, where it serves also to reinforce the disparities imposed
by dualism in the urban areas.

The link between the distribution

of income between modern and traditional sectors on one hand, and
the distribution of income by size-income groups on the other was
discussed in chapter 1.

In Fiji, the concentration of development

activity in recent years has taken place in and around the major
urban centres on the main islands of Viti Levu (Suva, Lautoka and
also Vatukoula) and Vanua Levu (Labasa).

This has been a source

of concern for the current Development Plan:

Although in the absence of adequate statistics
it is not possible to determine the level of
rural-to-urban migration in Fiji in recent years,
indications are that the towns have been
experiencing a considerable inflow of rural
dwellers, particularly youth. By mid-1973 an
estimated 33.8% of Fiji's population lived in the
country's 13 towns and city. For various reasons including an increase of urban anti-social
behaviour and inadequacy of urban job opportunities
- a major Plan objective is to reduce the level of
such movement, primarily through programmes to
improve the quality of 1ife,increase real rural
incomes, and expand employment opportunities in the
rural areas.
(Government of Fiji (1975), p.20).
Clearly, the attitude of the Fiji Government is much more
closely related to the second of the two viewpoints contrasted
above.11
With the publication of the 1976 Census it is possible to
estimate the change in the proportion of population living in
urban areas over the previous ten years and to obtain some
measures of age- and sex-specific rates of rural-to-urban
migration.

These estimates can only be interpreted as broad

indicators, because there is considerable short-period migration
which will not be reflected in intercensal comparisons.
In both the 1966 and 1976 Censuses, the urban population was
designated as those living in the towns and peri-urban areas of
Suva City, Lautoka, Ba, Labasa, Levuka, Nadi, Savusavu, Sigatoka
and Nausori, as well as the unincorporated townships of Korovou,
Navua, Raki-Raki, Tavua and Vatukoula.

The capital, Suva, is the

11 This view has not been unchallenged in recent years. Reference
to the debate on the desirability of concentrating development
resources in urban or rural areas is made by Brookfield et. a l .
(1977), who contrast their own view (supporting rural
development) with that of the UNFIPLAN team (1976) (arguing that
it is more efficient to encourage urban development to absorb
the inevitably greater flow of migrants). The debate is
centred on the man/land ratios in rural areas, and on the
carrying capacities and efficiency of land use in the outer
islands.
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only urban area with the status of a city;

in 1976 the population

of Suva and its surrounding urban area was 117827 persons
(54/£ of Fiji s urban population).

Lautoka in Ba Province is the

next largest town with 28847 persons.

In the same province,

Nadi had 12995 persons and Ba urban area comprised 9173 persons.
Nausori, near Suva, had 12821 persons and Labasa, in M a c uata*
Province, had 12956 persons.
The population in urban and rural areas from the 1966 and
1976 Censuses is shown below:
1966

1976

Urban

159259

218495

Rural

317468

369573

Total

476727

588068

The proportion of population living in urban areas in 1966
was 33.4%.
population.

In 1976 the urban population was 37.2% of the total
Urbanisation may be discussed in terms of levels

such as these, or in terms of rates of growth of urban population
and the two approaches should be clearly distinguished.

The

term "tempo of urbanisation" is often reserved for the latter
approach and one way of measuring this is the urban-rural-growthdifference (u.r.g.d.)

(U.N. (1974) chapter 3).

The average

exponential growth of Fiji's urban population between 1966 and 1976
was 3.16% per annum, while that of the rural population was 1.52%
per annum - an apparent u.r.g.d. of 1.64%.

However, recall that

emigration overseas has occurred at an increasing rate in the
intercensal period, amounting to a net outflow of some 30,000
persons in ten years.12

It is reasonable to assume that most of

12 This estimate takes into account the fact that my earlier
estimate of 35,500 was probably too high. The extent of the
error is difficult to quantify.
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these persons were urban dwellers.

If they had remained in Fiji,

the implied u.r.g.d. would have been much higher (approximately
2.93% per annum) and this is the more appropriate figure when
considering the issue from the point of view of a lagging rural
sector.
A more detailed and informative approach to internal migration
would recognise that the propensity to migrate is different for
persons of different ages.

There are also differences in

migration tendencies between males and females.

Although the

1966 and 1976 Censuses do list urban and rural populations by
sex, the 1966 census does not list urban and rural populations by
age group, so that it is not a simple matter to compute agespecific rates of rural-to-urban migration over the ten years.
Under these circumstances the approach adopted was to consider
the age/sex distribution of the fifteen provinces of Fiji, and of
Suva city separately (this data is available in both censuses).
An arbitrary but reasonable

distinction was drawn between those

provinces which are essentially "rural" and those which are
heavily influenced by urban centres within their boundaries.
In the latter group was included Ba Province (major towns being
Lautoka, Nadi and Ba), Macuata Province (Labasa), and the combined
Provinces of Rewa-Tailevu-Naitasiri (dominated by Suva and
Nausori).13

Those provinces which were designated as "rural"

included Bua, Cakaudrove, Kadavu, Lau, Lomaiviti, Nadroga/Navosa,
Namosi, Ra, Serua and Rotuma.

13 "Provincial boundaries are not particularly meaningful to the
people living in the Suva/Nausori area because the urban
sprawl overlies them and there were some inconsistencies
arising from ignorance of them".
(1976 Census Report, p.17).
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Table 4.17 shows the age and sex distribution of these "rural
provinces" combined and of Suva city in 1966 and in 1976.

By using

the survivorship ratios computed from the life tables of the
previous sections it is possible to compute the expected numbers
in each age-sex cohort for their population in 1976, at least for
ages 10 years and over.1Lf

This computation is shown in Table 4.18.

These numbers of expected survivors in the "rural provinces"
may then be compared with the actual 1976 enumeration for the
same provinces.

Any excess of the former over the latter is

mostly due to out-migration from rural areas (except for small
estimation errors).

The apparent non-transfer ratio is found by

dividing the census enumeration by the expected survivors for
each age/sex cohort.

Annual implicit rates of rural-to-urban

migration may then be calculated by subtracting the non-transfer
ratio from unity and dividing by ten years of the intercensal
period.

These age- and sex-specific migration rates are shown in

the right-most column of Table 4.18.

It should be reiterated that

these are useful as a guide to the actual orders of magnitude the last two digits have no significance at all.
For males, the annual rates of net rural emigration are
clearly greatest for age groups 15-19 years (2.3%), 20-24 years
(3.0%) and 25-29 years (1.8%).

Migration rates for males between

30 and 60 years of age vary between 0.6% and 0.8% per annum.
lk

The

It is not clear whether mortality is higher in urban or in
rural Fiji. Medical facilities are not as good in rural areas
but the risk of contagion is less and the diet is probably
more nutritious in rural areas.
Since the population is only
one-third urbanised, the survivorship ratios computed from a
national life table are probably not seriously inappropriate
for rural dwellers. The age and sex composition of Suva city
and of the rural provinces for both 1966 and 1976 is listed
in Table 4.17.
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Table 4.17
Age and sex distribution of "rural provinces11 1966 and 1S76
(from Table 7 in both Censuses)
'
1966 Census

1976 Census

Males

Females

Total

Males

Females

Total

0- 4
5- 9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75+

14107
12937
10054
7014
5551
5020
4431
3788
3134
2837
2445
1658
1295
882
563
820

13582
12215
9885
7482
6252
5252
4299
3693
2956
2676
2173
1565
1185
779
531
692

27689
25152
19939
14496
11803
10272
8730
7481
6090
5513
4618
3223
2480
1661
1094
1512

12502
12694
12998
9809
6909
5626
4975
4540
4008
3307
2681
2278
1842
1077
703
769

11809
12117
12404
9604
7267
5843
5134
4632
3719
3089
2458
2172
1660
1060
688
865

24311
24811
25402
19413
14176
11469
10109
9172
7727
6396
5139
4450
3502
2137
1391
1634

Total

76536

75217

151753

86718

84521

171239

"rural provinces":

Bua, Cakaudrove, Kadavu, Lau, Lomaiviti,
Namosi, Nadroga/Navosa, Ra, Serua, Rotuma

(75+ includes unknown age)

Age and sex distribution, Suva city, 1966 and 1976
1966 Census

0- 4
5- 9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75+

1976 Census

Males

Females

Total

Males

Females

Total

3924
3766
3310
3251
2737
2131
1765
1471
1266
1101
827
531
336
302
201
254

3687
3796
3383
3329
2901
2275
1749
1484
1188
1001
762
461
371
250
151
196

7611
7562
6693
6580
5638
4406
3514
2955
2454
2102
1589
992
707
552
352
450

4084
3362
3381
4057
3760
3105
2290
1775
1517
1221
1045
770
541
265
200
313

4027
3204
3483
4260
4104
3020
2222
1868
1503
1239
930
754
536
306
186
300

8111
6566
6864
8317
7864
6125
4512
3643
3020
2460
1975
1524
1077
571
386
613

54157

31686

31942

63628

27173

26984
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Table 4.18
Population of "rural provinces"
(age and sex)_________________ ________

Males
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75+

1976
Survivors

1976
Census

Apparent
Nontransfer
rates
(10 yrs)

Annual
Implicit
Migration
Rates

1966
Census

Survi vor
Ratios

14107
12937
10054
7014
5551
5020
4431
3788
3134
2837
2445
1658
1295
882
563
820

.9907
.9949
.9944
.9923
.9903
.9885
.9843
.9781
.9654
.9472
.9177
.8710
.8223
.7523
.6044
(.3493)

13905
12799
9921
6892
5434
4884
4266
3577
2866
2466
1954
1187
801
(1028)

12998
9809
6909
5626
4975
4540
4008
3307
2681
2278
1842
1077
703
769

.9348
.7664
.6964
.8163
.9155
.9296
.9395
.9245
.9355
.9238
.9427
.9073
.8777
.7481

.00652
.02336
.03036
.01837
.00845
.00704
.00605
.00755
.00645
.00762
.00573
.00927
.01223
.02519

.9909
.9951
.9948
.9924
.9915
.9900
.9860
.9819
.9775
.9662
.9487
.9116
.8796
.8305
.5992
(.3719)

13392
12092
9759
7362
6137
5127
4162
3545
2792
2453
1879
1255
866
(963)

12404
9604
7267
5843
5134
4632
3719
3089
2458
2172
1660
1060
688
865

.9262
.7942
.7446
.7937
.8366
.9035
.8936
.8714
.8804
.8854
.8834
.8446
.7945
.8982

.00738
.02058
.02554
.02063
.01634
.00965
.01064
.01286
.01196
.01146
.01166
.01554
.2055
.1018

Femal es
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75+

13582
12215
9885
7482
6252
5252
4299
3693
2956
2676
2173
1565
1185
779
531
692

"rural provinces":

Bua, Cakaudrove, Kadavu, Lau,
Lomaiviti, Namosi, Nadroga/Navosa,
Ra, Serua, Rotuma
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apparently high migration rates for males over 65 years of age
should be discounted in view of the small numbers in these age
groups and their sensitivity to inappropriate survivorship ratios.
The migration rate for males aged 10-14 years is also shown as
approximately 0.6% per annum.

Most of these are likely to be

accompanying their parents in search of better education for the
children in urban areas as well as higher income-earning
opportunities.
For females the annual rates of rural emigration are likewise
much higher in the age range 15 to 29 years than older years.
Female migration rates for 15-19 years (2.0%) and 20-24 years
(2.5%) are somewhat lower than their male contemporaries.

For

25-29 years (2.0%) and 30-34 years (1.6%) they are higher than
for males,substantially so in the case of the 30-34 years group.
Migration rates for females between 35 and 64 years of age vary
between 0.9% per annum and 1.2% per annum, somewhat higher than
for males of corresponding age.

I suspect that the survivorship

ratios for females over 40 years old may be too high (because of
greater underregistration of female deaths than male deaths),
and this probably accounts for any significant difference in
migration rates between males and females in these age groups.
Once again, the apparently high rates of migration for females
over 65 years of age should be discounted (and probably ignored).
The greater tendency of young people to migrate from rural to
urban areas is reinforced by considering the differences in
proportionate age distributions between the rural provinces and
Suva city.

This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 for both males and

females in 1966 and 1976.

The bars in Figure 4.2 show, for each

five-year age group (0-4, 5-9,...,55-59, 60 and over), the

Difference in percentage points (for age and sex cohorts) between
proportion of population of Suva city and proportion of population of rural provinces.
3 1-
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difference, measured in percentage points, between the proportion
of Suva city's population in a given age group, and the proportion
of the rural provinces' population in the same age group.

Suva

city has attracted a disproportionate share of population in the
15-34 years age groups, while the rural provinces seem to have a
disproportionate share of the very young and of the very old.
Interestingly the difference between Suva and the rural provinces
in the share of population in the 0-4 year age group is very much
less in 1976 then in 1966.

This is partly due to a high

propensity for fertile age females to migrate from rural to urban
areas, but is also influenced by the spread of family limiting
practices to rural areas in the intercensal period.
It should be noted that despite heavy outmigration of youths
and young adults from rural areas, the absolute numbers of
population in rural areas in all age groups has not declined.
There has been some positive growth in rural population even for
those age groups with high propensities to migrate.

Of course,

this is probably not a general rule - there are some localities
in which the population has declined (Brookfield et. a l . (1977),
page 28).

Further, the above analysis does not capture

the

effects of short-term migration, particularly seasonal migration.
Nevertheless, it would appear that the average rural man/land
ratio has not declined as a result of rural emigration over the
ten years to 1976, and this is particularly important in assessing
the relationship of demographic changes to income distribution and
welfare.

This point will be taken up in the next chapter.
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Summary
The main purposes of this chapter have been:

(i)

to quantify those demographic changes which have occurred
in Fiji in recent years and which are important for the
p.anning framework concerned with employment and income
inequality, and

(ii)

to assess the sensitivity of population forecasts to
alternative assumptions about fertility, mortality and
migration so thatfurther demographic implications for the
planning framework could be assessed^
Between 1966 and 1976 the population of Fiji grew from

477000 to 588000 persons, at an average growth rate of 2.1% per
annum.

In the same period there was net emigration of

approximately 30000 residents, most of which occurred during the
second half of the period and was concentrated among the younger
members of the working-age population.

While total population

growth was 2.1% per annum, the population of working age (15 years
and over) grew from 254000 in 1966 to 346000 in 1976, an average
growth rate of 3.1% per annum.

This rapid growth of the

working-age population has been a major contributing factor to
Fiji's growing unemployment problem in recent years.

Urban

unemployment has also been exacerbated by high rates of rural-tourban migration in the intercensal period, in excess of 2.0% per
annum for the rural population under 30 years of age.

The

structure of employment and the nature of underemployment and
unemployment in Fiji is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
Although rapid growth of the working-age population has
exacerbated the problems of creating sufficient employment
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opportunities, it has also contributed to a reduction in the
dependency burden by raising the growth of the working-age
population relative to that of the non-working-age population.
The other important influence in this respect was the fall in
fertility.

Between 1966 and 1976 the general fertility rate fell

from 178 to 131 births per thousand fertile-age females.

The

crude birth rate fell from 36 to 30 per thousand population.

As a

result, the non-working-age population grew from 223000 in 1966
to 242000 in 1976, an average growth rate of only 0.8% per annum.
This reduction in fertility and in the dependency burden would
have been a force working towards reductions in income inequality
in Fiji, according to the analysis based on cross-section data
from many countries (in chapter 2).

The measurement of income

inequality in Fiji is examined in chapter 8.
There are some interesting variations in this scenario
when Fiji's population is projected into the future.

With constant

rates of fertility and mortality as observed in 1976, and in the
absence of net emigration, the total population would probably
reach 758000 by 1986, an implied average growth rate of 2.5% per
annum.

This growth rate could be reduced to that observed

between 1966 and 1976 if net emigration averages 3000 persons per
year up to 1986.

The projected growth rate of the working-age

population will remain high, at an average 3.1% per annum, in
the absence of net emigration;
474000 by 1986.

its level might then reach

This has been caused by the high birth rates in

the 1950's and early 19601s .

Even if labour force participation

rates remain constant, this continued rapid growth of the workingage population will make the task of generating employment
opportunities extremely difficult in the coming decade.

The
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situation will be worse if female participation rates continue to
rise as was observed between 1966 and 1976 (see chapter 6).
Under the assumption of constant age-specific fertility
rates, the non-working-age population is projected to grow from
242000 in 1976 to 284000 in 1986, an average growth rate of 1.5%
per annum.

Thus the rate of reduction in the dependency burden

(and in income inequality as a consequence of it) will be much less
in the future than was observed in the 1966-76 period, unless
further reductions in fertility can be achieved.

As was noted in

the text, this is becoming increasingly difficult in Fiji.
Nevertheless, forecasting changes in fertility behaviour is a
very hazardous occupation.

In the validation process applied in

section 4.5 it was revealed that, even under reasonable
assumptions pertaining to expected fertility changes over the
immediate five year period (the common period for development
plans), the estimated 0-4 years population was in error by 5000
persons after five years.

Population forecasts based on constant

fertility regimes must therefore be regarded with a high degree
of caution over the medium to long term.
In view of this, two further population projections were
calculated to indicate the effects of both increasing and
decreasing the general fertility rate.

It was shown that modest

but sustained changes in fertility can have a large effect on the
rate of growth of the non-working age population.

For example,

if the general fertility rate were to decline by one point
(per thousand) each year for ten years, the non-working-age
population would only grow to 271000 in 1986, an average growth
rate of 1.1% per annum.

According to the analysis of chapter 1

we may expect that a reduction in the birthrate will improve the
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distribution of income in favour of the poor, and an increase in
the birthrate will cause an adverse shift in the distribution of
income.

An important conclusion of this chapter, therefore, is

that the birthrate (or the general fertility rate) is a critical
variable for the planning framework in which we a r e .interested.
Changes in mortality are expected to make an insignificant
impact on the projected numbers of cohorts already born in 1976.
The projected population aged 15-years-and-over in 1991 is
therefore thought to be a good representation of expected
survivors in the working-age population at that date.

The critical

factor in accurate estimation here is the level of net overseas
migration.

Although ex post

data on overseas migration to and

from Fiji should be readily obtained due to her island geography,
ex ante estimates are purely conjectural.

To the extent that net

emigration is related to domestic labour market difficulties in
general, and to the extent that these will be exacerbated by
rapid population growth, we may expect net emigration in the next
fifteen years not to be insignificant.
If rural-to-urban migration continues at the same rate as
was observed in 1966-76, the rural population of Fiji will
probably number 430000 in 1986.

This would be 57% of the total

population in the absence of net overseas migration (or 59% if
net emigration at the rate of 3000 persons per year from urban
locations occurs).

The success of the current development plan

in improving rural welfare in general, and the welfare effects on
rural households of absorbing more labour in productive activities,
will be the major determinants of the rate of rural-to-urban
migration in the immediate future.

It is unlikely that present

internal migration rates can be sustained without increasing
urban unemployment and social tensions.
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CHAPTER 5
The concept and measurement of employment and underemployment
5.1

Introduction
The rationale of this chapter is that a thorough examination

of the concept and measurement of employment in developing
countries is fundamental to understanding the relationship between
employment and the distribution of income in these countries.
It will be argued that the concept and measurement of employment in
developing countries is different from that in developed countries
and as such requires different methods of analysis.
Many theoretical and empirical difficulties are encountered
when analysis of employment problems in developing countries is
attempted using some of the formal models designed for this
purpose.

To a large extent this is because these models are built

upon a premise concerning labour force underutilisation1 which
is not appropriate for equity-oriented development planning.
That premise is concerned with the transfer of surplus labour
from the traditional sector to the modern sector in order to
support growth pe r se in the modern sector.

It is possible to

draw out some of the distributional implications of this sort of
development (as described in chapter one, for example), but they
are rarely treated explicitly.
1 The term "labour force underutilisation" is taken from Smith
(1971) who uses it as a portmanteau phrase for underemployment
and unemployment, constituting various degrees of wastage of
labour resources. The connotation of the phrase with manpower
utilisation for growth is not entirely apt for present purposes,
since we are more concerned with the relationship between
employment and income distribution.
Its use here is to avoid
semantic confusion between "underemployment" as a measurable
dimension of a concept and as a concept itself. Both aspects of
"underemployment" will be examined in this chapter.
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Empirical studies have shown that "the employment problem" in
developing countries is really a multitude of specific problems
related to technology, education, population, trade, urbanisation,
and so on.

This is well documented in the many studies undertaken

as part of the I.L.O. sponsored World Employment Programme
(I.L.O. (1974)).

The common denominator of all these problems is

the fact that poverty, or more generally, a high degree of
inequality in the distribution of income and of income-earning
opportunities, is the most pressing problem facing all developing
countries.

It has been suggested that the study of employment

problems may well be justified by the light which can thereby be
shed on poverty and inequality (Stewart (1975)).

This approach to

planning and policy formation may be regarded as a pragmatic
attempt to cut through the many theoretical and empirical
difficulties associated with the study of underemployment in
developing countries.

Accordingly this chapter presents a very

selective discussion of some recent attempts to define and analyse
a concept of employment which is relevant for a planning framework
in which distributional equity is given primary importance.
Section 2 of the chapter contains a brief overview of the
models which have been used to explain aspects of the employment
problem in developing countries and discusses the need for
country-specific empirical research.

Section 3 contains a critical

evaluation of the internationally accepted conventions used for
classifying persons according to their economic activity status.
Some of the problems involved in using this classification scheme
in developing countries may be overcome with an appropriate
statistical definition - appropriate, that is, to the particular
country being studied.

In chapter 6 these remarks will be drawn
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upon to discuss the structure of employment, underemployment and
open unemployment in Fiji.

There are other problems, however,

which require the establishment of appropriate theoretical concepts
before the classification scheme can be used properly in the
planning framework we have in mind.

These conceptual criteria are

the subject of Section 4 of this chapter.

5.2

Models and empirical research
Following Jolly et. al. (1973) the formal models designed to

explain the employment problems in developing countries may be
grouped into three schools:
(i)

models concerned with the transfer of surplus labour
from a traditional to a modern sector (for example,
Lewis (1954), Fei and Ranis (1964), Todaro (1971));

(ii)

models focussing on the growth of output and employment
(variants of Harrod (1948) and Domar (1957));

(iii) models concerned with factor price disequilibria
(for example, Eckaus (1955), Blaug, Layard and Woodhall
(1969)).
The Lewis-Fei-Ranis model has a distinct classical orientation
because its assumptions - that there is some level of agricultural
workforce oeyond which labour is redundant, and that the real
wage rate is institutionally fixed - are similar to those
underlying the Marxian "reserve army of unemployed".

Contemporary

research suggests that in many developing countries almost no
open surplus labour exists in rural areas, yet there is widespread
open unemployment in urban areas.

Further, the typical situation

in developing countries has been for urban real wages to rise both
absolutely and in relation to rural real incomes even in the
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presence of open unemployment (see, for instance, Turnham (1970),
Bairoch (1973)).

Todaro (1971) has formalised the individual's

decision to migrate from rural to urban areas as a function of
the difference in real incomes between rural and urban work, and
of the probability that a new migrant will find a job.

His model

has been further extended to account for persistent urban
unemployment by incorporating a waiting time into the probability
function (I.L.O. (1970), (1971), Blaug, Layard and Woodhall (1969)).
Jolly et. a l . (1973) regard the Todaro model as belonging to the
same school as the Lewis-Fei-Ranis model because he maintains the
basic contribution of attempting to explain the development of a
dualistic economy.

Then the Lewis-Fei-Ranis model may be

interpreted as an extreme case (no difference in real incomes, one
hundred percent probability of finding an urban job) of the more
general Todaro model.
In the second school of models, employment is made to be a
function of output through labour-output ratios which may be
constant or which may vary according to exogenously given changes
in productivity.

Population growth determines the workforce size

through well developed demographic techniques such as those
employed in chapter 4.

Unemployment is then the difference between

supply and demand for labour at the given wage.

This approach has

been extended to provide the rich detail of multi-sectoral analysis
using an input-output matrix and disaggregation by skills of
different labour units (Blitzer (1975), Dougherty (1972)).
Weaknesses in the approach as it has been applied in the past
include the exogenous treatment of productivity and the assumption
of fixed input-output ratios, especially in the long run.

The

BACHUE series of models (see I.L.O. (1973)) has demonstrated that
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such limitations would in principle present few barriers to model
builders of this school, if only adequate data was available to
test more complex relationships.
The third school of models takes as its starting point the
observation that the use of conventional income-generating policies
(i.e. Keynesian aggregate demand stimulation) is frustrated in
developing countries.

This leads only to excessive inflationary

pressures or balance of payments difficulties long before full
employment is approached.

The reasons advanced to explain this

are oriented towards relative factor proportions and the technology
of industry.

Eckaus (1955) described two aspects of this:
The first type assumes that available technology
would permit full use of the working force at
some set of relative prices and finds the source
of unemployment in various types of "imperfections"
in the price system. The second type suggests that
there are limitations in the existing technology or
the structure of demand which lead to a redundancy
of labour in densely populated underdeveloped areas.

Using a static model with different production functions in
different sectors he demonstrated how both of these aspects of the
factor proportions problem may result in persistent open
unemployment.

A specific example of this school is the study by

Blaug, Layard and Woodhall (1969) concentrating on wages and on
educated unemployment, and introducing a dynamic adjustment
mechanism to demand and supply curves for labour.
It is tempting to regard these three schools as complementary
parts of a more complete analysis.

However, this is not the

appropriate solution for two reasons - one methodological and the
other empirical.

A synthesis of models as they have been outlined

above is not possible because there are assumptions of some that
are inconsistent with others.

For example, the existence of
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surplus labour in the Lewis model is inconsistent with the
neoclassical price responsiveness assumed by Eckaus.

Also, the

adjustment mechanisms of each can be very different, and this is
particularly important for planning purposes.

The Lewis-Fei-Ranis

and Blaug et. a l . models lead to a prediction in which, after some
time lag, a reduction in unemployment is automatic.

On the other

hand the Harrod-Domar-type models and Eckaus models indicate a
knife-edge development path from which any deviation may cause a
worsening unemployment problem.
The empirical reason for rejecting an attempt to synthesise
the available theories is that the nature of the unemployment
problem is different in different countries.

This has been

expressed eloquently in the survey by Jolly et. al (1973, p.17)
In Ceylon, unemployment among secondary school
leavers and university graduates is the dominant
part of the problem (dominant, at least in
political terms) and urban-rural differences are
small.
In India, rural open unemployment is much
less important than seasonal underemployment.
In Colombia the highly unequal system of land
tenure has deprived a large proportion of the
rural population of sufficient land for adequate
work or income and left some of them totally
landless.
In most African countries there is still
no landless class, but often inadequate transport,
capital, knowledge, institutional channels and
incentives to stimulate full employment and
adequate income.
It is conceivable, therefore, that any given model may be
appropriate for some countries but not for others, or appropriate
at one particular period in the history of a country but not in
another period for the same country.

Under such circumstances

priority must be given to intensive empirical research, without
which useful analytical models cannot be formulated or tested.
An excellent basis for this for the case of Fiji is contained in
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the 1973 Unemployment Survey, and the next chapter looks at the
results of this survey in detail.

Before doing this it is

necessary to consider further the concept of employment in
developing countries and how this concept should be measured.

5.3

I.L.O, Categorisation approach
Unemployment in developed countries stems mainly from

disruptions to an economic system which has not coped successfully
with swings in aggregate demand (cyclical unemployment) or with
adaptations to changing technology (structural unemployment).
For these countries, the concept and measurement of unemployment
have been embodied in workable conventions which, for the most
part, are practicable (although there are some problems with the
classification of married women and some self-employed persons).
However, attempts to transfer such conventions to the
developing countries have not been entirely satisfactory, mainly
because the nature of the unemployment problem is so different.
In particular, the rural sector and small-scale artisan activities
are usually much larger and less efficiently organised in
developing countries.

A.K. Sen has described this problem very

well:
The concept of unemployment is notoriously vague in
any economy in which the wage system is weak and in
which self-employment and unpaid family labour are
common.
Indeed for an economy of peasants and
artisans the concept of employment loses its
straightforward meaning and economic activity
merges into a wider complex of family based
activities.
(Sen (1975) p.5)).
The categorisation of a person's activity status according to
internationally accepted conventions is shown in Table 5.1 which
shows categorisation found in annual Yearbooks of Labour Statistics
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published by the I.L.O.2

Table 5.1
Classification of Population by Activity Status
1.

Economically active
1.1

Employed

1.1.1

Adequately employed

1.1.2

Underemployed (inadequately employed)

1.1.2.1

Visible underemployment (short hours)

1.1.2.2

Invisible underemployment

1.1.2.2.1

Disguised (low income, underutilisation of skill)

1.1.2.2.2

Potential (low productivity of work)

1.2
2.

Unemployed (market or demand factors)

Economically inactive
2.1

Potentially employable

2.1.1

Discouraged (no opportunity, prejudiced)

2.1.2

Additional (married women, students, independent means)

2.2

Not available for employment

2.2.1

Unable (too old, sick, young)

2.2.2

Committed Otherwise (domestic work, study)

2.2.3

Other (in institutions, etc).

There are a number of observations which may be made
concerning this classification.

Some of these relate to purely

statistical problems which may be overcome only with reference
to the particular economy being studied.

Others will require the

establishment of conceptual criteria to enable the classification
to be useful in the planning framework we have in mind.
2 Table 5.1 is reproduced from Horn (1974, p.501). The discussion
of this categorisation in this section draws heavily on the
survey by Smith (1971).
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(i)

.

E c o n o m i c a l l y a c t i v e a n d inact i v e

The distinction between persons who are economically active
and persons who are economically inactive involves problems which
are largely of the statistical type and for which the conventions
in the country being studied may be adopted.

Problems with this

distinction arise firstly because the upper and lower age limits
to the working age population vary between countries, and sometimes
between activities within a given country.

Secondly, the role of

women in the workforce is similarly variable.

Thirdly, problems

are posed by the phenomenon of the discouraged worker.

The

framework in Table 5.1 classes such persons as economically inactive
because unemployment definitions (of Western origin) place great
stress on seeking work.

There is thus no unemployment category

within the active workforce to include those who are available
for work, but not fervently looking for work because they regard
their chances of success as too low.

The existence of an

identifiable group of discouraged workers has implications for
the elasticity of labour response to various government policies.
This is so irrespective of whether the policies are designed to
draw upon a labour reserve to support growth p e r se, or whether
they are designed to redistribute incomes through employment policy
explicitly.

For this reason the discouraged workers might be

considered as part of the economically active population.
(ii)

A d e q u a t e a n d inad e q u a t e employment

This distinction requires consideration of rather more
difficult conceptual problems, which are considered in detail in
the next section of this chapter.
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U n e m p l o y e d a n d u n d e r e mployed

The framework of Table 5.1 implies that, for any
this distinction is mutually exclusive.

individual,

There is a problem in

drawing this distinction in an agricultural economy because of
seasonal factors.

Agricultural workers are fully occupied on some

days, only partly so on others, and on other days still they may do
no work at all.

Therefore, the classification of agricultural

workers as employed, underemployed, or unemployed, depends in
part upon the length of the reference period of the employment
survey and the season of the year in which it is conducted.
It is also difficult to avoid a certain degree of arbitrariness
in this distinction with respect to non-agricultural activities.
Those who do no work at all in a given reference period (usually
one week) are classified as unemployed;

but those who work for

one or two hours are classified as underemployed and are grouped as
such with others who may work twenty hours.

A more logical approach

to this distinction would be to regard anything less than full
employment as a point on a continuum of various degrees of
underutilisation of labour resources (Smith (1971)), with
unemployment being the extreme case;

but this still requires a

definition of what is full (or adequate) employment.
(iv)

Visible and invisible underemployment

The first, most obvious problem which arises in this
distinction is that the different classes are subject to different
units of measurement - viz:

hours of work for visible underemployment

(1121), earnings or a skill factor for disguised underemployment
(11221) , and a productivity measure for potential underemployment
(11222) .

A beginning to the solution of this problem is made if

one recognises that there is no ambiguity in classification on the
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b a s i s o f h o u r s w o r k e d between visible and invisible underemployment.

Those in the former group are involuntarily working less than
normal

(or desired) hours.

Those in the latter group are,

i n t e r a l i a , working as long as is normal

(or desired).

Given that hours of work is to be the yardstick for
distinguishing between visible and invisible underemployment,
there remain two problems.

The first has been foreshadowed by

including the words "or desired" in brackets above.

If an

objective norm is established which applies across the board and
below which all concerned are visibly underemployed, then such
a norm may be arbitrary to the point of irrelevance for a large
section of the working age population.

This would be so if many

of those visibly underemployed (working less than "normal" hours)
failed to respond to the creation of more intensive employment
opportunities.

Under such circumstances the criteria of desired

hours is appealing because the elasticity of employment response
to various government policies could be assessed more accurately.3
The second problem concerns which feature of invisible
underemployment - low earnings, low productivity or low skill
utilisation - is to be regarded as the most appropriate indicator
of the degree of invisible underemployment.

The policy implications

of dealing with this classification will be different depending
upon which factor is the dominant one in the particular case one
is studying.

It would therefore be necessary to be guided by

empirical evidence on this point, but of course this is more easily

3 The 1963 Meeting of Experts on the Measurement of Underemployment
(I.L.O. Concepts and Methods of Measurement of Underemployment Working Paper No. 1, August 1963, p .16) maintained that
"...availability for extra work can be measured with reasonable
objectivity and accuracy",
(as cited in Smith (1971) p.52).
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said than done.

For one thing, the three indicators are not

mutually exclusive - a person may be in a situation where both
productivity and earnings are abnormally low, despite working
normal hours.

Moreover, the establishment of norms for each

indicator from empirical data is fraught with difficulties.
Consider the establishment of a norm for productivity, below
which all concerned would be regarded as being invisibly
underemployed.

Economic theory suggests that in a competitive

equilibrium situation the marginal productivity of homogeneous
factors will be equal.

Since variations in capital intensity do

exist between activities, then average labour productivity may
vary between activities.

When market imperfections and

institutional rigidities are introduced into the analysis,
equilibrium contrasts in factor proportions and average productivity
will be distorted.

These two influences - "normal" competitive

variations on the one hand, and market and institutional
imperfections on the other - are combined in empirical observations
of sectoral disparities in average productivity levels.

They

would need to be disentangled before the productivity criterion
could be used to identify the invisibly underemployed.
Assuming that these empirical problems can be adequately
accommodated, we return to the policy implications of dealing with
this classification of underemployment.

It is tempting to conclude

that more hours should be found for the visibly underemployed,
higher productivity or earnings or both for the invisibly
underemployed, and so on.

However, there is a need to exercise

considerable caution in drawing such a conclusion.

This can perhaps

best be illustrated by looking at each of the three criteria
separately.
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product i v i t y criterion

In the following table, 10% of the labour force is unemployed
at the start of the period, 50% is underemployed (disguised, low
productivity underemployment) and 40% is fully employed in high
productivity jobs.4

Suppose that a policy is implemented which

succeeds in having all output produced by high productivity
methods so that disguised underemployment disappears (by definition).

Beginning of the period
End of the period
Numbers Productivity Output Numbers Productivity Output
Unemployed

10

0

0

35

0

0

Underemployed

50

4

200

0

0

0

Fully employed

40

8

320

65

8

520

520

100

Total

100

520

Half of those previously underemployed are now fully employed
but the other half are unemployed.

Average living standards remain

constant, but income distribution has become more unequal with the
result that many more people suffer gross poverty.
Consider the same economy in the beginning of the period
which implements a policy of providing more jobs for the population
in labour-intensive (less productive) employment.

The result

might be the elimination of unemployment and perhaps some downgrading
of high productivity activities:

4 The example here is adapted from Smith (1971) p .57.
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Beginning of the period__________End of the period
Numbers Productivity Output Numbers Productivity Output
Unemployed

10

0

0

0

0

0

Underemployed

50

4

200

70

4

280

Fully employed

40

8

320

30

0

240

520

100

Total

100

520

Again per capita output is constant, but in this case income
distribution is made less unegual and abject poverty resulting
from open unemployment has been eliminated.
This static example is deficient in several respects.

In

particular it is unlikely that changing the technology mix
would leave total output unchanged.
adjustment effects.

It also ignores dynamic

Exactly what the outcome of such changes would

be is an empirical question about which we can say very little here.
What is clear is that, with no change in labour productivity,
per capita incomes can be raised by finding more employment
opportunities for the population at this productivity level.

It is

also clear that such a policy can potentially reduce the degree of
income inequality;

and further, that the faster is the rate of

growth of employment opportunities (at given productivity levels)
then the greater is the scope for both raising average living
standards and reducing inequalities.

It may be useful to point

out that this is fully consistent with the empirical evidence
discussed in Part I of the dissertation.

138 .

(b)

earnings criterion

Once again, the implication that underemployment defined on
the basis of a specific criterion (in this case, low income)
should be remedied by action with respect to that criterion
(i.e. by raising unduly low earnings) may prove to be misleading.
This would be so if employers reacted in such a way as to dismiss
underemployed workers if their wage rates increased, thereby
increasing the numbers in open unemployment and worsening income
distribution.

The extent to which this is possible depends upon

the elasticity of substitution of factors of production - another
empirical question.

Aside from this it may be argued that wages

policy should only act in such a way that real labour cost per
unit of output does not rise (i.e. by keeping wage rises in line
with productivity increases).
Leibenstein (1957) has built a specific underemployment
concept upon the premise that higher wages and an improved diet
would improve the health and efficiency of workers in developing
countries.

Since fewer workers could then produce the same

output as the previously less vigorous workforce, the number that
could be retrenched from such increases in wages is regarded as
surplus labour.

This, b y i t s e l f , clearly runs counter to the

objective of reduced income inequality.

The rise in income of those

who retain their jobs can only be considered beneficial if
employment is found for the "surplus labour" which is retrenched.
The relevant question does not concern the difference between
actual income and some higher acceptable norm.

Rather, one must

first ask what other income earning opportunities can be found
(at higher, lower, the same productivity levels) for the under
employed, and only then, what relation exists between higher
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wages and efficiency of those who retain existing jobs so that
labour cost per unit of output does not rise.
(c)

skill criterion

If employment opportunities are out of balance with the
expectations of a more educated workforce, then policies aimed at
creating more employment opportunities will depend for their
success partly on the degree of this mismatch problem - a problem
which may not necessarily be related to productivity or earnings
criterion.

One must first discover what relationship (if any)

exists between the number in the workforce with successively
higher levels of education and the rate of open unemployment.

If

the relationship is positive then more education appears to make
some people less employable.

If it is negative, more education

improves the chance of employment.

The point at issue has been

crystallised as follows:
It is obvious that education is in no way responsible
for the problem of over-all imbalance (i.e. between
labour supply and demand). Changes in the
educational system will not change the number of
job opportunities in the economy (except to the
extent that changes in pupil-teacher ratios affect
the demand for teaching staff). However, education
is definitely responsible for one of the problems
of structural imbalance: that of matching
employment opportunities and expectations. This is
one of the lessons to be drawn from the Colombia
and Ceylon employment reports, in particular the
latter.
(Emmerij (1973) p.415).
Generalisations from empirical work are difficult to draw.
The I.L.O. employment missions to Ceylon (1971) and Iran (1972)
observed an inverted U-shaped relationship, with the rate of
unemployment for secondary school graduates exceeding that for
primary school leavers, although it declines again for university
graduates.

The I.L.O. missions to Colombia (1970) and Kenya (1972)

found support for the negative relationship, unemployment being
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worst among those with no education whatsoever.

Blaug

(1973) has observed the inverted U-shape curve in Agentina,
India, Malaysia, Syria and Venezuela, and the negative relation
ship in the Philippines.
The link between this type of relationship and the skill
criterion for an indicator of invisible underemployment is an
implied one.

A strong relationship between open unemployment and

education level may be assumed to indicate that substantial
underemployment with respect to skill capabilities also exists.
For those who will remain unemployed rather than accept a position
well below the expectations which their education has generated,
there must be many more who are forced to accept more lowly
employment even on a full-time basis.
Once again, these observations are not necessarily meant to
imply that employment policy should be directed to creating
education-specific employment opportunities.

This is because

cross-section observation of unemployment by education levels is
the outcome of a complex of conflicting forces which will confuse
our interpretation of the evidence.

Firstly, labour force

participation rates are in most countries positively related to
educational attainment.

This might cause the unemployment rate

to decline with levels of education because the denominator of
the unemployment rate will rise (Blaug (1973) p.9).

Secondly, if

the education system is expanding rapidly, particularly higher
education, then students will comprise an increasing share of
the working age population, and educated unemployment will not
rise (in the immediate time period, at least - it may in the
longer term).

Thirdly, rapid population growth may cause the

throughput of at least primary, and perhaps some secondary,
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education levels to be very high.

Employers may be unwilling or

unable to hire the large numbers of graduates from the school
system primarily because they are young and inexperienced.

The

fact that they are also shown as a high proportion of educated
unemployment is not the critical factor, but their youth
(Blaug (1973)).

These considerations would have to be isolated

before one could properly devise policies for dealing with
disguised underemployment from underutilisation of skills.

5.4

A theoretical approach to underemployment

5.4.1

Introductory remarks:

In the previous section it was shown that attempts to apply
internationally accepted conventions for the categorisation of
labour force activities are more difficult in developing countries
than in developed countries.

Some of the difficulties may be

overcome by adopting statistical conventions which are appropriate
for the particular country being studied.

These include, for

example, specifying the minimum and maximum age by which people
are regarded as being part of the economically active population,
or specifying a norm for average hours of work below which people
are regarded as being visibly underemployed.

On the other hand

there are more difficult problems associated with the adequacy of
employment from both the point of view of the economy as a whole
as well as the individual concerned.

These require careful

consideration because the conceptual approach that is adopted will
have a direct bearing on the planning framework in which we are
interested.
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Conventional approaches to labour force underutilisation have
been concerned with the concept of surplus labour in underdeveloped
areas.

For example there has been considerable debate on whether

the marginal productivity of labour in agriculture in developing
countries is zero (classical approach) or positive (neo-classical
approach)5.

It has been argued that disguised underemployment

can exist under the former approach but not the latter.

Part of

this controversy was due to the lack of attention to differentiation
among labour inputs.

It may be possible to remove some labourers

without affecting agricultural output, provided that total labour
effort is not decreased - those remaining simply work harder - but
the marginal physical product of labour time can hardly be zero,
as Viner points out:
As far as agriculture is concerned, I find it
impossible to conceive of a farm of any kind on
which, other factors of production being held
constant in quantity, and even in form as well, it
would not be possible by known methods to obtain
some addition to the crop by using additional
labour in more careful selection and planting of
the seed, more intensive weeding, cultivation,
thinning, and more painstaking harvesting, gleaning
and clearing of the crop.
(Viner (1957), p .18).
For a planning framework in which employment is to be
regarded as a vehicle of income distribution as well as growth
of output it is necessary to go beyond this conventional treatment
of invisible underemployment.

This extension is needed, partly

because the conventional treatment has concentrated upon
agriculture and yet there is evidence of underemployment in urban

5

An analytical treatment of the classical/neo-classical
distinction is provided by Jorgenson (1970). This source also
contains critiques by Johnston, Marglin and Ruttan (Ibid).
Important contributions to the controversy over the existence
of surplus labour include Nurkse (1953), Viner (1957),
Schultz (1964), Myrdal (1968).
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service industries and some manufacturing, and partly because the
marginal productivity approach is too restrictive as the sole
criterion of underemployment.

A particularly useful approach

has been developed by A.K. Sen (1975) who suggests that there are
problems for which any one of three following concepts of
employment may be appropriate:
(1)

The p r o d u c t i o n a p p r o a c h :

if a man can leave his traditional

activity (e.g. family farm) without adversely affecting the total
product of this activity he may be regarded as being "under
employed in the production sense".

He is "employed in the

production sense" if his withdrawal from the traditional activity
would reduce its total output.
(2)

The income a p p r o a c h :

if a man's income (including direct

consumption, food and shelter, and any other emoluments) is not
conditional upon the continuation of his labour in the traditional
activity he may be regarded as being "underemployed in the income
sense".

He is "employed in the income sense" if his income is a

reward for work and if he would cease to receive it should he
withdraw his labour.
(3)

The recognition a p p r o a c h :

if a man regards himself as doing

something worthwhile he may be regarded as "employed in the
recognition sense".

He is "underemployed in the recognition

sense" if his activity does not satisfy certain expectations and
self-esteem.
These three approaches are quite different to the three
criteria for measuring underemployment discussed in the previous
section, viz:

the productivity criterion, the earnings criterion

and the skill criterion.

There the concern was for whether the

productivity of an activity, the earnings from an activity, or the

144

.

skill utilisation in an activity, was high or low, according to
some pre-determined norm.

In Sen's conceptual framework the

behavioural patterns of individuals and groups (families) is the
central concern.

For instance, Sen's income approach is not

particularly interested in whether the income is high or low, but
in whether or not it is conditional on the work done.

His

production approach is not only concerned with whether the
productivity of an activity is high or low (or zero), but also
with the effect of labour withdrawal on the output of the
activity and on the efforts induced in those remaining.

His

recognition approach relates to an individual's own perception
of the activity in which he is engaged, which is only partly a
function of the amount of skill which is required.

In short,

Sen's concepts are oriented to a welfare approach to employment,
which is necessary for adequate treatment of the employment-income
distribution relationship in the development planning framework.
The next section discusses these three approaches in more detail
and examines some of their implications:
5.4.2

The production approach:

The production approach to the concept of employment
discussed by Sen represents an illuminating departure from the
conventional treatment of surplus labour.

He comments:

While economists seem to have a preference for
proving the existence of or the absence of disguised
unemployment in the developing countries in general,
it is of course perfectly possible that the thesis
of disguised unemployment would be reasonably
correct for some countries or regions and not so
for others. Furthermore, the relevant issue is
not of the yes-no type, and there are questions
both of (i) the volume of surplus labour if present,
and (ii) the quantitative impact of labour
withdrawal on output, which could be high or low,
and whether it is exactly zero or not is not the
only interesting question.
(Sen (1975), p.36).
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Sen provides a highly simplified analytical model to
illustrate his conception of underemployment in the production
sense:
L = nx

.... 0 )

Q = f (L), with f' > 0, f" < 0
S(x) = zx, subject to x < x*

.... (3)

z = f '(nx)[a+( 1 -a)h], subject to x < x*

.... (4)

Q = G(z/[a+(l-a)h]), with G diminishing
and F ^(Q) < nx

.... (5)

Equation (1 ) gives the equal work-sharing rule for total
labour time (L) and the n working members of a peasant family
(i.e. x hours per member).

Equation (2 ) gives total output as a

function of labour, with constant inputs of other factors of
production6 .

Equation (3) sets compensation at z per unit of

work per member, subject to a maximum work constraint of x* per
person.

Equation (4) reflects the work equilibrium of a

representative worker.

Such equilibrium is characterised by the

equality of marginal cost of labour with marginal reward from the
individual's point of view.

It is assumed that of the additional

output produced by such work the labourer gets a proportionate
share designated a with 0 <_ a <_ 1.
valued at h per unit ( 0 £ h
by himself.

Output accruing to others is

1 ) in terms of units of output enjoyed

Sen suggests that if the labourer is completely

alienated from others, h = 0.

For a cohesive family, full concern

for others may imply that h = 1 (given equal distribution of work
6 Equations

(1) to (5) are as listed in Sen (1975) p.34; in an
earlier chapter he considers the effect of technological change
in the production function by using a technology parameter:
0 = $f(L), with 3 > 0.
This is rather too simplistic for an
adequate treatment of technology and its omission in the
following analysis does not alter the thrust of the argument.
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and income)7.

Equation (5) expresses output as a function of
★
z, a and h, subject to x < x . With this model, the work done
per person is given by:
X

= f" 1 (G(z/[a+(1-a)h]))/n

.... (6 )

The rationale of this equation is described as follows:
A reduction of a part of the labour force keeps the
t o t a l work time and the level of output completely
unchanged (the reduction in numbers being completely
compensated by the increase of work per person) as
long as x £ x*. Once that limit is reached,
everyone's work level gets fixed at this maximum
value x* and a reduction of workforce will reduce
output. So the necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of "disguised unemployment" in
this model is:
X

>_ f “ 1 (G(z/[oi+(l-a)h]))/n

.... (7)

in which n is the number of working people left in
the family after the withdrawal of a part of the
workforce.
(Sen (1975) p.34).
Sen describes this model as "shockingly simple" and proceeds
to make several further observations on it.

Each of these further

observations raises important questions which may be resolved
empirically.

It is intended here to concentrate on conceptual

issues so Sen's further observations are listed below with little
additional comment.

It should be noted that for the case of Fiji

some valuable research has already been done on these issues by
McGregor (1972).
1.

The required compensation for work (z) should not be constant,
but should increase as the amount of work effort (x) increases.
McGregor has shown that this is caused by two factors - the

I am grateful to Professor Blakey for pointing out that, for a
family which treats consumer goods as having some degree of
collective use within the family, then h = 1 is equally
consistent with concern for oneself. This is also relevant to
the income approach discussed later.
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disutility of work increases with successive increments to
effort, as does a worker's requirements for caloric energy
(which must be purchased in food).

Therefore, instead of z,

one must take S'(x) as compensation for work where
S'(x) > 0,
2.

S"(x) > 0 .

Output will not be a function of labour alone, but of other
factors as well.

McGregor also shows this for agriculture in

Fiji (as well as the elasticities of output with respect to
various inputs).

If one was to introduce these other factors,

the equilibrium conditions would have to be redefined.
3.

If labour has an outside employment opportunity, a dual market
equilibrium will exist with (say) z-j the supply price of
labour in peasant agriculture and z ^ the opportunity price in
capitalist production.

Once again, McGregor recognises this

in his paper and estimates an appropriate elasticity.
Alternatively it could be accounted for within a Todaro-type
framework, as Sen does in his sixth chapter.
4.

Sen introduces welfare considerations into his model from the
viewpoint of a group welfare function8 , which deducts the
sum of labour costs from output.
W = f(L) - z.x.n.

.... (8 )

From this formation, it can be seen that greater effort
involves a greater cost (z per unit) but also greater output
(in f (L )).

To determine whether there is a net gain from

working harder:
f £ = [f'(L)-z].n

.... (9)

8 The precise form of the welfare function which is thought to be

appropriate for an equity-oriented planning framework is discussed
later in chapter 7.
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There will be a net gain
implying f '(L) > z.

positive) if a > 0, h > 0, thus

Note that the limit will be reached more

quickly if S'(x) is substituted for z.
5.

The previous observation values output in natural units,
whereas in the earlier model, the individual's valuation of
it depends upon his concern for others (h) and the share of
output going to them (1 - a).

The net gain in the individual's

welfare (V) can thus be expressed as:
dV
dx
6.

=

f

1(L)[a + (1- a

)h ]-Z

( 10 )

However, the others gain too - viz, to the extent
f 1 (L)(1-a). Assuming symmetrically that they value
income going to them at one per unit while valuing
at h per unit the income going to the people whose
efforts yield these outputs (and similarly their
efforts), and adding the whole thing up, the total
social gain when everyone increases his effort,
x, would be found to be:
3 7 = [f(L)-z](1+h)n

.... (11)

In other words, this is simply a blown-up version
(of that in observation 4.) making allowance for
social concern to the extent of (1 +h).
(Sen (1975) p.28).

5.4.3

The income approach:

In order to distinguish the income approach to employment
from the production approach, consider the illustration given by
Sen in which if a person remains in the village he helps with
productive activities, but if he takes up employment elsewhere he
cannot do this.

Assume that in either situation he still receives

his share of the farm income.

Then if he is "underemployed in

the production sense" he will also be "underemployed in the income
sense".

149.

This is because his earnings from the farm are independent of
his participation in farm work or, put another way, his work has
no income consequences.
Now contrast this case with another in which a man is
supported in the village only on the condition that he helps in
the family work.
income.

If he leaves he will not get his traditional

Therefore, he is "employed (in the income sense)",

irrespective of whether or not he is so in the production sense.
Thus the income approach to unemployment may yield a different
measure to the production approach, depending upon the nature of
the particular situation.
One point of criticism which may be directed against the
income approach suggested is that the concept of conditionality
of income upon work presupposes a society which is strongly
individualistic.

If the (extended) family is the unit of society,

as it is in Fiji and in many other developing countries, and if
the family "income" is not apportioned among members but communally
consumed, and if work is considered as part of a complex of
socio-cultural activity within the family (perhaps even
indistinguishable from leisure), then the conditionality upon
work of any individual's claim to "income" may be impossible to
establish.

It is certainly impossible to establish unless and

until an individual does actually leave the village environment.
The distinction of an income approach to employment from the
other approaches requires further investigation in each of the two
issues for which Sen claims that it has significance, viz:

viewing

employment as a vehicle of income distribution, and in the
determination of the supply price of labour to enterprises or
activities outside of the family-based enterprise or activity.
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In terms of the first of these issues, the argument is as follows:
Finding an outside job for a person who was
employed in terms of the income approach has an
impact not only on his own well-being but also on
those left behind in the farm, since they now get
what he was earning while on the farm.
(Sen (1975) p.37).
In terms of the supply price of labour to outside enterprises,
Sen's argument is:
If a joint family stays joint and completely merged
together in terms of income, even after part of the
family migrates elsewhere in search of employment,
and the migrating members do not have to seek
compensation for an income loss, the supply price
of labour will be lower to that extent. This type
of question seems to have a bearing on the survival
and success of the so-called "informal" sector,
since its effective labour cost will remain low
vis-à-vis that of the organised sector operating
outside the family orbit. It also has some
relevance for the pattern of migration of industrial
labour in some countries, since short-period wage
employment might permit one to enjoy part of the
joint family income and assets.
(Sen (1975),
pp.37-38).
These two issues are closely related in the organisation of
a planning framework concerned with employment and income
distribution.

From the viewpoint of the (extended) family, each

member remaining after one (or more) migrates will have to work
harder to maintain the same total output.

If the migrant retains

his claim on traditional income, each remaining member may
experience a fall in real hourly reward for labour inputs.
On the other hand, if the migrant foregoes his share of income,
each remaining member may experience a rise or a fall in real
hourly reward for labour, depending upon the marginal productivity
of the migrant.

In either case the effect upon income distribution

within the (extended) family could be better examined under the
production approach, with appropriate acknowledgement to the
institutional rules governing traditional income claims.
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There remains the important question of income redistribution
between sectors - rural and urban, traditional and modern, formal
and informal - as a result of the migration of labour between
them, and the concept of conditionality of traditional income
upon participation in traditional activities as set by traditional
institutional arrangements in a particular society may have a
great deal of influence upon such redistribution.
The notion that a migrant who is "underemployed in the
income sense" would be prepared to work at a lower wage level
than his workmates is difficult to accept.

More importantly

though, given that the predominant employment mode in this sector
is wage employment, and given the rapid growth of workers'
unionism in L.D.C.'s, he may not be permitted to accept a lower
wage, even if he were willing to do so.

Sen himself recognises

this as a cause of dualism in labour markets in his sixth chapter.
However, for many migrants from traditional sector activities,
it is the "i n f o r m a l " sector (also modern) that may provide their
only available urban income opportunity;

for others it may

provide a temporary buffer against poverty while they seek formal
wage employment.

In either case, it may well be that there is

some relationship between income levels in informal sector
activities and traditional sector activities along the lines
suggested by Sen.

But it can also be argued that the survival

and success of the informal sector is not only dependent upon
the availability to migrants of income from traditional sources.
Hart (1971) contends that the range of income opportunities outside
the organised labour market is so wide that no-one need be without
income of some kind, however irregular and however illegitimate.
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He goes on to argue that income in the informal sector is
primarily a derivative of the "legitimacy" or otherwise of the
activities concerned.

Here the use of the word "legitimacy" is

not meant to imply only criminal activities such as petty theft,
prostitution or black-marketing.

Rather it refers to the presence

or absence of official limitations of access to formal sector
activities which are recognised and fostered by governments.
Informal sector activities are often ignored, which is sometimes
a help and sometimes a hindrance, but always the risk and
uncertainty of earning a livelihood in this sector is magnified
solely by the doubtful legality of the activity (whether or not
it is enforced).

The relationship between traditional sector

incomes and informal sector incomes, in view of the conditionality
of the former on participation in traditional sector activities,
should therefore be reasoned against the background of the
legitimacy of informal sector incomes.

Both issues are relevant

in assessing the supply price of labour.
Finally, returning to the relationship between modern
industrial sector wage rates and the income approach to employment,
the concept of conditionality of traditional income upon
participation in traditional activities will clearly be relevant
in affecting an individual's decision to migrate.

From the

individual's point of view, his subjective assessment of each
activity, (taking into account real wage differences and the
probability of finding a modern sector job) is the relevant point
and this is considered in the following paragraphs.

But from the

society's point of view, the impact of these institutional
arrangements (for sharing traditional income among family members)
upon these decisions of individual prospective migrants will be
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important in determining the rate of rural-to-urban migration and
the share of the workforce engaged in agriculture.

The importance

of this for income distribution has been demonstrated in Chapter 2,
and lies behind much of the discussion of intersectoral income
inequalities in Fiji referred to in this dissertation.

5.4.4

The recognition approach:

In discussing the recognition approach to employment,
Sen makes the following observations:
...the question of employment is one of having not
only a gainful occupation but one which also
satisfies some of the minimal expectations of the
job-seekers.
...Precisely because the person in question regards
himself as employed, certain actual behaviour
patterns may be expected to follow. One of them
relates to the question of seeking work elsewhere.
(Sen (1975), pp.5,39).
He cites the Indian National Sample Survey reports that,
in 1961-62 only 27% of rural workers with 15-28 hours of work per
week, said they were available for additional work if it were
offered.

Of those workers with 1-14 hours of work per week, the

corresponding proportion was even lower at 23%.
The conviction of a peasant that he is 'employed'
relates to a certain structure of thought to which
the concept of 'disguised unemployment' does not
really belong...it is necessary to view the
behaviour patterns of human beings also in terms of
their own assessments of their position...
Unemployment is a state of being without fruitful
work and the perception of the fruitfulness of
work is, to a large extent, a result of social
conditioning (Sen (1975), pp.39-40).
The assessment of the worth of a particular activity will
depend upon from whose point of view that assessment is made.
Clearly, through his emphasis on expectations, Sen means to stress
the i n d i v i d u a l ’s own assessment of his activities.

The main

154.

criterion suggested by Sen for determining "unemployment in the
recognition sense" is that of "seeking work elsewhere".
However, this may not always be equated with "having unsatisfied
expectations" which he appears to imply.
It is usual in unemployment surveys to ask, "Are you a
job-seeker?".

Anyone answering "Yes" to this question may be

dissatisfied with his present or immediate past occupation, or
he may simply be a victim of market or demand factors in an
industry.

Conversely, there may be some respondents who give a

negative answer because they have a "job", and yet that job fails
to satisfy certain minimal expectations.

The criterion of seeking

work elsewhere robs the recognition approach of much of its
significance.

For as such it would simply correspond to a portion

of conventionally defined open unemployment.

What is sufficient

and necessary for this approach is that certain expectations of
persons with regard to their occupations are not met.

Interpreting

recognition in this manner requires a definition of precisely
what factors influence this assessment (i.e. what are these
"minimum expectations"?).
According to Sen, an individual's assessment of the worth of
his activities stems largely from social conditioning.

One might

also say that it is made with respect to alternatives open to the
individual in other activities.

For instance, Todaro (1971)

has shown that a person may consider income differentials between
traditional sector activities and modern formal sector activities,
and in addition, the probability of his finding a job in the
latter sector, as factors affecting his decision to migrate
(i.e. to become a job-seeker).

In this respect a person may have

unsatisfied expectations with regard to his income level, but may
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regard his probability of finding employment which satisfies those
expectations as being very low, such that he decides not to
become a job-seeker.

Inertia itself may be a factor affecting

such a decision in a similar manner - so may traditional customs,
or rigid castes.

On the other hand, there may be externalities

working in the opposite direction, such as "bright city lights",
or the prestige attached to certain white-collar occupations.
It is tempting to define "recognition" such that all these
factors are subsumed by an individual "voting with his feet",
and thereby indicating in which situation his total economic,
psychological and social well-being is maximised.

However, in

addition to the reservations outlined above about equating
"job-seeking" with "having unsatisfied expectations", such an
approach is of limited usefulness to the planner who has no
knowledge of which factor (or factors) was of primary consequence
in leading individuals to their decisions.

It is difficult in

these circumstances to model the response of migration rates to
different policies.

Although in the previous chapter some

attention was given to rural-urban migration, no attempt has been
made to assess the recognition approach to underemployment,
because of the difficulties of measurement and the fact that it is
not included in conventional data.

5.5

Summary
Several different aspects of the concept and measurement of

employment in developing countries have been canvassed in this
chapter and it is now necessary to summarise the thread of the
argument.
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It was argued that the concept of labour force underutilisation
is quite different in developing countries compared with developed
countries.

Because of this the concept requires different methods

of analysis and approaches to measurement.

None of the now

conventional models of employment creation in developing countries
is wholly satisfactory for all countries at all times.

The

particular analytical framework chosen should therefore reflect
the dominant feature of the employment problem in the particular
case.

When it comes to assessing the extent and nature of the

problem in a particular case it is common to refer to the
internationally accepted framework for classifying persons by
their economic activity status.

There is some flexibility in the

interpretation of this international framework, and it was argued
that this should be oriented to identifying where and how
employment creation can improve the distribution of income-earning
opportunities.

The theoretical foundations for this reorientation

are not to be found in the conventional approaches to surplus
labour, but are evident in the approach lately outlined by
Sen (1975).

His theoretical approach is fully consistent with

the view that the appropriate way to discuss employment problems
in developing countries is in relation to the role of employment
as a creator of new income-earning opportunities for particular
(low income) groups.
The three main sections of this chapter therefore constitute
a discussion of the three basic elements of a planning framework
with which I am concerned, but with a focus on employment.
The three elements are theoretical foundations, data preparation,
and model building.

The order in which they have been discussed

was convenient for the purpose of exposition.

However, an
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economist would normally work in the reverse order.

One would

begin with the theoretical concepts, and would organise the
collection of data to provide information on these concepts.
Then the planner would be in a position to formalise the
relationships in an econometric model which should be useful for
assessing the impact of various alternative policies.
In the following chapter some of the issues raised in the
section on data preparation (section 5.3) are pursued for the
case of Fiji.
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CHAPTER 6
The structure of employment, underemployment and
unemployment in Fiji
6.1

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the level and

structure of employment, underemployment and open unemployment in
Fiji.

The primary reference is a comprehensive labour force

survey conducted in 1973 by the Bureau of Statistics under the
direction of I.W. Kannangara.

The survey was conducted on a

sample basis of twenty-five percent of all households in Fiji and
fairly represented all relevant dimensions of employment and the
labour force (i.e. age, sex, race, location, and so on).

Some

reference will also be made to the 1966 and 1976 censuses for
estimating relevant trends.

Census data is not comparable with

the 1973 survey, not only because the latter is based upon a
sample of households, but also because the fieldwork for it was
conducted over several months in 1973 in contrast to census
enumerations which relate to one particular night of the year.
Questions relating to labour force characteristics form only a
part of the census enquiry and may have been treated relatively
lightly by enumerators in relation to other questions such as age
of respondents (see 1976 Census Report pp.15-17).

On the other

hand, the 1973 Survey sought detailed information on labour force
characteristics and has reported over five hundred pages of data
on these characteristics.

The other major sources of data on

employment in Fiji are the Annual Employment Surveys published by
the Bureau of Statistics.

These annual surveys only cover wage

and salary employment in firms listed on a register maintained at
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the Bureau.

This register is not complete for small firms and

does not consider self-employed workers.

It may be regarded as a

survey of organised sector employment in contrast to the compre
hensive coverage of both organised and informal sectors in the 1973
Unemployment Survey.

6 .2

Definitions and conventions adopted
The lower age limit for allocating persons to labour force

categories in the 1973 Survey was 14 years.

There is no visible

evidence of very young children in paid employment in Fiji,
whether as domestic servants, agricultural workers or in work
shops or elsewhere.

Further, school enrolment data shows that

almost all children attend school up to class 8 or approximately
14 years of age (although 15 years is the nominal minimum
school-leaving age, and this is used in census reports).

Formal

retirement ages are irrelevant for most of Fiji's labour force and
no upper age limit was set on the economically active population.
The labour force therefore includes all persons 14 years of age
and over who are economically active (employed and unemployed).
Persons of working age but who are not economically active mainly
include students and women engaged in home duties, as well as
those unable to work because of age and infirmity.

Community

workers are also included in the economically inactive group,
although they are certainly not idle.

They are engaged in building

roads or churches, raising funds for village projects, disaster
relief, and so on, all in a voluntary capacity.
Categorisation of persons within the labour force closely
follows the international standards formulated by the I.L.O.
For example, the unemployed are defined as 'persons 14 years of
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age and over who are available for employment or whose contract
of employment has been terminated and who are without a job, and
all of whom are seeking work for pay or profit'.

Given that

such definitions are standardised, they do however pose certain
peculiar problems for researchers in developing countries, as has
been discussed in the previous chapter.

They also were in the

mind of the survey director, who found it necessary to insert the
following caveat in her report:
Though the international recommendation for the
definition of unemployment was followed as stated
above, there is sufficient material elsewhere in
this report to enable a more sophisticated analysis
of unemployment to be made, if so desired, (p.52).
Accordingly, considerable data is listed for persons employed
on the basis of hours of work, income and educational attainment
(these elements were considered to be important in the previous
chapter in the consideration of underemployment as well as
unemployment).
Classification of employed persons by industry and by
occupation follows the International Standard Industry Classificat
ion (I.S.I.C.) and the International Standard Classification of
Occupations (I.S.C.O.) respectively.

The coding of employed

persons by worker status recognises wage and salary earners (in
both private and public sectors), own account workers, and unpaid
family workers.
Aside from some reference to urban/rural differences, the
discussion in this chapter relates to all Fiji.

This was in

order to facilitate the accumulation of employment data for input
into the economy-wide planning framework.
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6.3

.

Participation ratios and open unemployment
Table 6.1 shows information taken from the 1966 and 1976

census on working-age population (15 years and over by census
definition), labour force and unemployment (standard definition).
Labour force participation ratios for males in each age cohort
have declined over the intercensal period while those for
females in each age cohort have increased.

A small portion of

the decline in male l.f.p.r. is due to the fact that in 1966
members of armed forces were included as economically active while
in 1976 they were counted as not economically active - but the
number concerned in only 500 persons in 1976.
An additional category of economically inactive persons was
added in the 1976 census called 'resting'.

It accounted for

1700 males and 1340 females, half of whom were under twenty-five
years of age.

This may be evidence that some part of the decline

in male l.f.p.r. was due to the discouraged worker phenomenon,
an assertion which is supported by the higher unemployment rate
which is the primary cause of this phenomenon in other countries
(see chapter 5).

It was not seasonal unemployment because this

was identified separately.
The major influence in the declining male l.f.p.r. for
15-19 year olds was the increase in secondary and tertiary
education enrolments.

The proportion of male 15-19 years

population counted as 'students' increased by fifty percent
between 1966 and 1976 (from 25.7% to 38.0% of the male 15-19 years
population).

For females in the same age group the proportion

counted as students more than doubled over the period (from 17.9%
to 38.1% of the female 15-19 years population).

In view of this,
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the increase in female participation rates in the young age group
was particularly strong, indicating a dramatic shift in attitudes
to both work and family among young women in Fiji.
However, for many young women, these aspirations have been
disappointed, as shown by the very high rates of open
unemployment for females, particularly those under thirty years
of age.

Unemployment of males has also increased in the

intercensal period, particularly males under thirty years of age.
A more detailed characterisation of the nature of open
unemployment in Fiji may be obtained from the 1973 Unemployment
Survey.

Table 6.2 shows information from the survey on

l.f.p.r.'s and unemployment.

The data in Table 6.2 is not

comparable to that in Table 6.1 because of the different sampling
procedure employed (as mentioned previously) and because the
lower age limit for the working-age population is different
(14 years for the survey, 15 years for censuses).
of age cohorts is also reported differently.

The grouping

It is still

interesting to note that the measured rates of open unemployment
in the 1973 survey are higher for males and apparently somewhat
lower for females than was indicated by the census data, and
that there is no significant difference between the rates of
youth unemployment for males and females in the 1973 survey.
This survey should be regarded as the more authoritative source
reference on labour force characteristics, for reasons stated in
the introduction.
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Table 6 .2 : Participation ratios and open unemployment
by age and sex 197?

SURVEY

Males :

+J

Participati
Ratio

r

No.
16772
21540
33780
24812
16480
7836
1900
123120

(*)
43.0

20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Total

No.
39024
24418
36830
27462
19076
11684
6196
164690

Females :
14-19
20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Total

38630
25704
37050
26274
17340
9368
5176
159542

4324
5432
6024
3640
1796
600
140
21956

1 1 .2
2 1 .1

8 8 .2

91.7
90.4
86.4
67.1
30.7
74.8

16.3
13.9
10.4
6.4
2.7
13.8

Unemployed

•I—

Labour
Force

Population

c

O

No.
3564
2168
1468
528
280
68
12

Unemploymen
Rate

1973

ß T

2 1 .2
1 0 .1

4.3
2 .1

1.7
0.9

8088

0 .6
6 .6

916
432
168
64
28

2 1 .2
8 .0
2 .8
1 .8
1 .6

8

1.3

-

-

1616

7.4

The characterisation of unemployment varies from country to
country according to which aspect is regarded as most critical.
It has been reported (Jolly et. a l . (T973) p .17 quoted in the
previous chapter) that in most of sub-Sahara Africa there is inad
equate infrastructure to provide full employment; that in Colombia
the system of land tenure has deprived many rural dwellers of
sufficient land; that in India seasonal underemployment is more
important than open rural unemployment; and that in Sri Lanka the
dominating factor in political terms is unemployment of educated
young adults.
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Some of these aspects emerge In Fiji as well, although there
is a general shortage of educated people in the workforce, not
a surplus.

The unemployment problem in Fiji is first and foremost

a problem of youth.

Whatever market or institutional factors

exist, the 14 to 24 year old population is particularly prone to
suffer unemployment.

This in turn is a function of the rapid rate

of growth of the working-age population as demonstrated in
chapter 4.

It can be expected to remain the pervasive character

istic of unemployment throughout the 1980's.

Table 6.2 shows that

twenty-one percent of the 14-19 year old workforce was unemployed
in 1973 (both males and females).

For 20-24 year olds the

unemployment rates were ten percent for males and eight percent
for females.

Three quarters of all unemployed persons in 1973

were aged between 14 and 24 years, yet this age group formed only
one third of the workforce.
Other characteristics of open unemployment which are important
to consider include the waiting time before a job seeker is
successful, and the education level of the unemployed.
Blaug has noted,
There is a world of difference between a situation
in which everybody takes six months to find a job
and then holds onto it until retirement, and one
where 90 percent find work on the day they leave
school while 10 percent take five years to get a
job, although both situations actually yield
identical unemployment rates.
(Blaug (19 )
pp. 1 0 - 1 1 ).
Figure 6.1 shows age-specific levels of unemployment in Fiji
(1973) expressed as a proportion of total unemployment of groups
who were unemployed for various lengths of time (less than 5 weeks,
5-9 weeks, 10-14 weeks, 15-26 weeks, 27-52 weeks, and more than
one year).

The diagram in Figure 6.1 again indicates the
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precarious position of youth in the labour market, with 14-19 year
olds forming a slowly growing proportion of longer-term unemploy
ment (although 20-24 year olds form a declining proportion of
1 onger-term unemployment).

Figure 6 . 2 shows the relationship between age-specific rates
of open unemployment and the level of schooling completed in the
unemployed in Fiji (1973).

Education levels shown include those

with no schooling, primary schooling, junior secondary, senior
secondary, and tertiary.

An obvious negative relationship exists

between unemployment rates and education, unemployment being
highest in all age groups for those with little or no schooling
and steadily decreasing as the period of education increases.
Figure 6 . 2 also shows the education/unemployment relationship for
urban and rural Fiji - the broken lines representing urban
unemployed and the unbroken lines rural.

The open unemployment

rate for 14-19 year olds is considerably higher in urban areas
than in rural areas.

This rate declines with increasing education

in urban areas, but there is no clear downward trend in open
unemployment with increasing education for 14-19 year olds in
rural areas.

Urban/rural differences in unemployment rates are

small for those over twenty five years old. (However, this does
not refer to underemployment which, as will be shown later, is
widespread in rural Fiji.)
Finally, we are interested in the behaviour of job seekers
with respect to the types of occupations sought.

Table 6.3

classifies those unemployed persons who previously held a job on
the basis of their previous occupation (row headings) and according
to the occupation they were seeking (column headings).

Inexperienced

job-seekers are also classified by the type of occupation they
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6.1

Open unemployment by age by duration of unemployment —
1973 Survey (All Fiji) (% of those unemployed for
given length of time)

50

40

30

20

10

35-44yrs
45-54yrs

0

<5

5-9

10-14

27-52
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Figure 6 . 2

.

Open unemployment by age and highest level of
schooling completed — 1973 Survey — Urban and
Rural Fiji (% of those unemployed with given
level of schooling.
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Table 6.3

Unemployed persons by occupation sought
and previous occupation 1973
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1973 Survey, p .541

most strongly desired.

Analysis of Table 6.3 reveals that

approximately half of those unemployed who previously held a job
were seeking different occupations to those from which they were
retrenched.

This indicates a relatively high degree of

occupational mobility1, which is highest among unemployed
agricultural, forestry and fishing workers.

Only 11% of unemployed

agricultural, forestry and fishing workers were seeking a similar
occupation - 82% were seeking jobs in manufacturing industry and
related non-farm labouring.

Of all the unemployed who had

previously held a job, 72% were seeking wage jobs in production
work and related labouring activities.

A further 13% sought

1 Strictly speaking it indicates a willingness to be occupationally

mobile - it is not evidence that these wishes are fulfilled.
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clerical positions.

None of the unemployed from occupations

other than agriculture sought to be farmers or fishermen.
Inexperienced job seekers make up three quarters of the
unemployed in Fiji (1973).

Table 6.3 reveals a similar disdain

for agricultural work among this group as was noted in the previous
paragraph - only 3% of the unemployed who had never worked wanted
agricultural work.

Twenty percent sought clerical positions and

16% sought sales and service occupations.

Almost 60% of the

unemployed who had never worked wanted jobs as wage labourers in
manufacturing and related production activities.

6.4

The structure of employment in Fiji

6.4.1

The employed labour force by industrial sector
and by occupational group.

Age specific levels of employment for males and females in
1973 are shown in Table 6.4 which also distinguishes between
agricultural industries on one hand (agriculture, forestry,
fishing, and including subsistence farmers) and non-agricultural
industries on the other.

The table indicates a preponderance of

very young people and very old people employed in agricultural
industries.

For instance 15.5% of agriculture's

workforce was

aged 14-19 years, and 11.1% was aged over 55 years.

Only 10% of

the non-agricultural industries workforce was in the 14-19 years
cohort while 5.2% was aged over 55 years.

Of all employed males

aged 14-19 years, almost 58% were engaged in agriculture;

yet

agriculture only employs 44% of the total male workforce.
Agriculture accounts for one-third of the employed females aged
14-19 years but only a little more than a quarter of the total
employed female workforce.

This gives rise to the proposition that
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Table 6.4:

Employed persons by age and sex, a g r ic u ltu r e
and n o n -a g r ic u ltu r a l in d u s tr ie s 1973

Age

Source:
(a)

.

A g r ic u ltu r e ^

Group
14 -19
2 0 -2 4
2 5 -3 4
35-44
4 5 -5 4
55 -6 4
65+

H a le s
7532
7404
11988
10208
7888
4628
1280

Females
n?g
836
1304
1252
724
272
104

T o ta l

51028

5640

Non- A g r i c u i t u r e
Males
w
11968
20324
140 76
8312
3140
608
64004

Females
2260
4 16 4
4552
2324
1044
320
36
14 70 0

1 9 73 S u r v e y , p . 1 1 8

A g r i c u l t u r e , f o r e s t r y and f i s h i n g , i n c l u d i n g
s e c to r.

s u b s is te n c e

many young people are drawn into agricultural activities immediately
after leaving school as a staging ground while they wait for
employment opportunities in modern sector manufacturing, clerical
and non-farm labouring jobs.

This proposition is supported by the

high rural-to-urban migration propensities of the young population
demonstrated in chapter 4.

From a different viewpoint it is

supported by the evidence on job-seeking behaviour of inexperienced
openly-unemployed youths cited in the previous section of this
chapter.

Support for the proposition will also be demonstrated in

a later section concerned with underemployment.
Table 6.5 shows males and females employed in 1973 by broad
occupational groups.

Employment of males is concentrated in the

agricultural occupations (including those partly or mainly engaged
in subsistence farming) and production and related workers - these
two occupational groups accounted for 43% and 29% respectively of
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Table 6 . 5 :

Employed p e r s o n s by m a j o r o c c u p a t i o n s

Males
No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

P r o f e s s i o n a l , T e c h n ic a l
M a n a g e ria l»A d m in is tra tiv e
C l e r i c a l and r e l a t e d
S a le s w o rk e rs
S e r v i c e o c c u p a tio n s
A g r ic u lt u r e ,f o r e s t ,f i s h i n g
M i n i n g ,q u a r r y i n g
P r o d u c t i o n and r e l a t e d
W o r k e r s ,L a b o u r e r s n . e . c .

7206
2 14 4
8490
7376
4328
4 9 716
700
33580
1492
115032

T o t a l Em ploym ent
Source:

(1973)

Females
%
6 .3
1 .9
7 .4
6 .4
3 .7
43.2
0 .6
29.2
1 .3
100

No.

%

3742
92
410 4
1 70 4
3748
5434
12
14 76
28

1 8 .4
0 .5
2 0 .2
8 .4
1 8 .4
26.7
-

7 .3
0 .1
100

20340

1 97 3 S u r v e y , p . 1 4 1 .

total employment of males.

Clerical and sales workers constituted

14% of the employed male workforce, with a further 8 % listed as
professional, technical, managerial and administrative personnel.
The pattern of female employment by occupations is quite
different to that of males.

Only 27% of employed females were

listed as agriculturalists.

Clerical and sales occupations

accounted for 28% of female employment, service occupations 18%,
and professional and technical personnel a further 18%.

It must

be noted that females made up only 15% of the employed workforce.
Thus, while there were relatively many females employed as
professional and technical personnel, their actual numbers were
only half those of the males.

Similarly, in clerical occupations

males outnumbered females by two to one.

For agriculture related

occupations there was only one female counted as employed for
every nine males.

It is evident that the survey enumerators have

classified most rural women as home workers (not economically
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active).

However, if subsistence farming activities are to be

included with cash activities in the listing of employment in
agriculture and related activities, there is an apparent
inconsistency in the survey here - certainly Fijian women do more
than just 10 l of the work done by men in the villages.

This is a

clear example of the difficulty of defining economic activity and
employment status discussed in chapter 5 .
Table 6 . 6 shows employed persons categorised in the nine major
industrial sectors (as column headings) and also according to their
occupation within an industry (as row headings).

The occupational

categories have been rearranged in order, but not
in content, from the listing of Table 6.5.

It is recognised that

within each industry there is a concentration of employment in one
or two main occupations.

For example, most workers in the

agriculture forestry and fishing industry are farmers or fishermen;
most workers in the commerce and distribution industry are sales
workers;

and so on.

The re-ordering of occupational groups was

arranged so as to coincide, somewhat roughly, with the ordering of
industries in which they are most concentrated.

Then the major part

of the economy's employment structure is found to be on or near a
diagonal line drawn downwards from left to right across Table 6 .6 .
Those listings not on or near the main diagonal may be thought of
as 'supporting' the main structure.
The survey classification of occupations is not ideally suited
to this type of device for analysing direct and indirect employment.
The leading diagonal would be more concentrated and illustrative
if the categories of 'production and related workers' and 'workers
and labourers n.e.c.' were differentiated according to the type of
unskilled or semi-skilled occupations they were in.

For instance,

one might want to identify 'manufacturing process workers' from

Table 6 .6 : Employed persons by occupation within industries (1973)

Industry of the Employed by 9 major I.S.I.C. groups
Occupation of the Employed

—

1

54316"
4
1004
284

ALL OCCUPATIONS

56668

Occupation of the Employed
Agricultural,forest,fishermen
Miners,quarrymen
Production and related
Workers»labourers n.e.c
Sales workers
Clerical and related
Service workers
Managers»administrators
Professional, technicians
Source:

1973 Survey, p -160.

88

406
108
34
424

3

^ ----- 7

5

4

28
672 13088

12
88

128
7696
188
164
896
196
308
268

1772

9844

4
704
676
36
12
200

40

12

200

176

16
1000
256
148
336

176
4
2808
164
8512
2848
2052
720
376

924 15072

17660

8
20

36

Industry
4

1

2

3

.9585
.0177
.0050
.0016
.0072
.0019
.0006
.0075

.0023
.3973
.3815
.0203
.0068
.1129
.0226
.0068
.0497

.0130
.7818
.0191
.0167
.0910
.0199
.0313
.0272

.7273
.0130
.1905
.0087
.0216
.0390

.0 0 1 1

.0663
.0170
.0098
.0223

TOTAL

40
5840
116
64
1816
532
300
528

4
148
60
104
1748
72
160
560

454
3124
460
120
3504
4812
534
8332

55150
712
35056
1520
9080
12594
8076
2236
10948

9236

2856

¿1340

135372

7

8

9

.0043
.6323
.0126
.0069
.1966
.0576
.0325
.0572

.0518
.0210
.0364
.6120
.0252
.0560
.1961

.0213
.1464
.0215
.0056
.1642
.2255
.0250
.3904

Coefficients
5
6
.0019
.8684
.0133

9

8

.0100
.1590
.0093
.4812
.1613
.1162
.0408
.0213
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Agricultural»forest,fishermen
Miners,quarrymen
Production and related
Workers»labourers n.e.c.
Sales workers
Clerical and related
Service workers
Managers, admini strators
Professional technicians

F ~
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.

'builders labourers and building tradesmen', as well as from
'transport workers'.

On the other hand, one might want to combine

the 'managerial and administrative' with the 'professional and
technical' occupations as one composite group of high level
manpower.
Examination of Table 6 . 6 reveals that in Fiji (1973) the
occupational groups of agricultural workers, miners, sales workers,
and professional and technical personnel were highly concentrated
in particular industries - in agriculture, mining, commerce, and
community and personal services respectively.
were more ubiquitous across industries.

The other occupations

The sub-table below

Table 6 . 6 shows the occupational distribution of each sector's
workforce in coefficient terms (with coefficients summing to unity
down the columns).

6.4.2

Employed labour force by worker status

The 1973 Unemployment Survey has highlighted an important and
illustrative distinction within the employed labour force on the
basis of whether a person was a wage-or-salary earner (and within
this group, whether in private or government employment), an
own-account worker (i.e. self-employed), or an unpaid family
worker.

Table 6.7 lists employed persons by type of worker and by

age and sex.
Almost 57% of the employed labour force were wage and salary
earners, and of these the public sector accounted for the jobs
of over 23,000 persons (more than 17% of total employment).

A

further 34% of the employed labour force were self-employed and
9% were unpaid family workers.
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Table 6.7:

.

Employed persons by age by sex by type of worker (1973)
M A L E S
Wage and Salary

Age
Group
14-19
20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 +
Tot.Employed 14yrs +
% of labour force

Private
5212
9344
14468
8724
4640
1740
384
44504
38.68%

Govt.
744
3008
6236
4764
3064
1084
116
19024
16.53%

Own
Account
Workers
2404
5348
10596
10440
8280
4700
1288
43056
37.42%

Unpaid
Family
Workers
4848
1672
1012

356
216
244
100

8448
7.34%

All
Male
Workers
13208
19372
32312
24284
16200
7768
1888
115032
100%

F E M A L E S
Wage and Salary
Age
Group
14-19
20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 +
Tot.Employed 14yrs +
% of labour force
Source:

Private

Govt.

1712
2756
2748
1268
588
136
4
9216
45.30%

408
1276
1596
768
260
44
4
4352
21.39%

Own
Account
Workers

Unpaid
Family
Workers

292
380

996
588
844
872
440
152

668
668

480
260
11 2

2860
14.06%

20

3912
19.23%

All
Female
Workers
3408
5000
5856
3576
1768
592
140
20340
100%

1973 Survey, p.171.

An interesting aspect of the assertion made above - that many
school leavers are drawn into agricultural employment as a staging
ground - is given by the data in Table 6.7, which shows 5,844 persons
aged between 14 and 19 years employed as unpaid family workers.
At 35% of the 14-19 years labour force, this is the highest
proportion of unpaid family workers of any age group.

Persons aged

14-19 years made up almost half of all unpaid family helpers, but
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only 12% of the employed labour force.

It may be reiterated

that many young people are absorbed in family based activities as
unpaid helpers while they wait for formal sector wage-employment.
The importance of agricultural activities as the dominant
employer of own account workers and unpaid family workers is shown
in Table 6 . 8 which shows employed persons by worker status within
nine major industries in 1973 (i.e. at single digit ISIC level).
Some 82% of the self-employed and 90% of unpaid family helpers
were employed in agriculture.
that sector's workforce.

Together they accounted for 8 6 % of

There are also significant numbers of

self-employed and unpaid family helpers in the commerce and
distribution sector (25% of that sector's workforce), and in the
transport sector (17% of the transport sector's workforce).
Half of the public sector workforce is employed in the
personal and community services industry, and another one quarter
is employed in the building and construction industry.

Employment

of private sector wage and salary earners is not concentrated
heavily in one or two sectors, but is represented by significant
numbers in each industry.
Table 6 .8 :

Employed persons by worker status within industries 1973

Wage

A g r i c u l t u r e , f o r e s t ,f i s h i n g
M in in g , q u a r r y in g
M a n u fa c tu rin g
E l e c t r i c i t y ,g a s , w a te r
B u i l d i n g ,c o n s t r u c t i on
Com m erce,di s t r i b u ti on
T ra n s p o rt,c o m m u n ic a tio n s
B u s in e ss s e r v ic e s
P e rs o n a l.c o m m u n ity s e r v ic e
A L L IN D U S T R IES
Source:

1973 Survey, p .190

and

P r i v a te
6036
1688
6 176
516
9280
13048
5756
2560
8660
53720

S a la ry
G o v t.
1660
24
2468
400
5164
96
1948
156
11460
23376

Own
A c co u n t
Workers
3 778 4
52
732
8
536
410 4
14 72
124
1104
45916

Unpaid
F a m ily
H e lp e rs
...... 1 1 18 8
8
468
-

92
412
60
16
116
12360

T o ta l
5555g1772
9844
924
15072
17660
9236
2856
21340
135372
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The broad picture emerging from Table 6 . 8 is one of formal
and non-formal sector activities.

In the formal sector,

government employees are concentrated in service industries in
clerical and administrative jobs, as well as in the building
industry in public works.

Private firms are responsible for most

non-farm directly productive employment.

The non-formal sector,

characterised by small scale self-employment activities, is
dominated by small-holder and village-based agriculture as well as
some small merchants/hawkers.

6.5

The nature of underemployment in Fiji

6.5.1

Visible underemployment

The conceptual difficulties associated with measuring the
extent of underemployment in developing countries have been
discussed in chapter 5.

With this discussion in mind it is

possible to derive an approximation to certain dimensions of
underemployment from the 1973 Unemployment Survey.

The Survey

director, Mrs Kannangara, was also aware of the difficulties here,
but seemed undecided about the results.

She stated:

Figures show that in entire Fiji the number of
persons employed for under 15 hours a week was 6 .1 %
and that all part-time workers or those working less
than 35 hours a week amounted to 15.4% of all
employed persons at work. This in a sense would be
a measure of the underemployed in Fiji, whether one
considers this as voluntary underemployment or
involuntary underemployment,
(p.34).
Then later on she added:
Some would be inclined to consider all persons
usually working part-time, i.e. less than 35 hours
a week, as being underemployed, but without knowing
their conditions of work, their reasons for part
time work, and their productivity, we cannot with
any justification include them among the
underemployed,
(p.41).
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In the previous chapter it was noted that the criterion of
hours of work is a useful starting point for identifying visible
underemployment.

The first problem which then arises is whether

to set an arbitrary norm of weekly hours of work, or whether to
consider the desired hours of work stated by survey respondents.
In Table 6.9 the norm of 35 hours per week is adopted as a level
above which employed persons are regarded as being fully
employed and below which they are regarded as part-time workers.
Those employed persons who usually worked fewer than 35 hours per
week are listed according to whether or not they wanted more work.
Those employed persons who usually worked full-time but who worked
less than 35 hours during the survey reference period are listed
according to their reason for working only part-time.

In non

agricultural industries there were very few part-time workers, but
almost three-quarters of those who worked part-time during the
reference period or who usually worked part-time stated that they
did not prefer more work.

In agricultural industries there was a

significant number of workers who usually worked full-time but only
worked part-time in the reference period.

Almost all of those who

did so for economic reasons stated that they worked full-time only
in peak season and that seasonal conditions were responsible for
their underemployment.

One quarter of the agricultural workforce

was listed as usually working only part-time, and 8 6 % of these
stated that they did not want more work - that is, only 2 1 % of
agricultural workers (with less than 35 hours of work per week) said
they were available for additional work if it were offered.

These

figures offer a broad indication for Fiji of the strength of the
recognition aspect of rural employment as described in the previous
chapter;

although without data on the terms and conditions upon

Table 6 . 9 :

Employed persons a t work in a g r ic u lt u r a l and n o n - a g r ic u ltu r a i in d u s t r ie s
se x , f u l l o r p a rt-tim e s t a t u s , and preference f o r more work (1 9 7 3 )/

Agricultural
Industries
Males

Usually worked part-time
Prefer to work full-time (35hrs+)
Do not prefer more work
Total employed persons at work
Source:

1973 Survey, p.292

Males

Females

13424

35944

1704

61396

2844
640

244
180

76
268

1868
8624

36
3412

156

49920

5576

Grand
Total

112468

60

3164
1148

1020

144
872

2204
13928

62916

14500

132912

-
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Usually worked full time
Worked full-time in reference period
Worked part-time in reference period
— for economic reasons
— for non-economic reasons

Females

Non-agricui turai
Industries
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which underemployed agricultural workers would be induced to seek
wage employment elsewhere in Fiji it is not possible to venture
far beyond these broad indicators.
In Table 6.10, employed persons at work in both agricultural
and non-agricultural industries are classified by worker status
and by the number of hours worked in the reference week.

In

agricultural industries 13% of wage and salary workers were on
short-time (less than 35 hours per week);

30% of own account

workers and 52% of unpaid family helpers worked less than 35 hours
per week.

For non-agricultural industries only 2% of wage and

salary workers were on short-time;

9% of own account workers and

12% of unpaid family helpers worked less than 35 hours per week.
These figures indicate that visible underemployment in terms of
workers on short-time is much more widespread in non-formal sector
activities than in formal sector wage employment, and it is more
prevalent in agricultural industries than in non-agricultural
industries.
A more detailed examination of working time in non-agricultural
industries is shown in Table 6.11 which shows the number of
employed persons (total of wage and salary earners, own account
workers and unpaid family helpers) at work in each industry,
classified by the number of hours worked in the reference week.
It is possible to extend the study of visible underemployment
(i.e. underemployment in terms of hours worked) by estimating the
employment level in each industry in terms of ‘full-time worker
equivalent units' and then comparing this estimate to the actual
number of persons employed in each industry.

To do this a norm

for the number of hours in an average working week must be
specified.

Table 6.10:

Employed persons at work In agricultural and non-agricui turai industries
by worker status and1 hours of work (1973)

Agricultural
Industries
Hours of work

Wage and
Salary

Own
Account

Less than 15 hrs
15-34 hours
35-39 hours
40-47 hours
More than 48 hrs

236
676
1464
3156
1580

4204
6924
10532

TOTAL

7112

Source:

1973 Survey, p.259.

Non-agriculturai
Industries
Unpaid
Family

Wage and
Salary

Own
Account

Unpaid
Family

Grand
Total

5596

2904
2924
2696
1636
956

380
1380
7504
50272
9024

288
388
756
3064
3212

452
316
240

8084
12360
23404
68456
20608

37268

11116

68560

7708

1148

132912

10012

72
68

Employed persons a t work in nine m ajor in d u s t r ie s by hours o f work (1973)

55496

Source:
Table 6.12:
Under 15
15-34
35-47
48 over
TOTAL
Visible
under employ.%

9548

Community and
personal services

44
840
32

60
144
824
12748
1196

328
440
1244
10920
4500

32
184
816
6028
1972

28
308
2216
276

228
836
4452
12800
2612

8084
12360
23404
68456
20608

916

14972

17432

9032

2828

20928

132912

57
418
17252
3265
20992

2021

Electricity,
gas and water

Manufacturing

Mining,
quarrying
1760

12

Transport and
communication

TOTAL

64
1560
124

92
192
960
6540
1764

Employed

Commerce and
distribution

7344
10524
14692
14804
8132

the

Building and
construction

Under 15
15-34
35-39
40-47
48 over

of

-

.

Total

1973 Survey, p. 244
Employment computed in "full-time worker equivalents"
1836
5262
29496
10165
46759

15.7%

6

1624
155
1785

•

•

23
96
7500
2205
9824

-2.9%

-

884
40
924

• •

15
72
13572
1495
15154

•

•

82

8

220

12164
5625
18091

92
6844
2465
9409

-3.8%

-4.2%

.

14
2524
345
2883

•

•

•

•

6180
91860
25760
125821

5.3%
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Hours
worked
during
week

Agriculture,
forestry,fishing
(incl.subsistence)

Industry

Business
services

Table 6.11 :
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is a certain
arbitrariness about the specification of such a norm.

The 1973

Annual Employment Survey showed that average normal weekly hours
worked was approximately 44 hours.

This is one possible norm,

but it refers only to organised sector employment.

From the 1973

Unemployment Survey we might estimate a mean for each class of
grouped data on employment by hours worked and multiply the mean
by the frequency to find total hours worked, then divide the
grand total by total employment.
Hours
Class

For example

Mean

Under 15 hours
15-34
hours
35-47
hours
48+
hours

Frequency

Hours

8084
12360
91860
20608
132912

10

25
40
50

80840
309000
3674400
1030400
5094640

The average hours worked may be found as
5094640 v 132912 = 38.:3 hours.
40 hours per week.

Let the 'norm' be approximately

Equivalent fractional-time worker status can

be assigned to any working week using this as a criterion for one
equivalent full-time worker.

Since Table 6.11 shows grouped data,

we assign the same fractional-time worker status to persons listed
in the same hourly group2 :
Let persons who worked

<

15 hours per week be k time workers
h

h

n

i,

h

n

35-47 hours

n

n

h

full-time

"

48 hours

n

h

h

Ik

"

M

n

h

h

15-34 hours

n

h

h

h

h

n

h

n

>

^2

"

For each industry, simply multiply the number of persons
employed in each hourly group by the corresponding fractional-time
2 Because the data is grouped it is not possible to approximate

any closer than this the ideal continuum of underutilisation
mentioned in the previous chapter.
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worker status, and then sum the results to give an estimate of
total employment in the industry in terms of full-time equivalent
employment units.

The results of this are shown in Table 6.12.

The difference between the computed full-time equivalent employment
units shown in Table 6.12, and the number of persons employed in
each corresponding industry in Table 6.11, is an estimate of
labour-force underutilisation which may be described as visible
underemployment.

In view of the nature of the data and the

simplifying assumptions made in the above calculations, too much
credence cannot be placed upon small quantum differences between
industries in this measure - it should be treated an an indicator
of the relative differences in visible underemployment between
industries.
Table 6.12 shows that the measure of visible underemployment
in terms of full-time equivalent jobs is insignificant in five
of the nine major I.S.I.C. groups, viz:

mining, electricity,

building, business services, and community-personal services.
These industries are dominated by wage and salary employment
modes characteristic of organised or formal sector activity
(see Table 6 .8 ).
There appears to be some degree of 'overutilisation' of
labour in manufacturing, commerce and distribution, and transport
industries - this is indicated by their negative measures of
visible underemployment in terms of full-time equivalent jobs of
between -3% and -4%.

Analysis of Table 6.11 reveals that in each

of these industries the proportion of workers employed for 48 hours
or more per week was well above the national average - in all Fiji
15% of employed persons were working 48 hours or more in the
reference week, but in manufacturing, commerce and transport
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industries the proportion of persons working correspondingly
long hours was 18.5%, 25.8% and 21.8% respectively.

These

industries also had some small, but not insignificant, numbers
employed on short-time (less than 35 hours per week), but since
only 25% of part-time non-agricultural workers expressed a desire
for full-time employment (see Table 6.9) there would seem to be
little scope for work-sharing within these industries' workforces.
The proportion of the workforce of manufacturing, commerce and
transport industries which was employed in informal sector
employment modes (own account workers and unpaid family helpers)
was higher than in other non-agricultural industries - self
employed and unpaid family helpers made up 1 2 .1 % of the manufacturing
sector's workforce, 25.5% of the commerce and distribution
workforce and 16.6% of the transport workforce, which contrasts
with 4% in building and 5.7% in community and personal services
(see Table 6 .8 ).
Visible underemployment in terms of full-time eguivalent
jobs is confined to the agriculture, forestry and fishing industry
(which includes the subsistence sector).

The underemployment

measure computed in Table 6.12 is 15.7%, although it is not clear
how this compares to the non-agricultural industries because of
the seasonal nature of work in agriculture (in the sugar industry,
for example).

Unlike the other industries, agriculture is

dominated by informal employment modes - self employed and unpaid
family helpers (see Tables 6 . 8 and 6.10).

While 35% of these

worked less than 35 hours during the reference week, 14% worked
more than 48 hours (see Table 6.10).

There would appear to be

scope for work-sharing arrangements within the informal sector in
agriculture, yet this is not occurring - only 2 0 % of part-time
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agricultural workers stated a preference for full-time work
(Table 6.9), and many of these may be presumed to be seeking wage
jobs in non-agricultural activities as previously argued.

It may

be concluded that visible underemployment in agriculture is a
persistent phenomenon, probably of the order of 1 0 % to 2 0 % of the
agricultural sector workforce.

Certain labour market behaviour

patterns associated with this have been discussed above.

We now

turn to examine disguised underemployment in Fiji.

6.5.2

Invisible underemployment

In the previous chapter it was shown that the adequacy of
employment from the society's point of view is not only measurable
in terms of hours of work.

There are other relevant dimensions of

labour force underutilisation, which may be associated with
activities spanning normal working hours, the two most important
being inadequate income from work and underutilisation of the
skills of the workforce.

These dimensions are called disguised

or invisible underemployment in order to distinguish them from
visible underemployment discussed in the previous section.
The immediate problem which arises concerns which particular
feature of invisible underemployment is the most appropriate for
the case of Fiji.

In section 3 of this chapter it was shown that

there is very little open unemployment of people with secondary or
higher education.

It is recognised that there is a general

shortage of skilled personnel in Fiji, a shortage which is
exacerbated by net overseas emigration of many well-qualified
workers and young people of high potential.

In view of these

observations it is unlikely that any serious underutilisation of
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skills of the workforce exists in Fiji3.

On the other hand it

can be shown that there is a lack of income-earning opportunities
in general, and especially for those with little or no education.
It was therefore decided to consider invisible underemployment in
terms of low incomes from work.
Table 6.13 lists employed wage and salary earners and own
account workers in nine major I.S.I.C. industries in 1973 by
weekly earnings.

Unpaid family helpers are excluded from Table 6.13,

but some 7,000 own account workers who were paid-in-kind-only
(mostly in agriculture) have been counted in the group receiving
less than $15 per week.

For all Fiji there were almost 42,000

wage and salary earners and own account workers who received less
than $15 per week, and a further 39,000 who received between $15
and $24 per week.

These two groups together made 65% of all

employed wage and salary and own account workers.
(30,000 persons) received between $25 and $49;
between $50 and $99;

A further 25%

7% received

and 3% received more than $100 per week.

An estimate of average weekly earnings in Fiji from the
Unemployment Survey is approximately $27.
of a norm is somewhat arbitrary.

Again the specification

The 1973 Annual Employment

Survey showed an average weekly earnings for wage earners of $22
and for salary earners $42, an overall average in organised
sector employment of $29.

The value in the text ($27) comes from

the following estimated frequency calculation:

3 Strictly speaking this refers to particular types of skills -

i.e. Western or modern skills as compared with more traditional
skills in agriculture.
It should also be noted that to some
extent the skill drain is a manifestation of the "mis-match"
problem referred to in the previous chapter.
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Income
Class
Under $15
$15-$24
$25-$49
$50-$99
$1 0 0 +

Mean
10
20

37
70
120

Frequency

Wage
bill

41964
38988
30304
8392
3364
123012

419640
779760
1121248
587440
403680
3311768

$3311768 v 123012 = $26.90
Another estimate obtained from national accounts data was $30
per week per employed person.

These several different estimates

are not greatly inconsistent with each other for present purposes.
The data in Table 6.13 gives some idea of the distribution
of weekly incomes about this mean, although the grouping of
weekly incomes disguises the $27 'norm 1 somewhat.

Analysis of

Table 6.13 shows that over three-quarters of the number of employed
wage and salary earners and own account workers in agriculture
received less than $25 per week (almost 35,000 persons).

Once

again it is difficult to draw comparisons with non-agricultural
industries because cf the prevalence of payment-in-kind in
agricultural employment and the difficulties of imputing monetary
values to such payments (especially for own account workers engaged
mainly in subsistence sector activities).

It should also be

remembered at this point that any comparisons which are made here
refer to income comparisons and not welfare comparisons - the link
between income and welfare is considerably more tenuous in rural
Fiji than in urban Fiji because of the subsistence affluence in
some rural areas

(see Chapter 8 ).

There was also over 70% of employed wage and salary earners
and own account workers in the manufacturing industry and building
and construction industry earning less than $25 per week (over
17,000 persons in both industries together).

The corresponding

Table 6 .1 3 :

Employed wage and s a la r y and own account workers
in nine major in d u s tr ie s by weekly e a rn in gs (1973)

1056
3968
3036
748
368

188
680
1132
464
376

5440
5944
7096
2168
576

41964
38988
30304
8392
3364

TOTAL

45480

1764

9376

924

14980

17248

9176

2840

21224

123012

Source:

1973 Survey, pp.409 ,430

Table 6.14:
Under $15
$15-$24
$25-$49
$50-$99
$ 1 0 0 over
TOTAL

Community and
personal services

3508
6380
4684
1504
1172

Transport and
[communication
!
1
i
Business
services

1744
8824
3836
400
176

68

i
Commerce and
[distribution
i
i

496
308
48
4

!
i
Building and
instruction

2116
4744
1848
384
284

i
i
Electricity,
gas and water

92
944
512
164
52

Manufacturing

27752
7008
7852
2512
356

i
Mining,
quarrying

Under $15
$15-$24
$25-$49
$50-$99
$ 1 0 0 over

Total

Invisible
Under
employed ^

Employment computed in “average-wage equivalent units"
5606
10993
6531
1602

37
755
717
426
234

846
3795
2587
998
1278

27
397
431
125
18

698
7059
5370
1040
792

1403
5104
6558
3910
5274

422
3174
4250
1945
1656

75
544
1585
1206
1692

2176
4755
9934
5637
2592

16786
31190
42426
21819
15138

35833

2169

9504

998

14959

22249

11447

5102

25094

127359

-18.2%

-3.5%

11101

21,2% -23.0%

.

- 8 .0%

-29.0% -24.7% -79.6%
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Weekly
Earnings
Bracket

Agriculture,
forestry,fishing
(incl.subsistence

Industry of Employed Wage, Salary and Own Account Workers
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numbers earning less than-$25 per week in other industries were:
10.000 in commerce and distribution (57% of employed wage, salary,
own account workers in that industry), 5,000 in transport (55%),
11.000 in community and personal services (54%).

In both the

mining industry and electricity industry there were 60% of employed
wage, salary and own account workers earning less than $25, but
the number of persons involved was only 1600.

This data is useful

as a guide to the distribution of earnings in each industry in
Fiji and as background to the estimation of invisible under
employment.
In order to derive estimates of the extent of invisible
underemployment in each industry a similar technique was adopted
to that in the previous section.

In this case the mean weekly

earnings of $27 was used as the criterion for computing employment
estimates in terms of 'average wage equivalent employment units'.
Fractional-wage equivalence measures were ascribed to each weekly
earnings group as follows:
Let persons who received

< $15

be 0.4 wage jobs

II

II

II

II

$15-$24

" 0.8

"

H

II

II

II

II

$25-$49

" 1.4

"

n

II

II

II

II

$50-$99

" 2.6

"

n

II

II

II

II

" 4.5

"

n

> $100

For each industry, the number of employed wage and salary
earners and own-account workers in each income bracket was
multiplied by these corresponding fractional-wage equivalence
measures and the results summed to give an estimate of total
employment in the industry in terms of average-wage equivalent
employment units.

The results of this calculation are shown in

Table 6.14 along with the corresponding invisible underemployment
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estimates.

They must be regarded very cautiously.

Once again

it is stressed that it is not possible to compare such estimates
on a cardinal scale because of the nature of the data and the
simplifying assumptions used.

The results of Table 6.14 should

be regarded as broad indicators of the relative differences between
industries in invisible underemployment in terms of average-wage
equivalent employment units.
The invisible underemployment estimates are not significant
in either the manufacturing industry or the building and
construction industry.

This is not because there were few workers

in these industries on low incomes - Table 6.13 shows that was not
the case at all.

The zero invisible underemployment measures in

manufacturing and in building occur because there were approximately
the same number of average wage-equivalent jobs attributable to
income groups on each side of the $27 mean weekly earnings.
In mining, electricity, commerce, transport, business
services, and community and personal services industries there
were more average-wage equivalent employment units above $27 per
week than there were below it.

Thus the invisible underemployment

measures for these industries were negative.

The measure was very

large for the business services industry (-80%) because it had
relatively few persons employed at low income levels (only 30% of
business services industry's workforce received less than $25 see Table 6.13).

The average degree of negative invisible

underemployment in terms of average-wage equivalent employment
units in mining, electricity, commerce, transport, and community
personal services industries was approximately -20%.

The latter

three of these five industries in particular had large numbers
of persons employed for less than $25 per week (Table 6.13); but
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while low-income workers made up 55% of the workforce of these
three industries, there was also a significant proportion earning
in excess of $50 (14% earning more than twice the average weekly
wage).

It is because of this large counterbalancing group of

high-income earners in commerce, transport and community-personal
services industries that their invisible underemployment measures
in average-wage equivalent employment units is negative.
Invisible underemployment in terms of average-wage equivalent
employment units is significantly positive only for agriculture,
at approximately +20%.

In spite of the difficulties of applying

an average money wage concept to agriculture, where self-employment
and unpaid family labour are the dominant employment modes and where
much of 'income' is paid-in-kind, it is clear that the problem
of invisible underemployment in terms of low incomes or low
earnings is widespread within the agricultural sector.

There is

a relatively small counterbalancing group of high-income
recipients in agriculture, but only 6% of employed wage, salary
and own account workers in agriculture earned more than $50 per
week.

The agriculture industry is a low-income industry,

relatively low incomes by national standards being the lot of the
vast majority of agricultural workers.

Finally we wish to consider the extent to which visible
underemployment (short hours of work) and invisible underemployment
(low income from work) are related to one another.

If hourly wage

rates were fixed at a single value, then inadequate working hours
would be directly related to low incomes.

However, the previous

analysis has shown that in non-agricultural industries there are
relatively few employed persons on short-time but relatively many
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with low incomes.

In agriculture on the other hand, there is

inadequate employment from both the hours of work and income points
of view.
Table 6.15 refers to employed wage and salary and own account
workers who drew their pay in cash - it excludes those who were
paid wholly or partly in kind, as well as unpaid family helpers.
This cash-earning workforce is divided into agricultural and
non-agricultural industries and cross-classified on the basis of
hours worked and usual weekly earnings.

The restriction of the

analysis to the cash-earning workforce avoids problems of valuation
of payments made in kind and of the labour efforts of unpaid
family helpers, but it reduces the estimated coverage ratio to
41% of the agricultural workforce and 93% of the non-agricultural
workforce.

It is necessary to adopt certain simplifying assumptions

to aid the analysis of Table 6.15.

Evidence of visible under

employment refers to those persons working less than 35 hours per
week (whether voluntarily or not).

Then we let invisible under

employment be characterised by situations in which working time
was not unduly low, but for long hours a person received low
income, viz:

less than $25 per week for 35 hours work or more.

In agricultural industries, 20.6% of the cash-earning
workforce was visibly underemployed (short working hours), and
45% was invisibly underemployed (long hours, low income).

Of the

very low income group in the agricultural cash-earning workforce
earning less than $15 per week, more than 75% were working 35 hours
or more.

These are the chronic invisible underemployment in

agriculture and they accounted for 28% of the cash-earning
agricultural workforce.
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Table 6.15: Employed wage, salary and own account workers who
received pay in money only (not paid in kind), by
usual weekly earnings and hours worked (1973)

AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES ( 41% coverage)
Weekly
Earnings
Under $15
$15-$24
$25-$49
$50-$99
$100 over
TOTAL

Under
15hrs

15-34
hours

35-39
hours

40-47
hours

556
348
276
96
4

1580
700
956
276
20

2364
1064
Ï576
572
44

2608
2010
2180
690
108

1592 |
912 1
"'1975
660
156

1280

3532

5620

7596

5296

48hrs +

Total
8700
5034
6964
2294
332
23324

NON-AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES (93% coverage)
Weekly
Earnings

Under
15hrs

15-34
hours

Under $15
$15-$24
$25-$49
$50-$99
$100 over

308
64
36

808
340
436
100
44

1868
2644
2412
852
196

7112
23420
15548
3584
1676

1652
4200
3476
1444
1052

11748
30668
21908
5980
2968

TOTAL

408

1728

7972

51340

11824

73272

-

35-39
hours

40-47
hours

48hrs +

Total

In non-agricultural industries only 3% of the cash-earning
workforce was visibly underemployed (short hours), but 55% was
invisibly underemployed (long hours for less than $25 per week).
Ninety percent of those earning less than $15 per week were working
35 hours or more.

These are the chronic invisible underemployment

in non-agricultural industries and they accounted for 14% of the
cash-earning non-agricultural workforce.
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6.6

Summary
A dualistic structure of formal sector and non-formal sector

economic activities is revealed by an analysis of employment
patterns in Fiji.

Employment in the service industries and in

construction work is dominated by the public sector.

Private

firms are responsible for most manufacturing, transport and large
commercial enterprise employment.

Together these make up the

formal sector where wage and salaried employment is the dominant
employment mode.

Agriculture, which here includes small-holder

commercial farms (primarily sugar cane) and village-based
agriculture, is characterised by self-employment and unpaid family
labour.

Agricultural industry comprises the major part of the

non-formal sector along with a relatively small component of the
distribution and service industries.
Visible underemployment in terms of short working time is
widespread only in agriculture.

After taking account of those

agricultural workers who worked very long hours in the fields, the
rate of visible underemployment in agriculture in 1973 was estimated
to be approximately 15%.

There was almost no visible underemployment

observed in non-agricultural industries.

This supports the

characterisation of dualism in the preceding paragraph.
Open unemployment in Fiji is primarily a problem of youth.
Almost 15% of the workforce under twenty-five years old was openly
unemployed in 1973 (21% for 14-19 years, 10% for 20-24 years).
Three quarters of all openly unemployed persons in Fiji in 1973
were under twenty-five years old, but this age group comprised
only one third of the workforce.

Evidence on the job-seeking

behaviour of the unemployed in 1973 reveals a marked aversion "from
agricultural employment.

Almost all of the unemployed were seeking
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non-agricultural occupations despite the fact that only 58% of the
employed workforce held non-agricultural occupations.
The age structure of the agricultural workforce is character
ised by a relatively high proportion of teenagers.

Over 15% of

the agricultural workforce was in the age group fourteen to
nineteen years old in 1973.

This age group only accounted for 10%

of the workforce in non-agricultural industries.

It was also

estimated that 20% of the agricultural workforce were unpaid
family helpers, and half of these were aged between fourteen and
nineteen years.
All of the above observations taken together suggest that
many young people are drawn into family-based agricultural
activities immediately after leaving school while they wait or
search for formal sector employment opportunities in manufacturing,
clerical or non-farm labouring jobs.

Those who are actively

seeking such employment opportunities (i.e. the openly unemployed)
would mostly be supported by their families rather than accepting
some non-formal sector activity.
Reasons for this may be found when the focus of analysis shifts
to invisible underemployment.

The criterion chosen to reflect

invisible underemployment is that of relatively low income.

In

spite of the difficulties of applying an average money wage concept
to agriculture, the evidence clearly shows that the agricultural
sector in Fiji is a low-income sector.

Very low incomes by national

standards are the lot of over 80% of agricultural workers.

There

are significant numbers employed in non-agricultural industries at
relatively low incomes.

Almost 60% of the employed non-agricultural

workforce received less than the national "average wage" in 1973.
However, there were also significant numbers of jobs earning much

198.

higher incomes in the non-agricultural industries, and such
opportunities in agriculture were very few.

These conditions would

constitute a large part of the reasons for the observed job-seeking
behaviour of the openly unemployed in Fiji.
Chronic invisible underemployment was defined as an employment
situation in which working time was not unduly low but for long
hours a person received low income (for example, income less than
fifteen dollars per week for more than thirty-five hours of work).
Here the analysis was restricted to the cash-earning workforce in
order to avoid problems of valuation of income received in kind.
This causes no significant distortion in non-agricultural industries
where chronic invisible underemployment was the lot of 14% of the
employed non-agricultural workforce in 1973.

At the same time the

chronic invisibly underemployed in agriculture comprised 28% of
the cash-earning agricultural workforce.

It may be added that

almost half of the unpaid family workers in agriculture worked more
than thirty-five hours per week.

Although invisible underemployment

is not confined to agriculture, it A s certainly far more prevalent
in agriculture than in the rest of the economy.
It is important to recognise the basic demographic causes of
the employment problem in Fiji.

High fertility in the 1950's and

early 1960's has led to rapid population growth.

Over 60% of

Fiji's population lives in rural areas where rapid population
growth has increased the density of settlement and commensurately
reduced the capacity of the agricultural sector (including
village-based agriculture) to absorb additional labour.

Despite

declining labour force participation ratios for young males
(as more of them stay longer in full-time education) the growth of
formal sector employment opportunities has been insufficient to
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absorb the number of new entrants to the labour market.

Wide

differences exist between rural and urban average income levels
and this, combined with high levels of underemployment in
agriculture, has caused the high rates of rural-to-urban migration
observed in chapter 4.

The result has been an increase in open

unemployment combined with high underemployment in agriculture.
Both problems are particularly severe for the young members of
the workforce.
In the previous chapter it was suggested that the appropriate
way to discuss employment problems in developing countries when
income distribution is of prime concern is in relation to the role
of employment as a creator of new income earning opportunities
for particular (low income) groups.

It was shown that per capita

incomes can be raised by finding more employment opportunities for
the workforce, even at unchanged productivity levels, and that
such a development strategy can significantly reduce the degree
of inequality in the income distribution.

The analysis in this

chapter has clearly identified the rural population as the
appropriate target population for employment promotion if income
inequality in Fiji is to be reduced.

This conclusion is fully in

accord with the long term development objectives of the Fiji
Government as set out in the Sixth and Seventh Development Plans.
There is insufficient recent data available

to enable us to form

a judgement about the degree of success enjoyed by this strategy
over the period of these two plans.

PART III
Welfare Economics and Income Distribution
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CHAPTER 7
Measurement of Inequality in a Social Welfare Function
7.1

Introduction
In Part I of the thesis it was shown that there is a

considerable amount of variation between countries in observed
inequality of income distribution.

It was noted that many

developing countries have experienced a worsening income
distribution as their per capita G.D.P. has grown and yet some other
developing countries have experienced a reduction in inequality
with growth.

The question was asked whether or not it was

possible to account for a significant part of inter-country
variability in inequality with reference to observed patterns of
change in certain socioeconomic variables thought to affect
inequality in some systematic manner, and several significant
relationships were identified.

It was then argued that the

significant relationships which were observed to account for
inequality variations between countries might also be regarded as
being of key importance in the design of a development planning ’
framework for individual developing countries in which concern
for income distribution is important.
In Part II these key variables were studied for the case of
Fiji.

It was shown that the pattern of employment and under

employment in Fiji is such that a concerted effort to create new
employment opportunities in rural areas is required in order to
make significant progress towards reducing the overall degree of
inequality of income distribution.

This is because very wide

differences exist between rural areas and urban areas in average
income levels and in the range of income-earning opportunities.
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This will be further examined in chapter 0 where indicators of
the degree of inequality in rural areas and in urban areas are
compared to those for the country as a whole.

There it will be

shown that other aspects of inequality in Fiji, such as that
between groups within urban areas, are of secondary importance to
the need for reducing rural-urban income inequality.

Part II also

showed that this development strategy would require continuing
efforts to reduce the rate of population growth by lowering
fertility rates.

This is to reduce the pressure of population on

land in rural areas and to limit the growth of the workforce to
the growth of new employment opportunities.
The approach of this chapter is more theoretical.

As an

opening proposition we state (without the need of proof) that in
such a development planning framework there is an important
distinction to be drawn between seeing more or less inequality on
one hand, and valuing it more or less in ethical terms on the
other.
This distinction has been stated in these words by A.K. Sen
(1973a) in connection with objective and normative features of
inequality indices, on which more will be said later in the
chapter,

But it is also a useful device for comparing the

objectives of this chapter with what has gone before.

The analysis

of the earlier chapters may be regarded as providing some of the
building blocks for plans to alter the observed distribution in the
desired direction, while this chapter is concerned with analysing
the criteria for judging the relative merits of alternative policies
that are based on such plans.
Tinbergen (1970) (1972) also distinguishes between theoretical
approaches to income distribution as being either positive or
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normative.

In Tinbergen's scheme a positive theory is essentially

concerned with explaining a given distribution in terms of its
underlying causes and with analysing its stability through the
parameters of change.

The income scale is the outcome of supply and

demand forces, the supply side being derived from the behaviour of
income maximising (or utility maximising) owners of factor services,
and the demand side being derived from the behaviour of profit
maximising organisers of production.

It will later be argued that

these efficiency criteria are very strongly normative in their
implications.

On the other hand, an avowedly normative approach

would be concerned with defining an optimum distribution of income
- that is, one which maximised social welfare - and possibly also
with prescribing policies to achieve gains in terms of the criteria
defined.
This distinction is not always a very clear one, and both
positive and normative aspects (in the Tinbergen sense) are
important for the economy-wide planning framework with which I
am concerned.

To the extent that they are separable, this chapter

contains a primarily normative approach.

It concentrates upon

defining an appropriate equality-preferring social welfare
function (i.e. an ordering of social states in which distributional
considerations are important), and on making explicit the ethical
judgements involved, through a selective interpretation of modern
welfare economics literature.

In more pedestrian fashion, it may

be regarded as an attempt to formulate an appropriate objective
function for use in a computerised programming model which is
constrained by the organisation of production in the economy
(i.e. technological and institutional relationships).
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Before approaching social welfare functions (s.w.f.), it is
useful to consider the normative judgements embodied in the
so-called objective indices of inequality.

It was Dalton (1920)

who first argued that underlying each of the summary measures then
in use was some concept of social welfare, and hence some implicit
form of the s.w.f.

The issue has been extensively analysed

recently by Atkinson (1970), Sen (1973a) and Champernowne (1974).
The next section summarises Champernowne1s results because his
presentation is especially illustrative of certain relations which
are used later in the next chapter.

The present chapter as a

whole draws heavily on Sen's book and also makes use of Atkinson's
remarkable result on Lorenz curve rankings.

7.2

Ethical judgements in inequality measures
Indices of inequality are often presented as measuring the

degree of inequality in a given income distribution in some
objective sense.

Champernowne (1974) (and others) have recently

demonstrated that it is possible for several indices to rank the
same set of different distributions in a different order.
Therefore there is something of a normative judgement involved
when one index says distribution x is less unequal than
distribution y, but another index says y is less unequal than x each of the summary indices of inequality embodies an implicit
judgement

about how income ought to be distributed.

Champernowne's study has exposed the ethical judgements
implicit in several commonly used inequality measures in a way
which is particularly illustrative for the purposes of this
chapter.

He began by noting that any inequality index should
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possess certain properties.

.

Firstly it should be easily computed,

on a range from zero to unity, from readily available statistics.
It should be impartial between persons, depending only on the
frequency distribution of income and not on other factors such as
wealth, race, and so on, in their association with income.

It

should be invariant with respect to a change in either the total
population or total income, as long as the proportionate
distribution is unaffected.

Finally any inequality index should

exhibit Pigou-Dalton efficiency.

Champernowne's interpretation

of this condition is that more weight should be attached to
absolute transfers at the low end of the income scale and less to
those at the top.

These criteria were shown to be fulfilled by

each of the following indices of inequality:
- the coefficient of variation (C)
- the standard deviation of income power (H)
- Atkinson's index (A)
- Gini's concentration ratio (G)
- Theil's entropy index (T)1
At this point Champernowne's approach requires some
qualification.

Firstly, a minor point, Theil's entropy measure

(T) does not range from zero to unity strictly, but can be made to
do so by a simple monotone transform.

Secondly, Champernowne's

interpretation of the Pigou-Dalton condition involves an ethical
judgement which seems to be derived from the utilitarian
assumptions about equal capacities for satisfaction enjoyed by
all persons, and which has earned the doctrine a reputation for
1 Computational and definitional formulae for these indices are
widely available and are not presented here. The Gini coefficient
is singled out for special treatment later on, but very little
use is made of the other measures beyond this section.
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egalitarian bias.

.

Sen (1973a) has shown that this reputation is

ill-deserved because it stems from certain special assumptions:
The trouble with this (utilitarian) approach is
that maximising the sum of individual utilities
is supremely unconcerned with the interpersonal
distribution of that sum. This should make it
a particularly unsuitable approach to use for
measuring or judging inequality.... The maximisation
of the sum of individual utilities through the
distribution of a given total income between
different persons requires equating the marginal
utilities from income of different persons, and if
the special assumption is made that everyone has
the same utility function, then equating marginal
utilities amounts to equating total utilities as
well.
(Sen (1973a) p.16).
But more on utilitarianism later.

The relevant point here is

that Sen's definition of Pigou-Dalton efficiency is satisfied if
the inequality index simply responds in the appropriate downward
(egalitarian) direction to any transfer of income from rich to
poor, which is evidently not the same thing as attaching
relatively more weight to transfers at the low end of the income
scale.

In Sen's analysis of inequality measures, the standard

deviation of the logarithm of income (H) does not satisfy the
Pigou-Dalton condition (although it only fails for transfers among
the very high incomes), but C, A, G and T do satisfy it.
Champernowne then drew up a taxonomy consisting of three
types of inequality, and proceeded to compare the performance of
each of the above indices with respect to their sensitivity to
each type of inequality.

He defined:

Type I

-

inequality due to extreme wealth;

Type II

-

inequality among the less extreme incomes;

Type III

-

inequality due to extreme poverty.

He found that Atkinson's index (A) and the standard deviation
of the logarithms of income (H) were both relatively more

206.

sensitive to type III inequality - that is, income transfers to
the poor registered relatively greater responses in A and H than
in the other indices.

Conversely, he found the coefficient of

variation (C) and Theil's entropy measure (T) to be more sensitive
to type I inequality.

Gini's concentration ratio (G) was found to

be relatively more sensitive when there is not a tendency for
incomes to be bunched in a narrow range but are widely spread
(type II inequality).
The illustrative value of Champerowne's typology is that it
translates easily into a geometrical property of the Lorenz curve.
The Lorenz curve of a distribution showing type I inequality would
be skewed to the lower-left.

The Lorenz curve for type III

inequality would be skewed to the upper-right.

The Lorenz curve

for type II inequality would not be skewed in either direction but
would be symmetrical about the leading diagonal drawn perpendicular
to the egalitarian line.2

This is shown in figure 7.1.

A potential source of confusion should be clarified at this
point.

The geometric shape of the Lorenz curve will be described

as "symmetrical" if the curve is furthest from the egalitarian
line at a point intersecting the perpendicular bisector of the
egalitarian line.

This is point X in figure 7.1.

On the other

hand, the property of "symmetry" which is ascribed to the social
welfare functions of the next section is a condition imposed to
show that we are unconcerned with who gets which income - the
s.w.f. and the inequality indices must be impartial between
individuals, depending only on the frequency distribution of
2 An interesting property of symmetrical Lorenz curves is that they
are derived from income density functions which are very close to
log-normal distributions (Aitchison and Brown (1957). This may be
seen as an advantage if one was interested in statistical
manipulation of the distribution.
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figure 7.1:

Lorenz curves, skewed and symmetrical

Percentage
of Income

income.

The context in which the words "symmetric income

distribution" and "symmetrical Lorenz curve" appear should be
clear enough in what follows to avoid confusion.
Champernowne's results have clearly demonstrated that the
indices most frequently used to measure inequality are not free of
ethical content.

On the contrary, certain welfare implications

may be seen to follow from the choice of one index over another.
Recall the distinction drawn earlier between seeing more or less
inequality on one hand, and valuing it more or less on the other.
Following Sen, it is further argued that it is reasonable, even
advantageous, to look for inequality measures that are as
'objective' as possible.

In view of the discussion above, this

would seem to imply a requirement for observing the shape of a
given distribution, and then choosing a measure of its inequality
that 'corresponds to' that shape.

Although variations in that
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inequality measure must still be interpreted in terms of the
particular welfare characteristics of the measure, we are then
permitting our ethical evaluation of such variations to be
dissociated (as much as possible) from the measure itself and,
equally important, we are not permitting our welfare judgements
to be biased by inappropriate sensitivities of the chosen
inequality measure.

This issue will later be linked more clearly

to that of value judgements about inequality in the framework of
a social welfare function, to which we now turn.

7.3

Welfare economics and equity
The traditional utilitarian argument in favour of equality of

income distribution is usually attributed to Pigou (1920) whose
welfare prescription was formulated on the basis of five
assumptions:
(i)

the utility an individual derives from his income
(and leisure and wealth) is cardinally measurable,

(ii)

the units in which the utilities of different
individuals are measured are the same,

(iii) all individuals have similar tastes, so that each one's
utility function is a given concave function of his
personal income (though, of course, individuals with
different money incomes are on different points of
such a function),
(iv)

social welfare is the unweighted sum of individual
utilities, and,

(v)

it is desirable to promote social welfare.

The fundamental theorem derived from these assumptions is
stated as:
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Theorem 1

Social welfare is maximised by distributing
income equally.

As emphasised by Nath (1973) the last of these assumptions
remains implicit in Pigou's work, which does not refer to the
concept of an 'ethical judgement'.

This is because his utilitarian

moral philosophy held certain propositions to be self-evident
- most importantly assumption (iii).

Actually Pigou's third

assumption is a non-testable assumption about the real world,
which Robbins (1932) exposed as a value judgement.

In the aftermath

of Robbins' critique, it might have been possible to interpret the
utilitarian assumptions as value judgements which might appeal to
some, but not necessarily all economists.

However, the mainstream

of welfare economics chose instead to eschew interpersonal
comparisons of welfare and cardinal measurability of individual's
utility, and to define criteria for social welfare upon 'almost
non-controversial' ethical judgements (Nath (1973) p .18).
Sen has described this development somewhat pejoratively
as "non-conflict economics":
The so-called basic theorem of welfare economics is
concerned with the relation between competitive
equilibria and Pareto optimality.
...A change
implies a Pareto-improvement if it makes no one
worse off and someone better off. A situation is
Pareto optimal if there exists no other attainable
situation such that a move to it would be a ^
Pareto-improvement. That is, Pareto optimality
only guarantees that no change is possible such
that someone would become better off without making
anyone worse off.
(Sen (1973a) pp.6,7).
The real difficulty for our present purpose is that
economists have tended to adhere to the concept of Pareto
optimality as being both necessary and sufficient for overall
social optimality.

A Pareto-optimum might better be regarded as

an optimum for a particular system subject to certain constraints;
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but there may be other systems which are not subject to the same
constraints.

Then a Pareto-optimum, which cannot be improved

upon in its own terms, may be regarded as inferior in terms of a
different system of values.

If goods are assumed to be finely

divisible then there exist countless allocations of resources
which may be Pareto-optimal, each one corresponding to a different
distribution of utilities (or incomes) among individual members of
the society.

The Paretian ethic does not enable a choice to be

made between different Pareto-optimum positions.

Therefore it is

not a sufficient criterion for the determination of welfare in my
view because in my ethical system income distribution ranks highly
as a direct determinant of welfare.3

The Paretian ethic may not

even be a necessary condition, for example, in a situation in
which an increase in income for a rich man with no loss for a poor
man is ruled out (on equity grounds) under the non-Paretian system
of values.
Utilitarianism is also unsuitable as an equity conscious
criterion because of its concentration on the aggregation of
individual utilities as mentioned previously.

Its assumption of

a common utility function for all individuals is also untenable to
many economists, although this in itself need not cause us to
reject the assumption outright.

Lerner (1944) rejected the

assumption that every individual had the same utility of income
function and suggested that it might be preferable (less
3 It should be remembered that concern for equity is not restricted
to ethical evaluations - it is also important in the positive
framework (in the Tinbergen sense) because we are concerned with
an economic system in which income distribution affects aggregate
output and income, and increasing aggregate output and income
may be conducive to improvements in income distribution under
certain policy regimes. See Part IV for further discussion
of this.
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controversial) for economists to be concerned with the expected
value of total utility, i.e. its mathematical expectation.

His

proposition is stated as follows:
If it is impossible, on any division of income,
to discover which of any two individuals has a
higher marginal utility of income, the probable
value of total satisfaction is maximised by
dividing income evenly.
(Lerner (1944) p.29).
More recently, Sen (1969) has provided a generalised
formulation of Lerner's proposition.

He made the following

assumptions:
(i)

(income fixity) there is a fixed amount of homogeneous
income to be distributed among a given number of
persons;

(ii)

(concave utility functions) all individual utility
functions are concave functions of individual income
and form a set V;

(iii) (equi-probability) the probability distribution of the
individual utility functions in V is taken by the
planner to be the same for all individuals;
(iv)

(additive probable welfare) probable social welfare is
the unweighted sum of the planner's mathematical
expectation of individual utilities.

From these assumptions, Sen formulated his "theorem of
probabilistic egalitarianism", which is essentially a restatement
of Lerner's theorem.
Theorem 2

Probable social welfare is maximised with an equal
division of income.

The equi-probability assumption means that every possible
assignment of utility functions among individuals is equally
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likely, and this was recognised by Sen as too restrictive.

He

also argued that maximising probable social welfare may not be
the only objective of the planner - in particular, in a situation
of uncertainty as to who has which utility function it might be
reasonable to adopt a "maximin" policy of maximising the security
level (minimum income) - Sen added two further (weaker) assumptions:
(iii*) (shared utility set) it is not possible for the
planner to specify a proper subset S of the set V
of utility functions that can be enjoyed only by a
proper subset of the individuals, and
(v)

(bounded utility functions) each utility function in
the set V is bounded from below.

Theorem 3

(Maximin egalitarianism)1*
Given assumptions (i), (ii), (iii*), (iv) and (v),
an equal division of income maximises the greatest
lower bound of aggregate welfare over all possible
utility correspondences.

Thus, using an individualistic s.w.f., Sen showed that an
equal division of income is an appropriate goal for a planner to
follow in a situation of uncertainty because it is a maximin policy.
As such it is in accordance with Rawls' (1971), (1974) principle of
"justice as fairness" which has been widely acclaimed, and in this*

** This theorem is alternatively stated by Sen as follows:
Let D be an n-vector of income distribution
E " " n-vector of equal income distribution
C " " n-vector in V with the convention that the i-th
element is the utility function assigned to individual i
(i.e. a correspondence between the n individuals and the
utility functions in V)
Let W(C,D) represent social welfare from distribution D with
utility correspondence C.
Then Theorem 3 :

max inf W(C,D) e inf W(C,E).
D C
C
(Sen (1969) pp.216-217).
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sense is less objectionable than the utilitarian arguments for
equality based on identical individual utility functions.
Until Atkinson's (1970) paper (reviewed below) this was
as much as welfare economics could offer to a system of values in
which income distribution was important.

The widely respected

Paretian ethic avoided distributional judgements completely, and
the traditional utilitarianism was regarded by most economists
(except a few hardened Benthamites) as resting on an untenable
premise.

The maximin option is based on more acceptable premises

(more correctly, it is in accord with more people's value
judgements under uncertainty) and through its concentration on
the poorest member of society it may also be recommended as a
criterion for a poverty-focused development strategy.

But this is

not the only concern of our development planning framework - we
are still interested in what happens to all of the other income
earning units in the course of development.
There are two issues which form a bridge between conventional
welfare economics and the rest of this chapter.

Firstly the

practical development planner is not very interested in an equal
division of income p e r se.

What is required for planning purposes

is a reasonable and practical criterion by which to judge that an
improvement in welfare is (or is not) achieved, i.e. a criterion
which may be applied to all courses of action that are feasible
in the sense that they lie within whatever institutional and
technological constraints must be observed.

This criterion for

an improvement in welfare should enable the planner to eliminate
all but the optimum policy mix in these terms;

but the theorist's
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concern for proving an optimum-optimorum exists in a state of
perfect equality seems somewhat remote.

Secondly, one might

question whether or not a s.w.f. should be individualistic at all.
For instance, the planner may have reason to believe that
individuals have a rate of time preference which is too low from
the social point of view.

Such would be the case if there was

inadequate provision of public goods to maintain the framework of
arrangements by which individual utilities are satisfied.

The

planner will probably not have the information to enable him to
assess individual preferences (even those of the poorest
individual or group).

From this position one may sympathise with

attempts to establish conditions under which the form of the
individual utility of income functions need not be specified at
all in order to compare distributions.

The response to both of

these issues begins with a review of Atkinson's 1970 paper.

7.4

Atkinson's results
Atkinson (1970) approached the problem of income distribution

rankings in the first instance using Dalton's additively separable
and symmetric s.w.f. defined over individual incomes and assuming
equal capacities for satisfaction:

W =

y
'max

U(y) f(y) •dy

J

0
where U(y) is the utility of income function
f(y) is the frequency distribution
y

is the highest income observed.

(7.4.1)
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If income distributions (f(Y)) are ranked according to their
contribution to welfare on the basis of (7.4.1), Atkinson proved:
Theorem 4

A distribution f(Y) will be preferred to another
distribution f*(Y) for aTJ_ U(Y)

fz
jq

and

*
[F(Y ) - F (Y)]dy £ 0,

F(Y) f

F (Y)

rY
f(Y)
J0

all z,

(U'> 0, U"< 0)

0 < z < y

iff

max

for some y, where

f(x).dx

(i.e. integral of the density
function)

This is shown to be equivalent to saying that if the Lorenz
curves o f two distributions do not i n t e r s e c t , one can unambiguously
infer that the distribution whose Lorenz curve is closer to the
egalitarian line is associated with a higher level of welfare.

Thus, although Atkinson's theorem is formulated on the basis of
utilitarian assumptions, he showed that a partial ordering of
distributions^*.e. one satisfying Lorenz superiority) can be
obtained without specifying at all the form of the individual
U(Y) function.

This is indeed a remarkable result, since in a

certain set of circumstances it abnegates the controversy over
the specification of individual utility functions.
Nevertheless one may regard Atkinson's paper as neo-utilitarian
(the description is due to Phelps(1977) - see footnote on page 224).
Recognising that his condition on Lorenz

curves provides only a

partial ordering, and that a complete ranking of distributions is
only possible if the precise form of the s.w.f. is specified, he
proceeded to restrict his attention to that class of U(y)
functions that are increasing and concave (as in theorem 4), and
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showed that
r

Y
max

Y
max
U(y)f(y)dy

e

U(yEDE)

f(y)dy

■0

(7.4.2)

0

where Y^^. is what he calls the "Equally Distributed Equivalent
level of income".

This concept is defined as the level of income

which, if equally distributed, would give the same level of social
welfare as the present observed income distribution.

In terms of

the theory of decision-making under uncertainty,

is analogous

to a certainty equivalent.

An inequality index defined on Y^DE is:

A = 1 ’ y EDE/

.... (7.4.3)

y

(where y is the mean of the distribution), and A can be thought of
as the proportional risk premium.5

To make his index mean-

independent Atkinson restricted his U(y) function to the following
class of homothetic functions:
U(y) = z + ^

£

e f

1

and

.... (7.4.4)
U(y) = loge y

,

e = 1

which in the case of discrete distributions implies an inequality
index

A = 1 - [

I &
1"e -f(yi)]1'e
1=1
u
i

.... (7.4.5)

where e is a parameter (0<e<“>) that indicates the degree of
inequality aversion of the society.

As e rises, more importance is

5Intuitively, for A = 0.3, we could say that if incomes were
distributed equally, only 70% of the present national income would
suffice to achieve the same level of welfare.
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attached to transfers at the lower end of the income scale.
Typical values of e would range from 0.5 to 3.5, with a low
degree of inequality aversion being represented by e < 1.
Atkinson analysed several inequality indices and found them
to embody varying implicit values of inequality aversion, and
hence about social welfare.

For instance, the coefficient of

variation can be shown to attach equal weight to transfers at
different income levels (e

t

0);

the Gini coefficient attaches

more weight to transfers affecting middle income classes and is
not particularly sensitive to inequality due to extreme poverty or
wealth (e t 1);

and the standard deviation of income power weights

transfers at the lower end relatively more heavily (e > 1).

These

conclusions parallel those of Champernowne discussed in section 2
above, except that Champernowne seems to assume e > 1 for
Atkinson's index whereas Atkinson regards it as possibly extending
below unity.

7.5

A generalisation by Sen
Drawing on work by Dasgupta, Sen and Starret (1972), Sen (1973a)

showed that Atkinson's result on Lorenz superior rankings could be
generalised beyond the restrictive utilitarian frame used by
Atkinson.

He extended the admissible class of s.w.f. to non-additive

individualistic functions such as:
W = G (U (y-j), U(y2 ).... U(yn )),
and then also by defining social welfare directly on the
distribution of incomes (without going through the intermediary of
individual utilities) as:
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W = F(y1 ,y2 ,...,yn ) 6
Sen then proceeded to show that the concavity restriction
could be relaxed - strict quasi-concavity7 is sufficient for his
generalisation which is expressed as follows (from Sen (1973a)
pp.53-56)
Considering, therefore, the s.w.f. (F) defined over
individual incomes, implying neither the necessity
to go through the intermediary of individual
utilities, nor the use of the utilitarian additive
framework, nor even the necessity of strict
concavity, let F be simply any function that is
symmetric and strictly quasi-concave. The following
theorem is true:
Theorem 5

Let F be symmetric and strictly quasi-concave.
For two different distributions x and y with the
same total income, yLx

F(y) > F(X);

and if not

yLx, then for some F, F(y) <_ F(x).
(note:

yLx is notation for "the Lorenz curve of y lies everywhere
inside that of x " ).

6 Clearly, for any given individual utility function U, the
individualistic form 6 is really a special case of F, so that
one is not obliged to go through the intermediary of individual
utilities at all.
7 The distinction between concavity and quasi-concavity is given
by Sen as follows:
'A concave welfare function F requires that the weighted average
of social welfare levels from two income distributions x and y
must be less than or equal to the social welfare of the weighted
average of the two distributions using the same weights.
tF(x) + (l-t)F(y) <_ F(tx + (l-t)y),

any t, 0 < t < 1.

On the other hand quasi-concavity requires that the minimum of
the two social welfare levels from x and y respectively should
be less than or equal to the social welfare of the weighted
average of the two distributions
Min[F(x), F(y)] £ F(tx+(l-t)y),

any t, 0 < t < 1.

For strict quasi-concavity the weak inequality £ is to be
replaced by <, so that the social welfare from the weighted
average must be strictly larger than the minimum of the two
welfare levels from x and y respectively.... This is a strictly
egalitarian feature which is all we need for building equalityconsciousness into our social welfare function'.
(Sen (1973a),
pp.52-53).
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His proof makes use of the following:
Firstly, rearranging the elements of x and y so that they
are in increasing order, i.e.

x, < x0 < ... < x , and
I— c —
— n

y-, ± y 2 1 ••• ± y n>
the following four conditions can be shown to be equivalent
((1) = (2) = (3)
n

(4)):

e

k
k

n

E

X. =

E

i=l

1

i=l

yi# and for k £ n >
l
k

E

i=l

kk
X. <

. with at

1 " i= l

k

least one k < n such that E X. < *
i=1 1
i=l
(2)

E

yr

1

x can be transformed into y by a non-empty finite sequence
of operations of the form
x .o+ l = x .“ + e“ < Xj°
a+1

xj

a

= xj

a

' e

w a

i xi

for i < j and ea > 0, with x^a+^ = xka if k f

(3)

For any strictly concave real-valued function U,
n

n

z u(x.) < e
i=l
(4)

i,j.

1

i=l

u(y.)
1

While y is not x, nor a permutation of x, there exists a
bistochastic

a

matrix Q such that y = Qx.

8 A bistochastic matrix is a non-negative square matrix, each of
the rows and columns of which add up to one. Multiplying a
vector x by a bistochastic matrix Q converts it into another
vector y which also has the same sum of its elements taken
together.
It is shown in Berge (Topological Spaces, Oliver &
Boyd, Edinburgh 1963 p .182) that any bistochastic matrix of
order n is some convex combination of the set of permutation
matrices of order n.
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Condition (1) is simply a restatement of the idea of Lorenz
superiority of y over x.

Since the Lorenz curve is computed by

considering the proportion of income accruing to the bottom m%
of the population and since total income is the same in x and y,
the set of inequalities (1) shows that for some bottom m% of the
population a lower share of income is given by x than y, and for
all bottom m%'s, x gives no more than y.

Condition (2) is easily

seen to be a finite sequence of transformations transferring
income from the rich to the poor, taking us from x to y.
Condition (3) reiterates that the Atkinson framework is a special
case of a strictly quasi-concave and symmetric function F.
Condition (4) is explained by recalling that any bistochastic
matrix of order n is some convex combination of the set of
permutation matrices of order n.

With Ps being any permutation

matrix, Q is obtained as
Q = I a Ps ,
s

(za
s

=1,

a

> 0)

Therefore, y lies inside the convex hull of the permutations of x,
but y is not an extreme point of this convex hull.

So y can be

obtained as a convex combination of the set of permutations of x,
which themselves are socially indifferent by virtue of symmetry.
Therefore for any strictly quasi-concave F satisfying symmetry,
F(y) > F(x).

(Sen (1973a) p.56).

Having generalised Atkinson's result on Lorenz superiority,
Sen noted that Theorem (5) is too restrictive for practical
purposes because the number of people in the two distributions is
assumed to be the same,as also is the total income to be
distributed (and hence, mean income is also identical).

The Lorenz
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curve result can easily be extended to the case of variable
population, which is important for comparing distributions between
countries or regions with different populations as well as
intertemporal comparisons of the same country when population
growth is rapid (see Sen (1973a), pp.58-60).
However, variations in mean income pose a much more difficult
problem for theoretical welfare economics and for the practising
planner.

Sen crystallises the difficulty as follows:
It is obvious that any possibility of making
distributional judgements independently of the size
of income will make sense only if the relative
ordering of welfare levels of distributions were
strictly neutral to the operation of multiplying
everybody’s income by a given number. We might
not, however, wish to make this assumption, since
our judgement about social welfare may not be
scale-independent in this sense (Sen (1973a),
pp.60,61).

Then, later on,
One can argue that for low income levels the
inequality measures should take much sharper note
of the same degree of relative variation on the
ground that inequality pinches most when people
are closer to starvation. On the other side, I
have heard it argued that 'equality' is a luxury
that only a rich economy can 'afford', and while I
cannot pretend to fully understand this point of
view, I am impressed by the number of people who
seem to be prepared to advocate such a position.
Though the considerations run in opposite directions,
that in itself is no justification for making the
inequality measure independent of the level of mean
income.
(Sen (1973a), pp.70-71).
Sen's approach to this problem is quite persuasive, although
not completely so.

He prefers to regard income distribution

comparisons as 'non-compulsive judgements'.

That is, Lorenz

superiority yLx is taken to constitute a prima facie case that y
is a better distribution from a welfare point of view than x (by
Theorem 5).

One must then recognise that contrary arguments may

exist - falling mean income may be one such argument.

Sen then
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places the onus of rejecting the judgement based on Lorenz ranking
upon any critic, who must in turn specify exactly how he expects
variations in mean income to affect the distributional judgement
from a welfare point of view.
There are two problems which must be faced by any attempt to
apply this criterion.
partial orderings.
approach.

Firstly, Lorenz rankings provide only

In certain cases this may be a very useful

However, if the Lorenz curves intersect, nothing can be

said about welfare unless the s.w.f. is made explicit;

and if the

s.w.f. is formalised, then any distribution function can be ranked
unambiguously against another in terms of its contribution to
welfare.

Whether or not the particular form of s.w.f. is widely

acceptable is another matter on which more is said later.
Secondly, even if the Lorenz curves do not intersect, Sen's
approach might very well involve quite independent judgements of
the welfare effects of income distribution on one hand and growth
on the other.

That is, the critic who believes that mean income

may fall with a movement to a higher Lorenz curve, and who wishes
to reject the "non-compulsive judgement" implied by the Lorenz
ordering on those grounds, may clearly be working to a different and possibly inconsistent - set of criteria.

Further, (and even

in the case when equity and growth are found not to conflict)
because the judgement on income growth is exogenous to the Lorenz
curve system which implies the judgement on distribution, one
cannot tell how much of the welfare change is due to the
egalitarian effect as compared with the growth effect.
The reason that these two problems remain is, of course, that
the function W = F(y^, y2 »...,yn ), from which Sen derives his
position on Lorenz orderings and non-compulsive judgements, depends
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only upon the distribution of incomes.

Questions relating to the

level of income and income growth are, by construction, exogenous
to his Lorenz ordering system.

Therefore, non-compulsive judgements

are indeed as far as it is possible to go with respect to the
effects of income growth on welfare.

It is possible to go through

the intermediary of individual U(y) functions if we so desire,
but we are not obliged to do so unless we want a complete ordering.
There is a way around these difficulties, but to date the
proof of the existence of this alternative requires that we make
use of the unpalatable utilitarian assumption of identical
individual utility of income functions.

The most favourable

interpretation of this assumption is frankly to recognise that it
is an ethical judgement which might appeal to some, but not
necessarily all (or even most), economists;

and also to recognise

that the derived social welfare function provides clearly useful
results, and a model does not have to be realistic in its structure
to give useful results.

The approach is discussed in the next

section and draws on recent articles by Sheshinski (1972) and
Kats (1972).

Their solution is to write an index of income

distribution and one of income level directly into the s.w.f. as
direct determinants of the level of welfare.

This approach has

been dubbed 'simple-minded and overtly honest1 by Rowley and
Peacock (1975).

In my view there are compelling reasons for keeping

the approach simple (and honest) in many developing countries'
central planning offices, although simplicity can not be the sole
supporting attribute.

Provided that it is also both reasonable

and practicable, then 'simple' is to be heartily-praised, not
disparaged.

Accordingly, I shall elevate their pejorative

remark to the heading of the next section.
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7.6

A simple-minded and overtly honest approach
(or, the neo-utilitarian alternative)9
The problem at hand is to specify those conditions under

which a particular functional form of s.w.f. will enable us to:
(i)

derive a complete ranking of income distributions, and

(ii)

consistently evaluate the relative impact on welfare of
both income redistribution and growth.
Sheshinski (1972) and Kats (1972) have addressed themselves to

this problem;

both can be grouped in the neo-utilitarian school

because of their assumption that all individuals have identical
utility of income functions.
Consider a vector of income I distributed among n individuals
with the same utility of income function U(I.), (i = 1,2,...,n).
(The symbol ~ denotes a vector of individual incomes).
Two attributes of I are its mean T and an index of inequality
calculated from it.

For instance, the Gini index (used by both

Sheshinski and Kats) is calculated as:

G(I) =

n
n
£
£ |1,-1,|
2n2I i=l j=l
1 3

.... (7.6.1)

(that is, one half of the mean difference between all pairs of
1 n
where I = — £ I..
n i=l 1
_
A social welfare function which is strictly increasing in I

incomes i,j)

and strictly decreasing in G(I) will be appropriate for our needs.
Let us call this criterion KS (for Kats and Sheshinski).
9 The notation in this section is different to that in the previous
section.
I have adhered to the notation used by the authors
cited. Atkinson and Sen use yi for income of individual i, and
y for. the mean of the distribution.
Kats and Sheshinski use I.
and I respectively for the same variables. The adjective
"neo-utilitarian" refers to use by Kats and Sheshinski of
cardinally measurable utility and identical individual utility of
income functions. They reject the need for additively
separable s.w.f.
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Sheshinski gave an example of one such function:
n n
-1
W(U(I1 ),U(I? ),...,U(In )) = H{ E z if [min(U(I•)»U(I.))]}
n
i=1j=l
1
J
.... (7.6.2)
This can be shown to satisfy the KS criterion from any
invertible function U, and any arbitrary strictly increasing
transformation H, by making use of:
I. + I. - Il.-I.
_J____ J
' i J

min(Ii ,1.)

9

and,
irrin(U(I.) ,U (Ij )) = U(min( 1^»Ij )) Then Sheshinski's function may be rewritten as:
n
n
n
W = H{ z
E U"'[mindKi.), U(I.))]}
i= i j = i
1
J
n
= H{n E I. i=l 1

n

n

E

E

i=l j=l

|l.-I.|}

1

J

= H{n2 I (1-G)}

(7.6.3)

which is increasing in I and decreasing in G.
on Sheshinski's function are of interest.

Several observations

Firstly, it is not

additive in individual utilities - this is the main point of
departure from traditional utilitarianism.

Neither does

Sheshinski's function possess the property of additive separability
(the independence of each person's welfare from the position of
others).

The status of additive separability in a s.w.f. has been

shown by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) to be a reasonable property
although not compelling in itself.

But there is a difference between

simply adding individual utilities and the concept of additive
separability.

Sen has shown that the former implies the latter,
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but not vice versa.

He explains it as follows:

If we take each U as a strictly concave function of
individual utilities we are avoiding the simple
additive formula of utilitarianism, but we are still
sticking to the notion of additive separability.
Individual components of social welfare continue to
be judged without reference to the welfare components
of others, and the social welfare components
corresponding to different persons are eventually
added up to arrive at an aggregate value of social
welfare...In general, if one feels that the social
valuation of the welfare of individuals should depend
crucially on the levels of welfare (or income) of
others, this property of the independence of each
person's welfare component from the position of
others has to be sacrificed.
(Sen (1973a),
pp.39-41).
Atkinson (1970) and Newbery (1970) have shown that if U is
strictly concave, there exists no additively separable s.w.f. which
ranks distributions in the same order as the Gini index.

The

status of additive separability thus has a bearing on whether the
Gini index can be used as an acceptable measure of inequality in
a s.w.f.

We shall return to this in the next section.

The second observation is that Sheshinski's s.w.f. is
independent of the form of U since any invertible function U will
suffice.
required.

He thus maintains that no concavity restriction is
But an invertible function must be strictly increasing

(or strictly decreasing) so U must be strictly increasing in
income.

Sheshinski's welfare function H is strictly concave

given H ' > 0 and H" < 0.
Thirdly, the trade-off between average income and the Gini
index is proportional on a given social welfare.
social welfare W held constant we have:

dl _

d G

_ -d(l-G)

i " I ’T gT _ T T g )

That is, for
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so that a one percent increase in average income accompanied by a
one percent increase in the inequality measure leaves social
welfare unchanged.
Finally, Sheshinski's function can be shown to be consistent
with Rawls' principle of justice which implies the appropriateness
of a maximin policy.

For instance, if n = 2, (7.6.2) reduces to

W (U (In ), U(I2 )) = H{min[U(I.|), U(I2 )]}

.... (7.6.4)

i.e. welfare depends on the income of the poorer member of the
society.

In extending the approach of Sheshinski, Kats showed that
another form of welfare function satisfying KS (and which is not
simply a monotone transform of (7.6.3)) is given by:
H(U(I1 ),...,U(In ) =

logd- z u(i ))
n i=l
1

1

n
I

n
z |U(I )-U(I.)

n
2n i U(I.) i=l 0=1
i=l
1

1

J
(7.6.6)

Making the traditional utilitarian assumption that utilities
10
are cardinally measurable (for instance, U (I^) = I.)
then Kats'

10 This is one of the "special cases" alluded to by Sen in my
footnote 6 above, which is required in order to derive a
consistent ranking of social states relating both income
distribution and growth. Any serious attempt to apply this
assumption would of course have to deal with the index number
problem of valuing real income for individuals facing different
prices for commodities and consuming different types of
commodities (some non-market goods as well). The problem is not
trivial as shown in Chapter 1; we simply note this fact here.
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function satisfies KS since it reduces obviously to
H = log I - G(I)

.... (7.6.7)

Using a sequence of lemmas, corollaries and propositions,
Kats showed the necessary and sufficient conditions for (7.6.6) to
satisfy criteria KS.

His paper is terse and difficult and several

proofs which he holds to be self-evident are not adequately
explained.

Accordingly, a detailed exposition of his paper with

comprehensive proofs and notes is given in Appendix A.

His main

results are paraphrased below.
The first condition is that H be symmetric.

This is the same

symmetry definition used by Sen and simply means that a permutation
of the co-ordinates of a distribution (I) leaves welfare unchanged.
That is, as long as the pattern of distribution is the same, we
are not concerned with who gets which particular income.

Note

that two distributions I and I' being symmetric implies that they
have the same mean and Gini index (T = T ' , G(I) = G (I ')).
The second condition is that H be strictly increasing along
rays from the origin.

Although this condition is difficult to

visualise in n-dimensions, it can be intuitively explained by
simplifying to the two-person case (n = 2).

Fig.7.2 shows that

the I.j axis measures individual 1's income and
individual 2's income (I-j,^ >_0).

axis measures

Clearly, any ray from the

origin represents a line on which the ratio I ^ i s

fixed (and

on the 45° line 1^ = I^).11

11 As Figure 2 is drawn it implies an additive s.w.f. which is
inconsistent both with Kats' function and with Gini orderings.
It is only intended to illustrate some properties used by
Kats and which I had found difficult to interpret.
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If the ray

fixes the distribution of income between individuals,

any movement along it away from the origin must represent an
increase in income of each individual and hence I.

Thus H

increases along any ray as T increases, with G (I) fixed.
Thirdly, in order to distinguish between rays (and hence,
between different inequality indices), he uses the idea of an
"r-simplex", which is simply a line in two-dimensions (hyperplane
in n-dimensions) showing all possible distributions of a given
level of income r.

The broken line in Fig.7.2 shows that r could

accrue solely to individual 1, or solely to individual 2, or any
combination along the r-simplex (rr).

Kats third condition is

that if two distributions I and I' are both on the same r simplex,
then H(U(I)) >_ H(U(11)) if and only if G(I) <_ G( 1 1).
The diagram also makes the definition of symmetry more
obvious.

A vector of income distributed between two individuals

can be represented by a point on rr indicated by the arrow drawn
along R^.

If R^ is the ray along which income is equally
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distributed then we can think of a permutation of co-ordinates
(i.e. swapping I-j and

axes around) as producing an income

distribution on rr which is a mirror image of the arrow on
shown as a dotted arrow in Fig.7.2.

Since the inequality index

ranges from zero on R^, to unity on each axis, the symmetric
distribution has the same inequality index as the original;

and

since it lies on the same r-simplex, it has the same mean income.

7.7

Summary and Conclusions
It is now necessary to draw together the threads of the

argument in this chapter and to indicate the main issues to be
further considered.
The traditional utilitarian proposition on welfare formalised
by Pigou (1920) was that social welfare is maximised by distributing
income equally.

This was the logical outcome of a set of

assumptions which included cardinally measurable utility and
identical individual utility functions with diminishing marginal
utility of income.

For traditional utilitarians the value of social

welfare was simply the unweighted sum of each individual's utility,
and since a poor man had a higher marginal utility of income than
a rich man, it followed that a redistribution of income to the
poor would raise total social welfare.
Many economists became disenchanted with the utilitarian
assumption that everyone had the same utility of income function
and, in the aftermath of Robbins' (1932) critique of utilitarianism,
there was a considerable effort to define the criteria for social
welfare upon less controversial ethical judgements.

Most

economists adhered to the Paretian ethic in which a situation is
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Pareto-optimal if no other attainable situation exists such that
no individual can be made better off (in his own estimation)
without another being made worse off (in his own estimation).
It has been argued above that this cannot be a sufficient condition
for welfare determination in a planning framework in which income
distribution is important because many different distributions of
a given level of income may exist, and the Pareto criterion does
not enable a choice to be made between them.
Lerner (1944) showed that without the restrictive utilitarian
assumptions an equal division of income maximises only the expected
value of total welfare.

Later, Sen (1969) showed that a

probabilistic egalitarian rule provides also for a maximin policy
in a situation of uncertainty as to the assignment of individual
utility functions (i.e. maximising the lower bound of income).
Atkinson (1970) demonstrated that the avoidance of
interpersonal utility comparisons presents no obstacle to the
ranking of income distributions in terms of their contribution to
welfare, provided that their Lorenz curves do not intersect.

This

result has been generalised by Sen (1973a) for non-utilitarian
assumptions.

He prefers to regard the distributional implications

of Lorenz rankings as "non-compulsive judgements" about welfare
gains from redistribution, which may be rejected by appropriate
counter arguments about adverse effects on growth.

(Note that we

do not presume any conflict here between growth and equity - in
fact Chapter 3 indicated the possibility of equitable growth - this
is regarded as an empirical question).
Sen's book also provides an appealing treatment of the
measurement of inequality changes.

An appropriate inequality

index is mean-independent (and thus consistent with the notion of
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non-compulsive judgements) and may be selected on the basis of
the particular sensitivities of different indices to particular
types of inequality (as analysed by Champernowne and Atkinson as
well).

While inequality indices are not free of ethical judgements

about how income ought to be distributed, this approach allows the
adopted inequality measure to come as close as possible to the
objective facts of the distribution, in terms of which normative
judgements may be conveniently made.
Although Sen's approach is probably the most persuasive
(because it uses widely acceptable assumptions) It is not the
only admissible approach.

Sheshinski and Kats have shown that a

consistent appraisal of growth and income distribution is possible
in a "neo-utilitarian" framework, which might appeal to some, but
not necessarily all economists.

Their social welfare functions

are expressed in terms of two variables, viz:
the Gini coefficient.

mean income, and

Their functions are not additive in

individual utilities (a condition consistent with Newbery's analysis
of Gini orderings), but they do allow for a complete ranking of
distributions, at least those distributions for which the Gini
index is the appropriate measure (in the Champernowne sense).
Sen has recently enquired into the necessary and sufficient
conditions which a s.w.f. must satisfy in order to yield higher
welfare whenever the Lorenz curve moves upwards.

His conclusion

was:
Essentially any welfare function that responds
positively to the type of rich to poor transfers
that is involved in moving to a higher Lorenz curve
will d o ....
(Sen (1973b), p.73).
Such transfers are always faithfully registered in the Gini
index in the appropriate direction, so that aspect of Kats1 and
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Sheshinski's criterion is consistent with Lorenz ranking.
On the problem of variation in mean income levels an earlier
quote from Sen (on page 221) indicated that he was sympathetic to
the view that our concern for inequality should be relatively
greater in low income cases than in high income cases because of
its association with abject poverty at low income levels.

The

s.w.f. explored by Kats is defined on the logarithm of mean income
and on a linear term in the Gini index, which means that in order
to achieve a given change in welfare (say, x%) we require a given
constant change in the Gini index (say y%) at all income levels.
But in order to achieve the same (x%) change in welfare by varying
mean income alone, we require a much greater percentage rise in
mean income level when that level is high

than when it is low

so that its logarithm gives the constant (x%) change required.
Therefore, in Kats' function, the Gini index has a greater relative
weight in determining welfare when income is low than when it
is high.
There is therefore a sense (albeit a superficial one) in
which the welfare criteria suggested by Sen are not inconsistent
with the welfare criteria of the neo-utilitarians.

However,

there do remain certain fundamental differences which need to be
sorted out by the planner.

Essentially there are four issues to

be resolved:
(i)

the status of additivity, and of additive separability, as
desirable properties in a social welfare function,

(ii)

the role of the assumption of identical individual utility
functions,

(iii) the extent to which partial orderings on the basis of Lorenz
rankings are useful, and,
(iv)

the appropriateness of the Gini index as an indicator of the
degree of inequality, and further, as an indicator of changes
in social welfare.
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As regards the first of these issues, it should be made
clear that additivity and additive separability are two different
properties.

A s.w.f. is additive in individual utilities if the

value of social welfare is arrived at by simply adding individual
utilities (of course, they would have to be cardinally measurable
to be additive).

By concentrating on the welfare sum, and not

specifically on the distribution of that sum, the property of
additivity is not appropriate for our needs as defined earlier.
Additive separability is a property in a s.w.f. in which individual
components of social welfare are judged without reference to the
welfare components of others.

In general this property of additive

separability must be rejected if we feel that the social valuation
of the welfare of individuals should depend also on the relative
welfare of others.

In a system of values in which income

inequality ranks high as a determinant of welfare, the valuation of
individual welfare components in relation to others is implied in
the process of arriving at social welfare.

For this reason neither

Sen, nor Sheshinski and Kats, nor the present writer regard
additive separability as a particularly desirable property in a
s.w.f.
Sen recognises that one may wish to go through the intermediary
of individual utilities, although one is not obliged to do so.
Sen would not wish to go as far as Kats and Sheshinski do in this
respect by assuming U(I.) = I..

There is clearly a difference

between an egalitarian value judgement that, ceteris p a r i b u s , all
persons should receive equal treatment in society, and an
objectionable utilitarian premise that all persons have identical
capacities for satisfaction.

Nevertheless, it is likely that in a

planning situation these would come to much the same result.
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The planner who is devising a strategy to alter the distribution
of income in the desired direction would be interested in
identifying a target group for the strategy and in evaluating the
success of the strategy.

The extent to which real incomes of the

target group are raised in relation to other groups would constitute
an important part of this evaluation, and this is what the
Kats-Sheshinski functions permit.

The planner may find it

impossible to justify the utilitarian assumption of equal individual
capacities for satisfaction by itself, but he may also find that
without it his ranking of social states is incomplete.

Unfortunately

this is an issue on which reasonable men may always differ.
It remains to assess the usefulness of partial orderings of
alternative social states on the basis of Lorenz curve rankings,
and to decide whether to use the Gini index as an appropriate
inequality indicator.

In view of the findings of Champernowne (1974)

and others as discussed earlier, it would appear that the
appropriateness of the Gini index as an indicator of the degree of
inequality may well be doubted if the Lorenz curve of a given
distribution was significantly skewed in one direction.

The Gini

index lays its strongest claim as an unbiased indicator of the
degree of inequality when the Lorenz curve is very nearly symmetrical.
This restricts the range of application of the Kats-Sheshinski s.w.f.
As regards Lorenz curve orderings, it would be impossible to infer
anything about welfare changes on the basis of Lorenz orderings
(and without specifying the form of the individual utility
functions and the s.w.f.) if it was found that in response to a
given strategy the Lorenz curves for income distributions in
different social states intersected one another.

If the Lorenz
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curves did intersect the planner would be forced to specify a
particular form of s.w.f. in order to decide which distribution
yielded the highest welfare level.

This is as much as can be

said from a theoretical point of view.

The issues of Lorenz curve

ranking and the appropriateness of the Gini index are both very
well suited to empirical analysis in a particular case for their
resolution.

This is the subject of the next chapter in which the

extent of income inequality in Fiji is assessed and Lorenz curves
are estimated from available data.
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APPENDIX A*
Expansion of Kats0972)
The problem:
Consider a vector I = (I^ , I2 ..... ,1 ) e |Rn of income
distributed among n individuals with I. >_ 0 (i = 1,2,.... ,n),
n >_ 2 (the case n = 1 is trivial).
Let each individual have a utility of income function U (I^),
U :

|R (where f/1 is the nonnegative orthant of |Rn ).

Let

all those utility functions be identical.
Let there be an individualistic social welfare function
W : |Rn -*» R expressed as
W i U d ^ , U(I2 ).... U(In )) = W(U(I)) where
u (i) = ( u d ^ , u(i2 ),... u(in ))
Consider the following possible indicators of income
distributions
1 n
I = - s I.
n i=l 1

G(I) =

,

(Al)

1

(A2)

2n2I 1=1 j=l
where (Al) is average income and (A2) is the Gini index.
We want to express W as
W(U(I)) = H O J d ^ , U(I2 ).... U (In)) = H (I, G),
such that H is strictly increasing in I
(A3)
and

H is strictly decreasing in G(I)

What are the necessary and sufficient conditions which H
must satisfy in order to fulfil the given criteria (A3)?
Assume to begin with that utility is cardinally measurable,
further that U(I.) = I. for all i.

Then discussion is initially

* The author wishes to acknowledge the advice of Subhan Ali
on the expansion of the proofs here.
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restricted to the function H (1^,

In ) = H(I), instead of

H(U(I)), defined on individual incomes.

Definition 1:

Let I, I' enn then I is symmetric to I' iff
(I-|5... In ) is a permutation of the coordinates of
(It '...., in ').

(note that this is the same definition of symmetry used by Sen).
Lemma 2:

If I is symmetric to I' and H(*) satisfies (A3)
then H(I) = H(I').

In this case we shall say that

11H is symmetric in I"
The proof of this Lemma presents no problem since if I and I ‘ are
symmetric (permutations of essentially the same distribution)
then I = T' and G(I) = G(I').
Lemma 3:

.*. H(I) = H(I').

For I eftn , G(I) = G( a I) for all A < 0. And I
symmetric to I 1 implies
H( a I) = H (A I*) for all A > 0.

Kats says that the proof is immediate!

It is expanded here for

added clarity.
Proof:

Define I

= Al = (AI^,AI2 ,...,Aln )

Then T* = ^ e a ^. = a ^ z I. = a!
.*.

H(I*) = H(AI) iff G(I*) = G(AI) = G(I).

Now

G(I*) = G(AI) = —
2n2I

E E |I.* - I.*|

i j

1

J

since I = I
*
, , G(AI) = — ---- E E |Al.-Al .| =
2n2AT i j
1 J
and I = Al
-^-=7
2n2Al

^ E |I,-I.| = G(I) Q.E.D.
i j
1 J
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Corollary 1:

If H(-) satisfies condition (A3) then it is
strictly increasing along rays from the origin.

The proof follows from the fact that I is strictly increasing
along rays from the origin (and note that G(I) is fixed for all
distributions characterised by vectors along a given ray from
the origin).
To explain "strictly increasing along rays from the origin"
(s.i.a.r.f.t.o.) is perhaps difficult in the n-dimensional
non-negative orthant of |Rn. It is a simple concept if we assume,
for the sake of clarity, n = 2.

Then the non-negative quadrant is:

Clearly any ray from the
origin fixes the ratio
of income divided
between the two individ
uals
.*. G is constant
a.r.f.t.o.
As we move away from the origin along a given ray, both
individuals receive higher income so that
a.r.f.t.o.

T

is strictly increasing

Symmetry is also obvious considering a vector drawn

as an arrow from the origin - A permutation of coordinates I-j and
I^ would leave

T and

G(I) unchanged.

We distinguish among rays, and therefore among Gini indices,
by comparing their projections on a given r-simplex - this requires
two more definitions.
Definition 2:

Let e . { r ) = (0,0,...,0,r,0,...,0) be a vector in
whose components are all zero, except for the i-th
component {i e 1, 2,...,n} whose value is r , r >_ 0.
Then the (n-dimensional) r simplex is
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n
(I : I =

t

i=l

n
z

a.e.(r),
1 1

1=1

a. = 1
1

and

a. > 0, all i
1 _

For clarity, this can be expanded as follows:
a-j e-j(r)

=(a^, 0, 0,

0)

i =1

a2 e2 (r)

= (0, a2r, 0,

0)

i =2

a 3 e3 (r)

= (0, 0, a3r, 0, ..., 0) i = 3

an en ^

=

.... > °» anr )

i = n

I is written on an r-simplex as (a^r, a2r,...anr)
or alternatively I = r(a-|, a2 ,..., an )
r represents the total income, and the a. are the shares
accruing to each individual i .
By definition, then, the sum of the shares exhausts the
n
whole, so that z a. = 1 (and no-one has a negative
i=i 1
share, so a^ _> 0).
Definition 3:

Q(r) = (£»£»••• »£)

r 1°

Clearly Q can be rewritten r(^, 1,...,^-) which is
simply the egalitarian line - where every individual
has an equal share, that share depending only on
the number of individuals.
Lemma 4:

I and I' are on the r-simplex for some
r > 0

iff

I = V .

For Kats the proof is immediate - not so for me:
Proof of Lemma 4:
(a)

(two parts)

Suppose I and 1 1 are on r-simplex for some r > 0;
show that I = 1 1.
From the definition, if I is on r-simplex, then
I = r(a,, a«,...,a )
\
l
M
where a. ^ 0, (i = l,2,...,n),

n
a. = 1.

try to
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Similarly
I' = r(a.j1, a2 ',...an ')
n
n) and z a . 1 = 1.
i=l
1

where
a.1 > 0 ,

(i = 1,2
r
n

n
z a.
i=l 1

r
n
r
n

I = I'.
(b)

Now suppose I = I', and try to show that I and I* are on
same r-simplex for r >_ 0.

That is, show that I and I' can

be written as
I = r (a^, a2 ,...,an )
I ' = r (a.|', a2 ',...,an ')
where a.., a..' >_ 0

(i = l,2,...,n)

n

and

n
a . = z a.' = 1
i=l
1
i=1
1
z

For the case r = 0 the proof is trivial since
I = I 1 = (0,0,...,0), so that we can choose a. and a.' to
satisfy the conditions.
For the case r > 0, let
I = (I^
r

I 2 ..............I n ) and

= ( I - , ■, i 2 ' ..............y )

be any two income distributions such that
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Rewrite I and I* as:
I

=

1

where

r

( i i

1 \ f

r=

9

ll.

ill)

r

||l|| =

9*'

*5 t

z I.
i=l 1

and I' = r 1(
r'

(normalised);

V_)
r1

r*

n
z I.1
i=l 1

where r ' = 111111 =

(normalised).

(Note that this type of normalisation is valid since the vectors
I and I' are in the non-negative orthant of
I.' > 0 ,

Rn ,

i.e. I. >_ 0,

(i = l,2,...n)
Now since I = I', we have r = r'
I,1
I,*
I' = r ( 4 , 4 -

- Thus

I = r (a.|, a2 ,... ,an )

I.
where a. = -J- > 0
l
r -

(i = l,2,...n)

n
n
I.
n
and z a. = z — ~ = — z I. = 1.
r 1=1 1
1=1 1
1=1
r
- Also

I' = r (a^1, a 2 li...5an ')
i!
a ^ ' = -p- >_ 0

where
n
and

z a.' =

1=1 1

n
z

i=l

(i = 1,2,... ,n)

I .'
— 7- =

r

■, n
- i

I.' = 1

r1=1 1

Hence if I = I', then I and I' are on the r simplex
for some r > 0

Q.E.D.
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Mow in order to compare Gini indices of vectors on the same
r-simplex, use the fact that I symmetric to I' implies
G(I) = G(I').

Therefore, without loss of generality, I can be

rearranged as follows
I, > I0 > ___ > I
1 — 2 — n
Lemma 5:

(A7)

If I satisfied (A7), then
G(I) = —
n2T

z(n-2i + 1 ) 1 .
1

(A8)

Kats' proof is to assume (A7) is satisfied so that
we can write
n
. . . .n
r
z
U i - I,|
1=1 j=l
1
J
3

n
n
= 2 z
z (I. - I.)
1=1 j=l
1
J

and (A8) follows.

II.-IJ
1 J

+ ...

+

+

iV hl

+

+

+ ...

+

+

+ ...

+ |I,-I

+

+ ...

+ Il - I
1n n

+

CO
•—1

l—l

+

+

iV hl

+

CM
i—i

+ U i-^l

=

1
1—CO
1

+

1—CO
(
1
1—1c

1=1

n
z
j=l

1—CO
1
1CM
i—
i

n
z

i—i
CO
11
1—
CO

Expanding this, we have

I V 1,.
13

n

- (1,-1,) + (lr l2 ) + d r l3 ) + ... + (lr ln )
+ ( I r I 2 ) + ( I 2- I 2 ) + ( I 2- I 3 ) + . . .

; {IT In ) +
n
n
= 2 z
z (I.-I.)
1=1 j=l
1 J
since

I-| >_

+ (I3 - V

+

+ ( I 2- I n )

• + <V

V
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1

G(I)

=

—

nll

lln

t

1

(I.-I.).
1 J

n2 I i=1 j = l
Now to show that
n
n
E
E (I..-I,) =

n
I

1 3

1=1 =1
0

(n-21+1) I.

1=1

1

rewrite L.H.S. as:
n

n

n

n

l

E (I .-I .) =

E

£

1=1 o=i

J

I.

-

1

i= i j= i

n

n

E

El.

i= i j= i

J

Consider
n
n
E

El.

1=1 j=i

£

I, +

E

I9 +

1 j=2 1

j=l

1

E

I- +

j=3 3

= nl^ + (n-1) I2 + (n-2) l3 +
n
i

=
(Note:

n

n

E

El.

E

1=1 0=1

1

i.e.

E

I

n

• rn

(n-i+1) I.

1=1
n

J=n

1
n

n

I. E 1 = E I. (n-i+1),
10=1
1=1 1

1=1

1 = (n-i+1)

and not

(n-1))

j=l
n
" !1 + V
+

lZ

+

*3

+ ... + I
n

(i =■ D

+ !3

+ ... + I
n

(i ■= 2)

1-1
00

n

+ ... + I
n

(i >= 3)

+ I
n

(i *= n)

1
n

n

.*. E

E

1=1
Hence

n

n

E

e

+ 212 +

CO
1—1
CO
+

+
•• nIn

n
I. =

0=1 J

E

il.

1=1

n
(I.-I.) = £ (n-2i+1) I..
1=1 j=l
1 3
1=1
1

Q.E.D.
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Now the Gini index is given in (A8) as a weighted sum of each
individual's income when these are ordered from largest to
smallest.

That is, it is no longer defined in terms of the

absolute differences between the incomes of any two individuals.
The weights depend only upon n, the number of individuals, and
n
the weights sum to zero i.e. z (n-2i+l) = 0
1=1
Proof:

n
z

(n-2i+l) =

1=1

n
z n +

1=1

n
z 1 -

1=1

n
z 2i

1=1

n
n
n
= n z 1 + z 1 - 2 z i
1=1
1=1
1=1
- n* + n-2

= n(n+l) - n(n+l)

= 0 ,

since

" 1 = n in ill
1=1

Lemma 6:

ù

If H(-) satisfies (A3) and I, I* are on an
r-simplex with
!1
It ' > I2 ‘ > --• >

(i.e. (A7) is satisfied by I and I')
then H(I) > H(I')

z

iff

(n-21+1) (1,-1,') < 0.

1=1
Proof of Lemma 6:

1
(Kats says it follows from Lemma 5 - we
expand it here).
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Suppose H(•) satisfies (A3), and I, I' are on the r-simplex
with I > 1« > ... > I
1 - 2 — n
y

> y

> - . . i y

Proof is again in two parts:
(a)

Let H (I) >_H(I‘) and show that
n
£ (n-21+1) (I.+I.1) < 0.
i=l
1 1
Since

H (I) _> H(I')

we have

H (I,G(I)) > H (!' ,G(I')) - *

and since I, I' are on the same r-simplex, T = V .
Therefore, as H satisfies (A3), i.e. H is a strictly
decreasing function in G(I), we have from the inequality - *,
that
G(I) < G(I')
Then from Lemma 5:
n
n
E (n-21+1) I. £ z (n-21+1) I.'.
1=1
1
1=1
1
Hence

n
s

(n-21+1) (1,-1.') < 0.

1=1
(b)

Suppose

1

1

“

n
z (n-2i+l) (I.-I.‘) < 0
i=l
1 1
“

and show that H(I) >_ H(I').
Now we have:
n
r

n
(n-2i+l) I. < ^z

(n-2i+1) I.'

which implies (from Lemma 5), G(I) < G(I').
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Therefore, as H(-) satisfies (A3) and I = I', we have
H (I,G(I)) > H (I',G(r))
hence
H (I) > H(I‘).

Q.E.D.

Now the above results are combined into a proposition which
gives necessary and sufficient conditions for H.
Proposition 1:

Let H(I):nn-*- R, then H(-) satisfies (A3) iff
the following hold simultaneously

1.

H is symmetric,

2.

H i s strictly increasing along rays from the origin,

3.

If I, I' are on an r-simplex then
n
H(I) > H(I') iff, e (n-2i+l) (I.-I.') < 0
1=1
1 1
“
for all r >_ 0 and I satisfying (A7).

Proof:

Necessity has been shown above.
H(*) satisfies (A3).

For instance, suppose

Then by Lemma 2, H is symmetric

in I which proves statement 1, Corollary 1 proves
Statement 2,and Lemma 6 proves statement 3.
For sufficiency, suppose statements 1, 2 and 3 hold,
then show H(-) satisfies (A3).

Statements 1 and 2 prove

H is increasing in T, and statement 3 proves H is
decreasing in G(I).
(Note:

Q.E.D.

while the idea of strictly increasing along rays from the
origin was used to distinguish distributions with variable
I but fixed G(I), the r-simplex holds I fixed and varies
G(I).

The r-simplex is shown in the two dimensional

diagrams under corollary 1 as a dotted line showing all
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combinations (I^, I2 ) for which total (and therefore,
average) income is the same).
A further property of H is given by Kats as:
Lemma 7:

On a given r-simplex, the Gini-lower contour sets are
strictly convex.

Proof:

Let I, I 1 be on the same r-simplex with G(I) < G(I').
Let I" = xl + (1-X) I 1 for 0 < x < 1 (This defines
convexity).

Without loss of generality, assume that

I, I 1 satisfy (A7).

It follows that I" also satisfies

(A7).
G(I") - G(I1) =

z

i=l
=

e

(n-2i+l) (I,"-I')
1
1
(n-21+1)

i=l
=

e

(XI.+ (1-x) I.'-I.')
1
1 1

(n-2i+l) x(I .-I.')

1=1

11

= x(G(I) - G(I')) < 0.
(Note on convex sets:

Q.E.D.

Let C be a set with vectors x, y e C.

Then the set is convex if another vector z e C can be
found such that z = a-j x + a2 y

where a-j + a2 = 1

and a.j, a2 > 0.
Clearly for any x, 0 < x

< 1, this can be written

z = x x + (l-x)y)
We now relax the assumption that H is defined directly on
individual incomes H(I) and state, in terms of the original
problem, that H is a function of utility (H(U(I))), where U is
strictly increasing.
above:

Then by reproducing the same analysis as
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Proposition 2:

Let H(U(I^), U ( ) > . . . ,U(I )):
Rn -> R, then H(-) satisfies (A3)
iff the following hold simultaneously

1.

H is symmetric in U, i.e. I symmetric to 1 1 +
H(U(I)) = H(U(I‘)).

2.

H is strictly increasing along rays from the origin.

3.

If U(I), U(I') are on an r-simplex, then
H(U(I)) > H(U(1 1)) iff
E (n-21+1) (U(I.) - U(I.')) < 0
i=1
1
1
for all r >_ 0 and I, I* satisfying (A7).

(Note:

the assumption that U is increasing implies that H is
defined on a domain which is bounded from below.
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CHAPTER 8
Income Distribution in Fiji
8.1

Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the measurement of the size

distribution of income among households and individuals in Fiji.
The nationwide income distribution is estimated at two points in
time, 1968 and 1973, and the urban 1973 distribution and rural
1975 distribution are also estimated.

It is first necessary to

attend to certain conceptual issues, as was the case for the
analysis of employment.

Here the important concepts relate to the

unit of account, the unit of measurement and the practices adopted
for measuring income.

We can be brief here because some relevant

points have already been discussed in chapter one and in chapter
five.
Tinbergen (1972) has suggested that it is useful to distinguish
three units of account for the purpose of analysing income
distributions - viz: (i) income recipients, (ii) households (which
may have more than one income recipient), and (iii) consumers
(typically larger in number per household than income recipients).
The most relevant unit of account for welfare studies is the
consuming unit, which may be any one of the above depending upon
the given situation.

Tinbergen accepts the latter unit as the

most relevant for welfare studies in developed market economies.
He also distinguishes three units of income measurement
- viz:

(i) primary income (gross earnings before tax),

(ii) secondary income (after tax), and (iii) income after complete
redistribution (i.e. after taking account of social security
transfers, housing and education subsidies, and so on).

Again,
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for Tinbergen the latter is the most relevant unit of measurement
for welfare studies.
The relatively clear definitions which are found to be
appropriate for developed market economies are more difficult to
apply in largely agrarian low-income economies.

The conceptual

difficulties are eloquently described by Freyssinet and Mounier
(1974).

They explain how income can accrue in a variety of ways

and at different levels, and that there is a good deal of overlapping
in these ways and levels in an economy in which a large part of
economic activity merges into a wider complex of family-based
socio-economic activity.

For instance, production and exchange

systems in agriculture may be of the self-sufficiency type,
small-scale cash crop farming, or large plantations.

Each of

these systems typically co-exist in developing countries and an
individual or household may participate in all three in any given
year or season.
A further consideration is that it would be desirable for our
measurement of income to reflect certain significant aspects of the
behaviour of economic agents.

According to Freyssinet and Mounier,

agricultural workers in developing countries tend to think in terms
of direct utilities and direct costs associated with their efforts.
To the extent that this holds in a particular case, the measurement
of physical quantities produced or consumed, and the measurement of
labour input, would have relevance to an appropriate concept of
income in addition to cash earnings.

Several issues associated with

this have been discussed in chapter five, where direct utilities and
costs of other members of the household were also argued to be
relevant components of a group welfare function and to enter into
the behavioural constraint set for individuals as well.

It is
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necessary to recall these conceptual difficulties in this chapter
as background to the discussion of income distribution data in Fiji.
Empirical data on the distribution of income in Fiji is scarce,
and that which is available differs between sources in the chosen
unit of account and in the practices adopted for measuring income.
Four sources have been selected for the purpose of this chapter.
Estimates of the nationwide distribution of income have been
derived from Ward (1971) and Government of Fiji (1974b).

An

estimate of the distribution of income in urban Fiji has been
derived from Government of Fiji (1974c), and an estimate of the
distribution of income in one rural district of Fiji has been
derived from Brookfield et. al (1977).

In each case the data on

income distribution was compiled as a by-product of a study designed
primarily to collect data on other variables, such as employment
or consumption expenditure.

Under such circumstances the attention

to detail given to the definition and the measurement of "income"
is likely to have been less strict than that afforded to the main
variables of interest in the particular study.

Accordingly, the

estimates which are presented below should be regarded at best as
approximations to the underlying distribution that we wish to
measure.
A description of the data on income distribution provided by
each source is given in the next section.

This description covers

the definition of income, the chosen unit of account, and an
assessment of the coverage of the sample surveyed.

No attempt has

been made to adjust the source data in order to achieve a greater
degree of comparability of definitions.

The income distribution

estimates obtained will therefore be interpreted in terms of the
particular definitions used by each individual source.
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Each of the estimates of income distribution is presented in
the form of a Lorenz curve, and the equations for each Lorenz
curve are calculated using a technique suggested by Kakwani and
Podder (1976).

This technique is well suited to the purpose at

hand because the estimated equation fits grouped observations on
income distributions very well.

Further, the parameter estimates

of the Lorenz curve equation readily translate into the properties
of Lorenz curves discussed in the preceeding chapter with regard
to skewness and the derivation of the Gini index.

The Kakwani-

Podder method for estimating the equation of the Lorenz curve is
summarised in the third section of this chapter, and the results
are discussed in section four.

8.2

Data Sources

8.2.1

Nationwide income distribution in 1968:

The source used for income distribution in Fiji in 1968 is
Ward (1971) (his table on page 109, ibid).

Ward’s data came from

the Inland Revenue Department, National Accounts Report, and was
based on individuals assessed for income tax.

More than 21000

individuals filed taxation returns in 1968 and their average
taxable gross income was $1700.

There are certain limitations to

the use of taxation data for estimating income distribution in Fiji.
The coverage of the data is extremely limited.

On the basis of

census enumerations and other data, the employed labour force of
Fiji in 1968 was approximately 128000, which means that over one
million

employed individuals did not submit a taxation return.

Further, the accuracy of individuals' taxation returns is often
suspect.

On income disparities between Indians and Fijians in
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Fiji, Ward made the following observation:
When account is taken of the differences in
subsistence income and average family size between
Indians and Fijians, the effect of slightly higher
cash income on the average standard of living of
Indians tends to cancel out and both racial groups
probably enjoy a similar, though moderate income
per head. This applies only to taxpayers, however,
and takes no account of the fact that firstly, there
were far fewer Fijian than Indian taxpayers and
secondly, that because of the very wide differences
between these two races in their way of life,
consumption habits, etc, it is impossible to draw
any conclusions about their relative standards of
living. (Ward (1971) p.112)

8.2.2

Nationwide income distribution in 1973:

The 1973 Nationwide Unemployment Survey is the source for the
income distribution estimate in 1973 (Government of Fiji (1974b),
pages 409 and 430).

This survey actually became a full-scale

labour force survey, as described in chapter 6 above, and sampled
25% of all households in Fiji.

The sample was drawn in the same

proportion from rural areas (14400 households), Suva urban area
(4600 households), and the other twelve urban areas (4000 households),
and fairly represented the distribution of population by race.
Data for the survey was collected from different households at
different times between February and November 1973.
The income distribution estimate derived from this survey is
based upon cash income received by wage and salaried employees and
by own account workers who drew payment in cash (i.e. earnings
after tax).

From a total labour force estimate of 145076 persons

we take out the openly unemployed (9704), the unpaid family helpers
(12360) and the own account workers who drew payment only in kind
(7196), to arrive at an estimate of cash income recipients of
115816 persons.

Ranking these by income received during the
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reference period provides the information needed to prepare an
estimate of income distribution.

The 115816 persons were ranked

in discrete income groups and had an average annual cash income
of approximately $1450;

but this figure is not directly comparable

to the above estimate from Ward (1971).

This is because one

refers to income before tax and the other to income after tax, and
also because one is based only upon taxpayers while the other is
based upon all of the employed labour force.

8.2.3

Urban income distribution in 1973:

The Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey for 1973
(Government of Fiji (1974c)) enumerated 641 households in the six
main urban areas of Fiji:
Labasa.
in Fiji.

Suva, Nausori, Lautoka, Ba, Nadi and

This represents between 7% and 8% of all urban households
Of the 641 households surveyed, 44% were headed by

Fijians, 50% were headed by Indians and 6% were headed by other
races.

These sampling proportions by race are very close to the

racial composition of Fiji's total population, but the urban
population composition actually has a higher proportion of Indians
and other races and a lower proportion of Fijians.

The objectives

of the 1973 urban survey were to analyse cross-section family
budgets for information on expenditure elasticities of demand for
certain commodities, to determine the general pattern of expenditure
of families living in urban areas, and to check on the continued
validity of the commodity weights used to calculate the Consumer
Price Index.
The estimate of income distribution was taken from Table 9
(page 19, ibid).

The estimated average annual income per urban

household was $2800.

This income was defined as follows:

.
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...the sum of earnings of all household members
engaged in paid employment, property income, pensions,
assistance, gifts, interest and dividends, lottery
wins and other windfall gains. Also included as
part of income were receipts from the sale of home
produced goods actually consumed by the family, as
well as the imputed rental value of owner-occupied
housing. All items in income were taken or
estimated as "gross", i.e. before deduction of
direct taxes. (Government of Fiji (1974c) p.9).

8.2.4

Rural income distribution in 1975:

To the author's knowledge there is no available estimate of
income distribution for all rural areas of Fiji.

The most detailed

rural study to date is that by Brookfield et. al. (1977) which
provides information on income distribution for Taveuni District
in the Eastern Islands.

This survey enumerated 927 Taveuni

households which represents between 6% and 7% of the total number
of rural households in Fiji.

However, the study cannot be

interpreted as being representative of all rural Fiji for several
reasons.

The racial composition of the 927 households in the

survey was 74% Fijian, 20% Indian and 4% Part European.

The 1976

Census shows a considerably higher proportion of Indian households
in rural areas (48%). Indians tend to be concentrated in the
sugar-growing areas of Western Viti Levu and Northern Vanua Levu,
as well as the Rewa and Sigatoka Valleys, whereas the Fijian
rural population is more widely distributed.

There is also

considerable variation in the capacity of the land to support the
subsistence needs of local populations in different areas of Fiji.
Taveuni, for example, is generally regarded as being very fertile
among the Eastern Islands and the valuation of subsistence income
there is accordingly relatively high.
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The data reported by Brookfield et.al. (1977) on household
income in Taveuni District (Table 5.14 on page 220, ibid) was
collected during parts of 1974 and 1975, but primarily the latter.
It included cash income from wage employment, remittances, business
enterprises, agriculture, fishing, livestock, handicrafts, as well
as an estimated subsistence income equivalent.

Wage employment

opportunities provided approximately 45% of cash income received by
Taveuni households.

Their average household income including an

imputed subsistence component was estimated to be $1360 per annum.
This figure is broadly comparable to the $2800 for urban Fiji.
Although one refers to income before tax and the other to income
after tax, the tax base is quite small and would account for a
minor part of the difference between the two figures.

The two

figures also refer to different periods of time and inflation was
high in Fiji during the mid-1970's.

One could escalate the urban

household income to 1975 prices using the Consumer Price Index
(since this is based on urban households' expenditure patterns) and
this would give an estimated average urban household income level
of approximately $3250 per annum in mid-1975, thus accentuating
the income gap between Taveuni District and urban Fiji.

Both the

Taveuni and urban surveys refer to households as the unit of
account, and both include an imputed non-market component in
household income.

Brookfield et.al. (1977) make the following

comment on rural-urban income differences in Fiji:
In 1974 the average industrial worker in Suva had an
income of $1404 per year, and the United Nations
sugar study (UNDAT, 1974) argued that households in
the sugar industry should not receive less. Even
allowing for subsistence income only some 30 per
cent of Taveuni district households enjoyed an
income above this figure. Moreover, the majority

258.

of these households had more than one adult male
member. Among Indo-Fijians, and among estate
dwellers, over 80 per cent of households were
receiving less than $1400 per year. Taking the
median cash income of Taveuni district households
at $528 (Table 5.13), then on the basis of a 275
day working year the median daily income (i.e. the
income received by the mid-point member of the
population, half earning less and half earning
more) of a Taveuni household works out at only
$1.92, while the arithmetic mean is $2.43. This
compares most unfavourably with an average agricult
ural wage for all Fiji of $4.34 in 1974, as supplied
to the UNDAT sugar survey. Wage-earners on Taveuni
estates received an average daily wage of $2.29,
according to our data. (Ibid, p.224).

Income distribution estimates drawn from each of the above
four sources are shown in Table 8.1.

The estimates show the

percentage of income (as defined) accruing to each decile of the
relevant population (as defined).

Quartile observations are also

shown as well as the ninety-fifth percentile.

By simple subtraction

the latter indicates the proportion of income accruing to the
richest five percent of the population.

The estimates are put in

the same format for ease of presentation, and any attempt to draw
direct comparisons between them would need to bear in mind all of
the foregoing discussion of concepts and definitions and coverage.
The income shares shown in Table 8.1 were calculated from the
equations of the Lorenz curves fitted to the source data using
the Kakwani-Podder method discussed in section 8.3 below.
With the exception of the Brookfield et.al. study, each of the
surveys reported frequency distributions of income for discrete
income classes so that estimates of the cumulative frequency
distribution had to be prepared in order to calculate the Lorenz
curves.

Thirteen income classes were used for the 1973 urban

survey and the conventional procedure was adopted of treating the
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Table 8.1

Income Distribution Estimates for Fiji

Percent of Income
Percent of
Population

1968
Nationwide

1973
Nationwide

1973
Urban

1975
Rural

10

2.0

2.0

2.5

2.6

20

4.0

4.5

6.5

7.2

25

5.5

6.5

9.0

9.9

30

7.5

8.0

12.0

12.9

40

12.0

13.5

18.0

19.7

50

17.5

20.5

25.5

27.6

60

25.3

28.5

34.0

36.8

70

35.0

39.0

44.5

47.4

75

40.5

45.0

50.5

53.5

80

47.7

51.0

57.0

60.1

90

66.5

67.5

73.5

75.6

95

78.6

79.5

84.0

85.3

mid-point of each income interval as the mean income for households
in that class .

This involved some distortion in the lowest income

class (downward bias) and highest income class (upward bias).
This problem is potentially serious for the two estimates of the
nationwide income distribution in 1968 and 1973.

The data which

is reported in the original sources for these estimates is highly
aggregated (four or five income classes) and some observations had
to be interpolated.

Nevertheless, the Lorenz curve estimates

obtained were very good and, by preserving the observations which
were available, very little adjustment to the interpolated
observations was necessary.

The Brookfield et.al. study reported

income shares by decile groups which was most convenient for the
estimation of the Lorenz curve in that case.
We turn now to a discussion of the Lorenz curve estimation
technique.

8 .3

The K a k w a n i-P o d d e r method o f L o re n z c u rv e e s t im a t io n

Suppose income Y of a family is a random variable with
probability distribution F(y).

Assume that the mean of the

distribution y exists and that Y is strictly positive.

Then the

first moment distribution function of Y is given by
. 1

Fl ( y ) = ^

yr

V g(y).dY

... (8 .3.. 1)

where g(y) is the density function.

The Lorenz curve is the

relationship between F(y) and F^(y) shown in Figure 1 below:

The egalitarian line is the line F^ = F shown as the leading
diagonal of the unit square.
new system of co-ordinates.
with co-ordinates:
1

Kakwani and Podder then introduce a
Let P be any point on the Lorenz curve
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where

tt

is the distance of the ordinate from the origin along the

egalitarian line, and n is the length of the ordinate from P
perpendicular to the egalitarian line.
conditions will hold:

We note that the following

F <_ F.|, 0<_n<_7r, 0 <_ ir £ / 2 . The equation

of the Lorenz curve in terms of
n =

tt

and n can now be written as
(8.3.3)

f ( tt)

It can be shown that
dr) _ y-y
dir
y+y

.... (8.3.4)

and
d2n _

~

V

< o

2

.... (8.3.5)

dlT2 " g(y)(y+y)3
for
F' = g(y)
Therefore,

and

F ^ = y.g(y)/y

f(ir) has a maximum value at y = y.

Kakwani and Podder introduce symmetry of the Lorenz curve as
was discussed in the previous chapter.

It is a concept completely

different from the idea of symmetry in a welfare function or in an
income distribution function where one is unconcerned about who
receives which particular income.

Symmetry of f(tt) is defined here

in terms of the shape of the Lorenz curve with respect to the
negative diagonal drawn perpendicular to the egalitarian line.
Definition:

n = f(tt) is symmetrical iff
f(tt) = f(/2-7f),

all TT.

The Lorenz curve is said to be skewed towards (1,1) if
f (tt) > f(/2-Tr), and skewed towards the origin (0,0) if
f(tt) < f(/2-Tr).
A particular functional form of (8.3.3) which satisfies the
above restrictions, and which Kakwani and Podder show to fit many
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sets of grouped observations very well, is given by:

n = a * “ (/2-u)6

where a > 0 + n 21 0

(8.3.6)

(i.e. the Lorenz curve lies below the

egalitarian line), and where

a,3 > 0 -*• { n = 0

From the definition of symmetrical Lorenz curves above, (8.3.6)
is symmetrical if a = 3 .

It is skewed towards (1,1) if a < 6

and skewed towards (0,0) if a > 3 .

Sufficient conditions for

(8.3.4) and (8.3.5) to be satisfied (i.e. no points of inflexion)
are 0 < a £ 1

and

0 < 3 £ 1.

Since (8.3.2) may be shown to provide consistent estimators
of 7T and n (see Kakwani and Podder (1976), equation (8.3.6) may be
linearised by taking logarithms of both sides as:
log n = log a + a log tt + 3 log (/2-it)

.... (8.3.7)

which may be fitted by ordinary least squares after performing the
transformations (8.3.2) on F and F^.

The resulting parameter

estimates for a 3 a and 3 may be checked for compliance with the
above restrictions and analysed by conventional tests of
significance.
A sufficient condition for two Lorenz curves to be nonintersecting is for the ratio a / 3 to be the same for each and the
value of a to be smaller for one than the other - then the curve
with smaller a value lies everywhere inside the second curve.
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This is only a sufficient condition, and little can be said about
Lorenz rankings only on the basis of these parameter estimates if
a/3 is very different between the two curves.

For some purposes

this may be an unwanted extra restriction which further limits the
usefulness of the Lorenz ordering (which is itself only partial),
but it is not a serious restriction for the present purposes.
In terms of the types of inequality listed by Champernowne, a
Lorenz curve skewed towards the origin would be typical of a
distribution with inequality characterised by extreme wealth, that
is type I inequality.
greater than unity.

Here the ratio a/3 would be significantly
Conversely, a Lorenz curve skewed towards

(1,1) would be typical of a distribution with inequality
characterised by extreme poverty (that is, type III inequality),
and would show a/3 < 1 significantly.

If there was no tendency

for incomes to be bunched in a narrow range (type II inequality)
we would expect the Lorenz curve to be approximately symmetrical that is, a t 3 .
Some authors have attempted to define a measure of inequality
on the 'skewness' of the income distribution;

but the discussion

here is in terms of the general shape of the Lorenz curve and
'skewness' of the Lorenz curve is not the same as the 'degree of
inequality'.

Three Lorenz curves of widely differing shapes,

corresponding (for example) to the three types of inequality, may
still have the same value of a given inequality index (say, the
Gini index).

Here we wish to recall the particular sensitivities

of different indices to each of the three forms of inequality.

In

the previous chapter it was made clear that all inequality indices
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embody particular normative implications or, what amounts to the
same thing, changes in any particular index reflect changes in
inequality only in the sense in which that index is defined.
However, we also want the chosen index to be as 'objective' as
possible so that normative judgements may be expressed in terms
of an indicator which reflects most appropriately the observed facts
of the situation.
Therefore, in view of Champernowne's findings outlined
previously, and in relation to a Lorenz curve estimated by
(8.3.7), it may be concluded that the Gini index has its
strongest claim for being a relatively unbiased indicator of the
degree of inequality when the Lorenz curve is close to symmetrical
(i.e. a t 3 ).

Otherwise, it would be more appropriate to choose

alternative indices such as, for instance, Theil's entropy
measure if a > $, or the standard deviation of the logarithm of
income if a < 3 .
It will be shown below that Lorenz curves estimated for
Fiji are very nearly symmetrical, and moreover, this property
is consistently observed at different points in time and for urban
and rural Fiji.

For this reason we are particularly interested in

the Gini index which may be computed from the parameter estimates
of (8.3.7).

The Gini index is shown geometrically in figure 8.1 as

the area between the egalitarian line and the Lorenz curve,
expressed as a ratio of one half the unit square.
from (8.3.6) is as follows:

Its derivation
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f(ir) .dir

G = 2
o

f t .

= 2

Eaira (/2-tt)

= 2a ( ^ ) 1+a+e B ( l + a , l + B )

...(8 .3 .8 )

where B is the widely tabulated Beta Function evaluated at
(1+a, 1+3).

This last step may require further elaboration.

Consider the formula for the Beta Function:
l
B(Z,W)

.dt
0

by analogy,
1
ta (l-t)B .dt

B(l+a, 1+3)
-

0

Let t = — , and note that by doing so we have
/2
and tt =

when t = 1.

TT0 = / F . t01
(/? - w)e = (/? - /Zt)B = ( S z f . (l-t)B
Then from

'

o

aTTa ( / 1

= 0 when t = 0,

Then the following will also hold:

dir - / l . dt

G = 2

tt

tt)^. dir,
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we have by substitution:

G - 2a

(/2)at“ (/2)B (l-t)B /2.dt

= 2a(/?)1+“+B

it°(l - t)B.dt

= 2a(/2)1+a+B B(l+a> 1+S)

...Q.E.D.

In the computations below, the Beta Function was evaluated with
reference to the related Gamma Function, where B(Z,W) = ^ ( z + w y ^
= B(W,Z), (Abramowitz and Stegun (1972), chapter 6 by P.J. Davis).

8.4

Lorenz curves for Fiji
Table 8.2 shows the results of applying the Kakwani-Podder

method of estimating the Lorenz curve equation for each of the four
income distributions for Fiji which were discussed in section 8.2.
In addition to the Lorenz curve parameters, a, 3 and a, the
ratio a/3 is shown as an indicator of the degree of skewness in
the Lorenz curves.

The Gini ratio is also shown as an indicator

of the degree of inequality in the respective income distributions.
The high values of R2 and low standard errors (in brackets) indicate
that the chosen functional form fits the data extremely well.
From Table 8.2 it can be seen that although the ratio a/$ is
slightly less than unity for each Lorenz curve, it is very close
to unity in each case.
very nearly symmetrical.

This indicates that the Lorenz curves are
It also indicates that a feature of

inequality in Fiji is the inequality among the less extreme incomes.

267.

!Table 8.2

Lorenz curve parameters

KakwaniPodder
Parameters

1968
Nationwide

1973
Nationwide

a

0.4806
(0.0035)

0.4283
(0.0141)

0.3343
0.2892
(0.0020) (0.0021)

a

0.9332
(0.0047)

0.9055
(0.0292)

0.8602
0.8025
(0.0054) (0.0072)

ß

0.9618
(0.0048)

0.9160
(0.0223)

0.8686
0.8282
(0.0065) (0.0109)

a/ß

0.9703

0.9885

0.9903

0.9689

R2

0.9999

0.9937

0.9996

0.9994

0.477

0.441

0.360

0.327

Gini Ratio

Note:

1973
Urban

1975
Rural

Figures in brackets are standard errors.

There are some very rich individuals in Fiji, and there are some
who are poor in an absolute sense, but there is no general
tendency for income recipients to be bunched at either end of the
income scale.

In other words, there is no large class of extremely

wealthy or of extremely impoverished households.
In view of this symmetry of the Lorenz curves, and for the
reasons discussed in section 8.3 as well as in the previous
chapter, it would appear reasonable to accept the Gini index as
an unbiased indicator of the degree of income inequality in Fiji.
The measured Gini index is significantly larger for the nationwide
income distributions than it is for either the urban or the rural
distribution.

The nationwide distributions both exhibit a

moderate degree of inequality by world standards (see, for
instance, Table 1.1), v/hereas the urban and rural income distributions
exhibit a remarkably low degree of inequality.
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This observation on different Gini indices requires careful
interpretation in terms of the definitions used in different
surveys.

This has been implied by the discussion in section 8.2

with particular regard to the inclusion of non-market sector
income:

its valuation is important for the inequality comparisons

made here.

Brookfield et. al. show that the average level of

cash income in Taveuni was approximately $669 per household at the
time of their survey, and a Gini ratio computed from their
distribution of cash income gives a value of 0.436, considerably
higher than the 0.327 shown above.

Clearly the inclusion of an

imputed non-market income equivalent raises the incomes of
households with low cash income and, ceteris p a r i b u s , reduces the
degree of income inequality.

It is not clear from the Brookfield

Report how the imputed non-market income, amounting to over $700
per household, was calculated.

Neither is it clear from the

1973 Urban Household Expenditure Survey how the imputed non-market
income component in that case was calculated.

For present

purposes it is appropriate to discuss income inequality in rural
areas and in urban areas with some estimate of non-market income
being included in the measurement, and it was decided to accept
the estimates made in the above sources.
This being said, the difference in the measured degree of
income inequality between the nationwide income distributions on
one hand, and the urban and rural income distributions on the
other, has substantive meaning.

It indicates that a further

feature of income inequality in Fiji is the wide gap between
average income levels in urban areas and average income levels in
rural areas.

It is worth explaining this conclusion in more detail.
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The nationwide income distribution may be regarded as a weighted
average of the rural and the urban income distributions, with the
weights being determined by the size of the population in rural
areas as compared with urban areas, and by the amount of national
income accruing to groups in rural areas as compared with urban
areas.

If, as appears to be the case in Fiji, the urban and

rural income distributions both exhibit a similar (and low) degree
of inequality, while the nationwide income distribution exhibits
a very different (higher) degree of inequality, then it is clear
that the amount of income accruing to households in rural areas
(who comprise over 60% of the population) must be very different
to that accruing to households in urban areas.

The fact that

such income differences exist has been established in section 8.2
above and in chapter 6.

The discussion here in terms of sectoral

income distributions underscores this.
Lorenz curves from the income distributions discussed above
are shown in Figures 8.2 and 8.3, which illustrate the points
made about relative inequality.

The Lorenz curve for the

nationwide income distribution in 1973 lies everywhere inside that
of the nationwide income distribution in 1968.

The Lorenz curve

for Taveuni District in 1975 lies everywhere inside that of the
urban areas in 1973.

Both of the Lorenz curves in Figure 8.3 are

closer to the egalitarian line than those in Figure 8.2.
One may want to make a judgement about relative welfare in
urban and rural areas based only upon Lorenz curve rankings from
Figure 8.3.

However, following Sen (1973), one would be more

likely to make this a non-compulsive judgement.

In view of the

evidence presented above, one would then probably go further and

27 0

10

.

;20

30

*+0

50

60

70

80

90

Percentage of Income Recipients
Figure 8.3

Percentage
of Income

Lorenz Curves for Urban (1973) and Rural (1975)
Income Distribution in Fiji.

271

.

reject the Lorenz curve ranking of welfare implied by Figure 8.3.
Average household income in urban Fiji in 1975 was approximately
two-and-one-half times the average household income in Taveuni
(including a generous non-market component).

This gap is so large,

and the Lorenz curve difference so small, that the issue in this
case is unequivocal.

PART IV
Patterns of Output and Consumption
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CHAPTER 9
Income Distribution in an Interindustry Framework

9.1

Introduction
The primary objective of this chapter is to evaluate through

simulations the effects of income redistribution on the growth and
structure of the Fiji economy.

Growth and equity have been

regarded by the conventional development theory as conflicting
goals.

The reasons for this were discussed in chapter one.

Not

only was a high degree of income inequality regarded as necessary
for high rates of savings, capital accumulation and growth, but
efforts to redistribute income to the poor were regarded as being
counter-productive because the adverse effects on the savings
ratio and on growth would leave little surplus from which to
redistribute.
A less orthodox theory of the effect of income redistribution
on growth is concerned with the composition of consumer demand
and has become known as the "structuralist school" (see, for
instance, I.L.O. (1970)).

This school argues that low income

groups mainly consume commodities which have a high labour content
and/or a low import content.

Such factor intensities are

characteristic of traditional foodstuffs, textiles and simple
domestic equipment.

It is argued that high income groups consume

more capital-intensive goods which typically are imported.

Then

a redistribution of income towards low-income groups would tend
to increase employment levels and reduce import requirements.
This theory has attracted considerable attention in Latin American
countries where it has been argued, from the so-called "two-gap"
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growth models (Chenery and Strout (1966), Vanek (1967), that the
limiting constraint on growth is foreign exchange and not domestic
savings capacity.

Under such circumstances an import-reducing

redistribution of income offers the possibility of faster economic
growth.
It is difficult to state a priori whether the structuralist
type of effects of income redistribution on growth will prevail
over the savings effect in any given case.

The question is

largely an empirical one and several case studies have recently
addressed themselves to it.

These include Cline (1972),

Chinn (1973), Paukert et. a l . (1974), Figueroa (1975), Ho (1976),
Foxley (1976), and several others are reviewed in Cline (1975).
Almost all of these studies conclude that the effect of simulated
income redistributions on economic growth has been overemphasised
in the past and is likely to be rather small.

However, the

direction of the growth effect varies from case to case and
different studies report different employment and balance of
payments effects.

Some of these results are described below.

Each of the case studies uses an interindustry type of
analysis, but each uses a different level of aggregation of
consumption and production data, and different conceptual and
statistical definitions.

These would account for some of the

differences in results, so that it is not clear to what extent
different countries' economic structures do cause different
responses to income redistribution policies.

It is also noted

that the range of policies which may be regarded as redistributive
is very large, and each policy will have economic and social
effects unique to itself.

The common methodological denominator

of the case studies is that there is a sense in which the
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distribution of income may be regarded as a variable in positive
economics.

This is because a given income distribution reflects

(and is reflected by) a given pattern of domestic consumption and
output.

The case studies are interested in evaluating the effects

on demand and output of a change in income distribution in
isolation from the way redistribution is accomplished.

These

ceteris paribus conditions remain unspecified.

Cline's (1972) study for selected Latin American countries
used family budget data to calculate the savings effect of income
redistribution in terms of a Harrod-Domar growth relationship.
He used input-output relationships to calculate the import effect
and factor use effects for Brazil (thirty-two industry input-output
table

for 1959) and import effect for Mexico (forty-five industry

input-output table

for 1960).

His results showed that a

redistribution of income to that observed in Britain would reduce
the growth rates of both Brazil and Mexico by approximately 1%.
A similar redistribution showed a 0,66% fall in the growth rate
of Argentina but had no significant effect at all on Venezuela's
growth rate.

Cline calculated that there would be no significant

change in import requirements of Brazil or Mexico, but employment
in Brazil was projected to rise by 6% as a result of the changed
production composition.
Chinn (1973) confined his attention to urban wage and salary
earning households in the Republic of Korea.

He identified eight

income groups from the 1964 household expenditure survey and
examined the demand compositional effects of a redistribution of
income using a sixteen industry input-output table for 1963.
His results indicated a decline in both imports and employment
but these effects were extremely small.
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Another study confined to urban data is that by Figueroa
(1975) for Peru.

His study simulated the effects on manufacturing

employment and imports of income redistribution from rich to poor
households in Lima using data for 1964-65.

This study identified

five income groups and nine manufacturing industries.

The

discussion of the methods of analysis is rather sparse, but the
results indicate that a selective redistribution of 6% of Peru's
national income would raise industrial employment in Lima by 3%.
Paukert et. al. (1974) used a sixty-four industry input
output table for the Philippines for 1965, and identified ten
income groups from the 1971 household income and expenditure
survey.

The study developed a static semi-closed input-output

model (outlined and used in section 9.3 below) to assess the
impact of twenty-two alternative income distributions on employment,
imports, savings and growth potential for the Philippines.

Their

results showed a relatively strong increase in employment as a
result of income redistribution to the poor because the shift in
consumption pattern led to an increased demand for the products of
labour intensive industries.
but by a small amount.

Imports were projected to increase

The volume of private household savings

fell considerably after redistribution to the poor.

This savings

effect was partly offset by increases in public sector savings
(higher tax collections with expenditure assumed constant) as
well as by higher corporate savings in the form of depreciation
reserves.

Overall total savings fell causing a decline in the

rate of growth but again this growth effect was very small.
Ho (1976) used data from Taiwan for 1966 to examine the
empirical content of the factor differential hypothesis in that
country and to simulate the impact of income redistribution on
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growth.

His static input-output model had seventy-six industries

and identified thirty-one income groups from the nationwide survey
of households.

Ho found that consumption by low income households

in Taiwan was more capital intensive than that by high income
households because of higher consumption of services by the rich.
This differential in consumption in terms of factor requirements
tended to be confined to comparisons between the very rich and
the very poor, while for the majority of middle income households
the differences were not very great.

For households in the same

income class, consumption by urban households tended to be more
capital intensive than that by rural households.

Simulations of

alternative income redistributions towards the low income groups
yielded higher levels of employment and of total output.
Foxley's (1976) study for Chile began by defining a basic
consumption threshold on the basis of data from the Santiago
household expenditure survey of 1968-69.

He then divided all

households in Chile into two groups, those above and those below
the threshold, and estimated consumption functions for each group.
These consumption functions were incorporated into a dynamic
linear programming model which maximised terminal year consumption
subject to primary resource constraints and commodity balances
from a fifteen industry input-output table.

Redistribution over

time was effected by increasing the rate of growth of consumption
by households below the threshold more rapidly than that of the
other group.

The most radical redistribution assessed by Foxley

achieved a doubling of consumption of the low income group in
six years (an average real growth of 13% per annum).

This was

found to have almost no effect on the rate of growth of total
output but did increase the level of employment slightly.
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Foxley cautioned that the insensitivity of the growth rate to
redistribution could be due in part to his assumption of a constant
savings ratio, but noted that the employment effect may be
reinforced by complementary government expenditure programmes in
education, health and housing.

The next section of this chapter outlines a generalised
input-output model incorporating distribution of industry value
added among size income groups and disaggregated consumer demand
patterns by income groups.

The model is static in the sense

that it does not describe the time path of variables in its
solution.

It is described as "semi-closed", to distinguish it

from the simple open input-output model in which all final
demands are aggregated into a single exogenous vector.

In the

semi-closed input-output model, part of final demand is made to
be a function of primary inputs rather than being determined
exogenously.

One of the most illustrative treatments of such

models known to the author is by Miyazawa (1976), but lack of
suitable data has prevented its empirical application for Fiji.
In one chapter of Miyazawa1s book he discusses income distribution
in an input-output model which is closed to foreign trade.

In

another chapter he discusses trade without reference to income
distribution.

In Appendix A to this chapter both are synthesised

in one model.
An alternative model of the same class has been developed by
a research team at the I.L.O. (Paukert et. a l . (1974), Skolka
and Garzuel (1976)).

This model has the important advantage of

simplicity in design and is modest in its demands for data input.
The model is described in section three and simulation results for
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Fiji are reported in section four.

The Fiji database for the

model is described in detail in Appendix B.

The critical link in

models of the type discussed in this chapter, which distinguishes
them from other input-output models, is the system of consumer
demand equations which translates changes in the distribution of
income into changes in the pattern of household consumption
demand.

A substantial literature exists on the specification and

estimation of systems of consumer demand equations.

Data

limitations have prevented me from taking full advantage of this
rich field of research.

Fortunately it can be shown that for

present purposes a very simple specification of demand relation
ships is adequate.

Expenditure systems are reviewed in

Appendix C where the latter point is defended.

9.2

General framework
One of the most important tasks of economy-wide planning

models is to highlight the compatibility (or incompatibility) of
alternative resource allocation programmes with given social
objectives.
this task.

Input-output models are particularly well suited to
All input-output models ensure the consistency of

industry supplies with all demands for industry outputs through the
fundamental balance equation:

0.

t

_
+ Nn =
i

n
z a . . Q. + C. + G. + K. + X.
j =1
U
\]
i
i
i
i

where i is an index of commodities (i=1, ..., m)
j is an index of industries (j=l, ..., n)
(h is gross domestic output of commodity j
Mc is competing imports

(9.1)
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a . . are intermediate purchases coefficients of commodity
i for industry j
C is final households consumption expenditure
G is final government consumption expenditure
K is gross fixed capital accumulation (including stocks)
X is exports.
There are several empirical problems which must be solved
before an input-output model may be used for planning.

Firstly,

the level of aggregation should ideally be chosen to highlight
the important issues for policy purposes;

in practice the level

of aggregation is determined on the basis of available data and
the two criteria do not always coincide.

It is also usually

assumed that each industry produces one (or primarily one)
commodity which may be used either as an intermediate input or
as a component of final demand.

There are then problems with the

treatment of secondary products, although the ease of
mathematical analysis is greatly simplified.

There are differences

between the producers' prices of a commodity and the purchasers'
prices of the same commodity attributable to commercialisation
margins, and several alternative methods of accounting for these
are possible.

Finally, the distinction between competing and

non-competing imports is not always obvious in all cases, and even
when they are separated the prices of competing imports are not
always the same as those of the domestic substitute.

Then

problems of choice and substitution occur within the Leontief
fixed-coefficient technology framework.

These problems are

discussed in U.N. Statistical Office (1973).

In this section

we assume that they have been adequately solved for a given
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model so as to concentrate upon the concept of consistency in an
input-output model.1
The simplest consistency test is made by expressing all
final demand elements in a single vector:1
2

F = C + G + K+ X - M c

.... (9.2)

and setting this vector as an exogenous target for the economic
system.

The Leontief inverse matrix multiplier may then be used

to calculate the direct and indirect output required from each
industry to achieve the target final demand.

In matrix notation

we have:
Q - ( I - A ) -1.F

.... (9.3)

Consistent estimates of factor inputs can most simply be
derived in a static model by assuming Leontief production
functions.3

Then
P = VQ

(9.4)

where P is the vector of factor input requirements
V is the matrix of factor productivity ratios.
1

For a discussion of several of these issues in the context of an
applied simulation model see Dixon et.al. (1977) and Parmenter
(1976). For an evaluation of static input-output models in
general see Taylor (1975), Manne (1974) and Usui (1972). Much
of the discussion of consistency in this section is based on
Clark (1975).

2

In the following analysis the assumed input-output structure is
industry-by-industry where (i,j = 1 ..., n). The i, j
subscripts are dropped and vector notation ~ is used to
distinguish vectors from matrices.

3

Although this is not the only way. In 1953 Klein (1953)
suggested interpreting the a^j coefficients as derived from a
Cobb-Douglas production function, such that they should stay
constant in value terms but not volume terms. Several more
recent studies (cited by Taylor (1975)) have shown that the
elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs and
primary factors is non-zero, and that there is often scope for
substitution between primary inputs. For an excellent treatment
of substitution in a CES framework see Dixon et.al. (1977).
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Note that the vector of primary inputs P may include non
competing imports, capital of various types, and labour
disaggregated by various skills.

The exact specification is

quite flexible, depending upon the problem at hand and the
availability of data on various inputs.

Equations (9.3) and (9.4)

may be written in partitioned matrix form as

~9_

-v~~!

=

T T

F~

y

for which the solution is

j_

y

«

F

y

r*

"\V (Î- a' ) - Ï ! Ï

•

F

1__ 1

-1
_i_-a i 0
_~ - v ~i ï_ï

(9.6)

The static input-output solution written in this form
demonstrates two things which are important for this chapter.
Firstly, the Leontief inverse matrix multiplier (I-A)"^ appears
in both the upper and lower parts of the inverted partitioned
matrix on the right hand side of equation (9.6).

They calculate

the direct as well as indirect requirements of commodities and
primary inputs, analogous to the concept of linkages between
industries discussed by Hirschman (1958).
important for analysis of employment.

This is particularly

For instance, Krishnamurty

has shown that:
...industries and techniques which generate a
relatively large direct employment might not
generate a relatively large total employment, in
the same way as activities which generate a
relatively large total output might not generate a
relatively large total employment. Thus a simple
direct employment criterion or a simple outputlinkage criterion in the choice of industry and
technology could give misleading results.
(Krishnamurty (1974), p.l).
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Secondly, because the northeast corner of the inverted
matrix is a null matrix, there is no interaction between the
commodity balances in the upper part and the factor employment
calculations in the lower part.

Since there is no specified inter

dependence between them the unknowns Q and P may be calculated in
sequence.

In order to make all variables in the system mutually

consistent, this open static model must be 'closed' by adding
some feedback loop to link the northeast and southwest quadrants
of the partitioned matrix.
The particular closed-loop specification adopted by the
class of models considered in this chapter explicitly recognises
the interdependence between the distribution of factor incomes and
the pattern of expenditure on domestic output by households in
different percentiles of the size distribution of income.

For

instance, the economy-wide size distribution of (disposable)
income is regarded as being determined by both technological
factors and institutional factors.

Labour and capital inputs

employed in each industry are (ultimately) owned by individuals,
and each individual's income depends on the quantity of factors
he owns, the current prices of those factors, and the industry in
which the factors are employed.

Then that part of the overall

size distribution which is technologically determined is simply
a weighted sum of the distribution of factor incomes (by size
income groups) in each industry.

Some of the factor incomes are

appropriated by the State and redistributed to other households
as direct payments to individuals who do not own productive
factors, and as indirect benefits from 'public goods'.

Then

changes in the economy-wide distribution of income may occur
because of changes in the output configuration (industry mix),
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the quantity of factors owned by different groups, factor prices,
and tax and transfer structures.

Variations in each of these

may occur as a result of deliberate government policy or they
may be the result of forces outside the control of the
authorities. *+
Then it is necessary to recognise that low-income households
typically have a different pattern of consumption expenditure than
middle or high-income households.
studies in every case.

This is verified by budget

The total consumption of each income

group may be broken down into component parts using Engel curves
or other forms of demand functions (see Appendix C).

Once a given

pattern of income redistribution is assumed, based on government
policies or external forces which cause variations described
above, then the system of Engel curves will calculate new levels
of total consumption for each commodity.

This variation in

households final demand is fed back into the input-output system
which generates new output and employment levels to satisfy that
demand, and also changes the distribution of income again as a
second-round effect.

The final solution is obtained by an

iterative procedure (for which it is possible to prove convergence),
and the welfare effects of the change may be analysed as a
redistribution effect, a growth effect, and an employment effect.*
)
i
(
4 Some examples may include:
(i)

output configuration varied in response to changes in
consumers1 tastes, changes in world demand for traded goods,
changes in government expenditure and capital works;

(ii)

quantity of factors owned by different groups varied as
a result of population growth patterns, education,
purchase and sale of capital assets;

(iii) factor prices varied by market forces (supply and demand
in a competitive environment) or variations in distortions
of factor markets (monopoly/monopsony, exchange rate
fluctuations, etc.); etc.
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In mathematical terms, the static semi-closed input-output
model may be expressed as follows.

The fundamental balance

equation is rewritten as:

g = AQ + CY + D

.... (9.7)

where A is a matrix of intermediate coefficients A..,
*si

C is a matrix of coefficients showing the consumption
pattern of k income groups for n commodities
D is a vector of final demands other than households' final
consumption expenditure (i.e. D = F - C),
and where industry value added is paid directly to households as
income Y accruing to k income groups, thus:
(9.8)

Y = VQ

and thus V is a (kxn) matrix of coefficients showing the
distribution of value added in each industry among the income
groups.

Writing (9.7) and (9.8) in partitioned matrix form (and

dropping the ~ vector notation) we have:
r

«

i-A «-c

-:V- [ T

"1

Q

D

Y

0

(9.9)

for which the solution is found by:

_Y_

I-A i - < T

trrd

•

D

^ :
1___ L

~Q_

(9.10)

To simplify notation for the expanded form of the solution, let
the Leontief inverse matrix multiplier be given by B = (I-A)
Then inverting the partitioned matrix of coefficients in (9.10)
gives the solution in expanded form as:
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The essential difference between (9.11) and (9.6) is that the
null-matrix in the northeast corner of the partitioned inverse in
the open model (9.6) has been replaced by the introduction of the
feedback mechanism described above.
(9.11) are important here.

Two aspects of the solution

Firstly, note that B,V and C all appear

in each part of the partitioned inverse.

This ensures that the

solution variables are mutually consistent.

It also means that

the solution variables (output by industries and income by size
income groups) can no longer be calculated in sequence but are
computed simultaneously.

Secondly, although the existence of a

non-negative Leontief inverse matrix multiplier (B) may readily be
proven, the non-negativity of the other complex inverse matrices
shown is more difficult to establish.

We will return to this

point later on.
Finally it is necessary to stress the distinction between
the concept of 'consistency' in a model as developed above, and
what we may think of as 'feasibility' of alternative actions.
The class of models described above imposes a discipline on the
planner which Manne (1974) has described as logical consistency.
Given the balance equation and the particular closed loop
specification, then the solution is calculated as the deterministic
outcome of the system.

Because the number of industries and

commodities and income groups is large, the solution could not
be found by simple 'back of the envelope' calculations, even if
the planner possessed an extremely intimate knowledge of the
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workings of his economy.
solution may
of view.

Nevertheless, the internally consistent

not be at all feasible

from a macroeconomic point

To quote Clark (1975), (pp.130-131):
A model produces feasible plans only if it includes
supply considerations in one of the following ways;
(a) By putting primary resource restrictions on
foreign exchange, initial capital stock, savings,
labour supply, and so on, within an optimising
model (static or dynamic, linear or nonlinear,
programming model).... : (e.g. Foxley (1976));
(b) By being elaborated into a general equilibrium
model in which both demand and supply adjustments
are made in order to reach an equilibrium.
Normally endogenous price determination is the
equilibrating adjustment process; (e.g. Dixon
et.al. (1977));
(c) By simulation studies using input-output models,
coupled with close communication between model
builders and the people in the economy who decide
on and implement policy. In this case
feasibility is in part a matter of judgement
based on information transmitted outside the
model.

To expand on the last point with particular reference to the
model concerned with income distribution, we should recognise
that the change in income distribution which initialises the
process of adjustment to a new consistency solution is a matter
outside the model presented above.

This also presents a

feasibility problem, which may be partly political and partly
economic, and which is simply assumed to be solved before the
model solution is computed.

Thus, while the model may show the

logical consequences of adopting certain policies whose initial
redistributive effects are known, it does not provide a
mechanism for choosing between alternative policies which may
have the same final outcome, or for judging the feasibility of
alternative policies in terms outlined by Clark above.
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The Paukert-Skolka-Maton-Garzuel model (PSMG)
As a member of the class of static semi-closed input-output

models discussed above, the PSMG model brings household's final
consumption expenditure into the matrix inversion which
calculates mutually consistent output, employment and income
patterns as functions of exogenous other final demands, without
reference to the time-pattern of change in the solution variables.
In this particular specification, however, the vector of other
final demands is held constant, and the strict exogenous
variables in the model are the hypothetical income distribution
regimes which are imposed upon the model to simulate the effects
on the economy of varying the income distribution.
The model shares an important limitation with regard to
feasibility considerations as discussed in the previous section.
In between the generation of primary factor incomes in each
industry of the economy on one hand, and the distribution of
household income by size income groups on the other, there is a
network of income flows - a mapping system which depends partly
upon the number of employed persons per household, and on the
income maintenance activities described previously.

In the PSMG

model this mapping system is not specified - it is simply assumed
to exist.

This prevents direct analysis of policy measures

designed to make income distribution less unequal by altering,
for example, the wage structure or the tax-and-transfer structure.
It is difficult to model the effects of policies aimed specifically
at, say, "households in the lowest quartile of the income scale"
when the mapping process is not specified.
The PSMG model does show what the equilibrium structure of
output and employment in the economy would look like if the
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distribution of household income was different, and assuming no
change in the mapping system.

The model is characterised by

Leontief-type fixed-coefficient production functions, Keynesiantype consumption and savings functions, and Lewis-type excess
supplies of labour.

There are no other primary resource

restrictions imposed upon the consistency solution, so that
feasibility of the results in the macroeconomic sense is also
simply assumed to exist (i.e. there is no divergence between
aggregate savings and investment and there are no balance of
payments limitations).
The model is formulated as a set of identities.

The

fundamental balance equation is the same as equation (9.7) in the
previous section:

Q = AQ + CY + D

.... (9.7)

Analgous to equation (9.8) income generation is given by:

Y = a

~ V

Q
~

.... (9.12)

where Y is (scalar) value added accruing to households as income
from the use of their factor services,
a

is a (Ixn) vector whose elements are the proportions of
gross output in each industry accruing to households
as factor income.

The stipulated income distribution in discrete income groups
is found by dividing the total number of households into four
groups (quartile grouping was dictated by available data);

Y^ is

the proportion of total household income Y accruing to group k
(k = 1,2,3,4), and the income distribution vector is written J
where
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Y
(k-1.

' T *

(9.13)

, 4)

A redistribution of income is defined in a new vector J
different from J such that income in each group after
redistribution is given by:
J*
Yk = Y k ‘ j f

•

( k = 1 .................4 )

..............0 . 1 4 )

A very simple form of consumption function is used in the
model (but see below for further discussion of the consumption
function).

It is assumed that for each income group (k) the

share of expenditure on each commodity is constant.

Total

consumption expenditure on the output of industry i is given by:

Ci " ? i k Y k

’

(i 1# •••» n ) ,
(9.15)
(k= l,

. . . ,

4),

where c-k is a (Ixk) vector whose elements are the proportions
of income of the respective income groups spent on
domestic output of i;
Y^ is a (kxl) vector of income levels of the k income
groups given by the income distribution equation:

Yk = J.Y

.... (9.16)

Similarly, the savings function may be written as:

S = Ssk Y k

.... ^9 ‘17^

where csk is a (Ixk) vector whose elements are the savings
propensities of the respective income groups.
Imports are given by
M = a .Q. + c , Y. + D
~mj ¿3
~mk I k
m

(9.18)
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where a . is a (Ixn) vector of import coefficients for
~mj

intermediate uses
c . is a (Ixk) vector of import propensities for imported
consumer goods by each group k,
Dm

is the (scalar) value of imports required for other
final uses.

The expenditure and savings coefficients of each income group
satisfy the adding-up condition:
n
•^

c i k + cmk + c sk = ■>’

(a11

k>

(9.19)

Employment is also written using the simple fixed coefficients
specification:
E = 5p 9

(9.20)

where ag is a (Ixn) vector of average employment coefficients this row vector may be expanded to a matrix of
coefficients for disaggregating employment by skills.
The coefficients used in the above relations (9.7), (9.12),
..., (9.20) may be arranged in a single square matrix, say B, as
in Figure 9.1.

The order of the matrices and vectors comprising B

are shown in brackets.

It should be noted that the av vector

from equation (9.12) has been expanded to show u rows of primary
inputs coefficients, the last row being the household income
coefficients generated in each industry.
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Figure 9.1
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The analytical representation of the complete model may be
written in matrix form as:

B.Z = D

.... (9.21)

where Z is a column vector of endogenous variables (the solution
vector), and D is a column vector of exogenous variables (final
demand other than household's consumption expenditure).

This

conveniently simple formulation may be solved with a single
matrix inversion:

Z = B_ 1 .D

(9.22)
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The data used in the basic version of the model is shown in
Figure 9.2 and the data sources and methods are explained in
Appendix B.

Figure 9.2 illustrates the model format B.Z = D and

the partitioning of the B matrix is analogous to that in
Figure 9.1.

A description or row heading for each row in

Figure 9.2 unfortunately was omitted from the diagram because of
lack of space - however the row headings are listed in Table 9.1
which shows the basic consistency solution.

9.4

Simulation results for Fiji 1972
The vector of income distribution shares given in Figure 9.2

(J = [-.09, -.17, -.25, -.49]) is the quartile distribution of
income from the 1973 Urban Household Income and Expenditure
survey upon which the consumption coefficients were based.

It

provides the income distribution for the basic consistency
solution of the model.5

This basic consistency solution gives

industry outputs, imports and incomes equal to their actual 1972
values shown in the input-output table
that year.

and national accounts for

The table of complete solution values for the basic

consistency solution is shown in Table 9.1 and the validation of
this solution is discussed in Appendix B (i.e. estimating domestic
consumption coefficients for each income group, verifying the
aggregate savings and investment balance, and so on).

In order

simulate the structure of the economy under a range of different
income distributions the vector of income distribution shares (J)
5 Only the relative pattern of household expenditure in 1973 was
used. The levels of all variables refer to the year 1972.
There is no data to enable the consumption expenditure patterns
of rural households to be adequately incorporated in this study,
(see Appendix B).
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Table 9.1

Basic Consistency Solution
($'000)

Q 1
Q 2
Q 3
Q 4
Q 5
Q 6
Q 7
Q 8
Q 9
Q10
Qll
Q12
Q13
Q14
Q15
Q16
Q17
Q18
Q19
Q20
Q21
M
IT
DT
DP
GS
S
Y
Y4
Y3
Y2
Y1
E

Note:

Sugar Cane
Other Agriculture
Mining & Quarrying
Sugar Manufacturing
Other Food Manufact.
Textiles, Wood, Etc.,
Cement, Etc.,
Other Manufacturing
Elect., Gas, Water
Building
Other Construction
Distribution
Restaurants, Hotels
Transport
Communications
Banking, Insurance
Private Services
Govt. Services
Education
Health
Dwellings
Imports (c.i.f.)
Indirect Taxes
Direct Taxes
Depreciation
Govt. Op. Surplus
H/Hold Savings (Tot)
H/Hold Income (Tot)
Income (4th Quartile)
Income (3rd Quartile)
Income (2nd Quartile)
Income (1st Quartile)
Employment

22161
16809
7747
34361
22903
15458
5264
9539
5658
26140
13279
58555
21886
28961
3497
8691
21912
19912
12022
5624
13441
132067
31192
18358
10954
5449
16856
168117
15131
28580
42029
82377
108632

Q1-Q21 are gross outputs of each input-output industry
(F $ 1000). The industry numbers are slightly different
to those in the official input-output table (Government
of Fiji (1974d)) because of the omission of the
subsistence sector and the aggregation of "private non
profit services" and "other services" into one industry.
The indicator of employment is actually the wage and
salary bill for the economy, also in F $ '000. Refer to
Appendix B for further notes.
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was replaced by different vectors (J*) and all other coefficients
in the B matrix were held constant.

The B matrix was inverted6

with the new J* and multiplied by the constant D vector to obtain
a corresponding consistency solution Z*.
Nine alternative income distributions were examined in the
first version of the model.7

These distributions are listed in

Table 9.2, in order of decreasing inequality measured by the Gini
index, with their Lorenz curve parameters (corresponding to the
analysis of chapter eight) and quartile income shares.

The

ranking of distributions in Table 9.2 is unambiguous because each
distribution shown corresponds to one of nine non-intersecting
Lorenz curves (see chapter seven).

Put another way, a shift

from one income distribution to the next may be achieved by a
transfer of income-share from the richest quartile to the poorer
quartiles, which is associated with a shift to a higher Lorenz
curve.

In this sense, each of the nine alternative income

distributions (J*) could be generated artificially by such
6 It is not possible to prove mathematically that the inverse of
a matrix with the structure of B does exist. Fortunately there
were very few computational problems involved in inverting the
B matrix.
7 The first version of the model refers to that used in Paukert
et.al. (1974), and is the only version for which results are
discussed here. Another version discussed by Skolka and Garzuel
(1976) adjusted the expenditure patterns of each percentile
income group by an iterative procedure in the course of solution
to simulate the effects of shifting preferences. Skolka and
Garzuel reported lower sensitivity of their solution to
simulated income redistributions than in the first version.
Certain computational problems arose when the iterative version
was tested for Fiji. In addition there are certain method
ological problems involved in attempts to account for shifting
preferences for which the author has not yet found a satisfactory
solution (see Appendix C).

Table 9.2

Nine Income D is tr ib u tio n s Imposed on the Model

Gi ni
Index

Lorenz Curve 1Parameters
a
a
8

Quartile Income Shares
2nd
3rd
1st
4th

1. Philippines (1971)

.494

.4779

.9151

.8971

.605

.219

.121

.055

2. Fiji (1968)

.477

.4806

.9332

.9618

.580

.230

.130

.060

3. Fiji (1973)

.441

.4283

.9055

.9160

.561

.236

.136

.067

4. Constructed

.424

.4570

.9975

.9863

.541

.240

.150

.070

5. Constructed

.381

.3711

.9142

.9127

.500

.250

.170

.080

6. Urban Fiji (1973)

.360

.3343

.8602

.8686

.490

.250

.170

.090

7. Constructed

.344

.3512

.9938

.9309

.480

.250

.170

.100

8. Australia (1968)

.319

.2743

.7628

.8176

.455

.263

.182

.100

9. Taiwan (1972)

.283

.2532

.8299

.8162

.437

.259

.186

.118

Note:

Income distributions for Philippines, Australia and Taiwan are from Jain (1975).
Income distributions for Fiji were discussed in chapter eight.
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Alternative Simulated
Income Distributions
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rich-to-poor transfers.

As they are listed in Table 9.2, the

first corresponds to the observed income distribution of the
Philippines in 1971;

the second and third are Fiji's economy-wide

income distributions in 1968 and 1973 respectively (recall
chapter eight discussion of income distribution measurement in
Fiji);

the sixth is the same as that used in the basic consistency

solution, Fiji's 1973 urban income distribution;

and the eighth

and ninth are, respectively, the observed distribution of
Australia in 1968 and Taiwan in 1972.

The remaining income

distributions in Table 9.2 were artificially constructed on the
basis of rich-to-poor transfers to fill in large shifts between
observed distributions in the measured Gini index.8
The concept of income transfers between quartile income
groups is useful for describing the size of the redistributions
involved.

For example, a shift from income distribution number

six (the basic consistency solution) to income distribution
number nine (Taiwan 1972) would require taking 5.3% of the national
income away from the first, or richest, quartile and redistributing
it as 0.9% to the second quartile, 1.6% to the third quartile,
and 2.8% to the fourth quartile.

This would indeed be a radical

redistribution and one which would require a very careful
interpretation of the ceteris paribus conditions described above.
A more modest redistribution is involved in a shift from income
distribution number six to income distribution number seven.
8 Any number of alternative distributions could be constructed in
this manner if desired. Those reported here are adequate to
demonstrate the properties of the model and the direction and
magnitude of the redistribution impact on variables of interest.
It would be more interesting to test other redistributions if
the mapping system which generates them could be specified but
this is not the case.
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This redistribution was constructed by taking 1% of the national
income away from the richest quartile and giving it all to the
poorest quartile.

Achieving a static redistribution of this

amount would also be difficult, but would be less likely to
strain the credibility of the ceteris paribus conditions.

For

this reason a modest redistribution may be regarded as more
"feasible" in the sense outlined above.
Table 9.3 shows the impact of nine static income
redistributions upon the gross outputs of the twenty-one
input-output industries and upon some macroeconomic variables.
The results are expressed as the ratio of the solution values of
variables obtained after redistribution to their values in the
basic consistency solution.

For example, imposing income

distribution number one (Philippines 1971) on the model gives a
ratio for employment of 0.9788, which means the solution value is
2.12% lower than in the basic consistency solution.

Since income

distribution number six is the same as that used in the basic
consistency solution, the ratio for all variables is 1.0000 in
that case.
Given the assumptions of the PSMG model, the results shown
in Table 9.3 indicate that if the income distribution in Fiji was
more.unequal than that in the basic consistency solution then the
outputs of almost all industries would be less in order to satisfy
the given exogenous final demand and household consumption.

The

equilibrium levels of household income and of employment would
also be lower.

Conversely, if the income distribution was less

unequal than that in the basic consistency solution, higher
industry outputs and employment and income would be generated.

Table 9.3

Sim ulation Results fo r Nine A lte rn ative Income D istrib u tio n s.
1

2

3

4

Industry Results:
Q 1
Q 2
Q 3
Q 4
Q 5
Q 6
Q 7
Q 8
Q 9
Q10
Qll
Q12
Q13
Q14
Q15
Q16
Q17
Q18
Q19
Q20
Q21

Sugar cane
Other Agriculture
Mining, quarrying
Sugar manufacturing
Other food products
Textiles, wood products, etc
Cement, earthenware
Other manufacturing
Electricity, gas, water
Building construction
Other construction
Distribution
Restaurants, hotels
Transport
Communications
Banking, insurance
Private services
Government services
Education
Health
Dwellings ownership

Macro Results:
M
Imports (c.i.f.)
IT
Indirect taxes
DT
Direct taxes
DP
Depreciation
GS
Govt, operating surplus
S
Household savings
Y
Household income
E
Aggregate employment

.9934
.9129
.9997
.9934
.9341
.9850
.9981
.9855
.9737
.9992
.9997
.9628
.9923
.9460
.9760
.9931
.9770
1.0000
.9889
.9840
.9231

.9946
.9285
.9998
.9946
.9457
.9877
.9984
.9881
.9788
.9994
.9998
.9694
.9935
.9556
.9804
.9941
.9812
1.0000
.9910
.9866
.9368

.9957
.9426
.9998
.9957
.9565
.9902
.9987
.9905
.9830
.9995
.9998
.9755
.9948
.9643
.9844
.9953
.9852
1.0000
.9928
.9891
.9492

.9968
.9580
.9999
.9968
.9677
.9926
.9990
.9930
.9878
.9996
.9999
.9819
.9960
.9739
.9883
.9963
.9885
1.0000
.9946
.9921
.9627

.9653
.9498
.9762
.9677
.9761
1.4193
.9719
.9788

.9715
.9587
.9807
.9734
.9806
1.3445
.9769
.9826

.9772
.9669
.9844
.9787
.9846
1.2761
.9815
.9861

.9831
.9755
.9891
.9842
.9885
1.2037
.9863
.9897

5

6

7

8

9

1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

1.,0010
1. 0120
1. 0000
1. 0010
1. 0099
1. 0025
1. 0003
1. 0021
1. 0029
1. 0001
1. 0000
1. 0055
1. 0015
1. 0075
1. 0036
1. 0015
1. 0040
1. 0000
1. 0017
1. 0022
1. 0109

1.0019
1.0247
1.0001
1.0019
1.0185
1.0042
1.0006
1.0041
1.0077
1.0002
1.0001
1.0105
1.0020
1.0151
1.0069
1.0017
1.0066
1.0000
1.0032
1.0042
1.0216

1.0039
1.0500
1.0002
1.0039
1.0393
1.0093
1.0012
1.0085
1.0138
1.0005
1.0002
1.0220
1.0053
1.0312
1.0142
1.0049
1.0146
1.0000
1.0066
1.0093
1.0446

.9949
.9927
.9976
.9953
.9966
1.0602
.9959
.9969

1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

1. 0051
1. 0074
1. 0024
1. 0047
1. 0034
0. 9393
1. 0041
1. 0031

1.0098
1.0141
1.0069
1.0091
1.0069
0.8817
1.0079
1.0060

1.0205
1.0296
1.0122
1.0190
1.0139
0.7545
1.0166
1.0125
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.9990
.9881
.9999
.9990
.9901
.9976
.9997
.9979
.9971
.9999
.9999
.9945
.9985
.9925
.9964
.9986
.9960
1.0000
.9983
.9978
.9892
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There are some interesting differences between input-output
industries in the degree of sensitivity of their gross outputs to
income redistribution in this model.

The discussion to follow is

simplified by restricting our attention to two income distributions,
say, to income distribution numbers seven and nine (the modest
and radical redistributions described above).

The group of

industries which demonstrated the highest sensitivity to income
redistribution is represented in Table 9.4 below, with the
percentage change in their gross outputs from the basic consistency
solution given for redistribution seven and for redistribution
nine.

Table 9.4

Percentage increase in gross outputs of selected
industries in Fiji, redistributing from
Gini = 0.360 to:
Gi ni = 0.344

Gi ni = 0.283

%

Q 2
Q

5

Q12
Q14
Q21

Other Agriculture
Other Food Products
Distribution
Transport
Dwellings Ownership

1.20
0.99
0.55
0.75
1.09

%

5.00
4.46

3.93
3.12
2.20

Each of these industries disposes a high proportion of its
output to households' final domestic consumption expenditure.
The propensity to consume the outputs of these industries was
found to be much larger for poor households than for rich
households.

Therefore, a redistribution of income generated

relatively higher output response from these industries than from
other industries.

Table 9.4 also indicates that different

industries would expand at different rates depending upon the
particular pattern of income redistribution chosen.

For instance,

the radical redistribution shown provides gains for the second
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and third quartiles as well as the poorest fourth quartile, whereas
the other redistribution provides only for a modest gain in the
income share of the fourth quartile.

This accounts for part of

the different relative industry effects, in addition to variations
in the marginal propensity to consume different outputs at
different income levels.
Some other industries which sell a high proportion of their
output to households' final domestic consumption (for example,
"health" and "textiles, wood products, printing") showed much
lower sensitivity to income redistribution, mainly because their
average and marginal consumption propensities were found not to be
very different between income groups.

Industries which cater to

exports ("sugar manufacturing" and "mining"), or which cater to
capital formation ("building" and "construction"), and others
which do not directly satisfy household consumption, were almost
completely unaffected by the simulated redistributions of income
among households.
Turning to the results for the macroeconomic variables it is
convenient once again to restrict our attention to one or two
redistributions.

Consider a shift from income distribution

number six to income distribution number seven, and recall that
this involves a simulated redistribution of 1% of the national
income from the richest quartile to the poorest quartile.

This

redistribution caused household savings in the model to fall by
6.07% or $1,023 million.

Household consumption expenditure

increased by $1,023 million, a 0.68% rise.

Approximately two-

thirds of this increase in consumption would be spent on
domestically produced consumer goods and services, and the
remainder would go to imports and taxes.

The increase in
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households' demand for domestic output also induced higher
aggregate employment, income and materials imports.

The increased

employment effect of 0.31% would amount to approximately 420 jobs
with given wage rates, and the corresponding increase in household
income would be 0.41% or $0,689 million.

The total increase in the

economy's imports of 0.51% or $0,673 million is the sum of direct
and indirect imports required to satisfy the higher consumption
demand.
The impact of income redistribution on the rate of growth is
best examined in the context of the familiar two-gap model of
growth (Chenery and Strout (1966), Guest (1975)).

This model

postulates that foreign capital inflow can act either as a
supplement to domestic savings or as a supplement to foreign
exchange.

For a developing country which conforms to the model

and for which capital inflow is of the form satisfying the implied
requirements, it can be shown that the impact of foreign capital
inflow on the growth rate will be different depending upon which
resource, savings or foreign exchange, is the dominant constraint
on growth.

Put another way, the planned growth rate of the economy

implies a certain level of investment and a corresponding level of
imported equipment and materials.

The planned investment must be

financed by domestic savings plus foreign capital inflow.

The

planned imports must be paid for by exports plus foreign capital
inflow.

These two resource gaps to be filled by foreign capital

inflow may differ ex ante, but will adjust to equal the amount of
foreign capital actually forthcoming ex p o s t .

If the planned

growth rate of the economy is to be achieved, there must be
adequate foreign capital to fill the larger of the two resource
gaps.
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The cost of redistributing 1% of the national income from
the richest quartile to the poorest quartile can now be seen in
terms of an increased requirement for net foreign capital inflow.
With exports held constant in the exogenous D vector, the current
account balance was found to deteriorate as imports of goods and
services rose by 0.51% or $0,673 million.
increase in the foreign exchange gap.

This represents an

The savings gap also

increased by the same amount, preserving the ex post identity:
investment was held constant in the exogenous D vector, household
savings fell by $1,023 million, but other sources of domestic
investible finance (i.e. government tax revenues, operating
surplus of public enterprises, and depreciation reserves)
increased by a total of $0.35 million, as can be easily verified.
Therefore the net rise in the savings gap was $0,673 million.
If additional foreign capital inflow was forthcoming to meet
this increase in the resource gap then the planned growth rate
would not be frustrated by a lack of finance.

Income

redistribution to the poor would create no further macroeconomic
adjustment problems and the 1.66% increase in the level of
household income shown above would be realised.

If the required

foreign capital inflow was not available, the effect of income
redistribution on the planned growth rate would depend upon
which of the two resource gaps was locally dominant and upon the
extent of the resource shortfall.

These conditions determine the

nature of the adjustment process to a new equilibrium growth
rate (Vanek (1967), Guest (1975)).

The simulation model does not

permit an assessment to be made of the dominant resource gap so,
following Paukert et. al. (1974), it is assumed that the
appropriate adjustments take place.
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Nevertheless it is of interest to consider the significance
of the increase in the resource gap.

Macroeconomic forecasts

for the period 1975-1980 shown in an Appendix to Fiji's Seventh
Development Plan indicate that the ex ante savings gap would be
consistently larger than the ex ante trade gap.

These forecasts

are shown below and would be consistent with a planned G.D.P.
growth rate of 7.3% per annum.

Table 9.5

Ex ante resource gaps (F$million), constant
1975 prices)
1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

Savings gap

24.8

54.4

56.7

64.6

73.9

77.4

Trade gap

14.9

44.3

46.0

54.0

61.3

69.5

(Source:

Government of Fiji (1975) Table C.4 page 258).

The additional $0,673 million of foreign capital inflow
(in 1972 prices) required as a consequence of redistributing 1% of
Fiji's national income (approximately $2.3 million in 1972 prices)
is not an insignificant amount.
resource gap.

It represents 2.8% of the 1972

Escalated to 1975 prices it represents almost 4% of

the forecast savings gap in 1975 shown above.

The ability of the

Fiji Government to attract this additional capital inflow and to
pursue appropriate macroeconomic adjustment policies are two
important issues related to the feasibility considerations mentioned
earlier and which are outside the scope of the consistency
framework used here.
In summary, a redistribution of 1% of Fiji's national income
from the richest quartile to the poorest quartile would represent
a transfer of $2.3 million in 1972.

The simulated effect of such
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a redistribution was
(i)

to increase the level of aggregate consumption expenditure
by 0.68% or $1.02 million;

(ii)

to increase the levels of output in each industry by varying
amounts (up to 1%) to meet this increased demand;

(iii) to increase the level of employment by 0.31% (equivalent to
approximately 420 jobs);
(iv)

to increase the level of total household income by 0.41% or
$0.69 million;

(v)

to increase the required foreign capital inflow by 2.8% or
$0.67 million.
Provided that the latter was judged to be manageable there

need be no reduction in the rate of growth of the economy.

These

results would tend to support the broad conclusion reached by
other studies that the economic impact of simulated income
redistributions is rather small.

The effect of a modest

redistribution of income in Fiji would appear to be beneficial in
terms of the criteria for judging welfare gains discussed in
chapter 7.
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APPENDIX A:

Miyazawa's model

Consider an economy closed to foreign trade (we introduce
international trade later).

The balance equation is written

Q = AQ + f

...(A.1)

where Q is (nxl) vector of gross outputs
A is (nxn) matrix of intermediate coefficients
f is (nxl) vector of final demand; sum of household
consumption (E), investment (K) and current government
expenditure (G).
The consumption function is written
E = C + CY

...(A.2)

where E is (nxl) vector of households consumption expenditure
C is (nxl) vector of basic consumption
C is (nxk) consumption coefficients matrix
Y is (kxl) vector of income accruing to k income groups:
Y = VQ

...(A.3)

where V is (kxn) matrix of value added generated by each of n
industries accruing to k income groups in each industry.
(Note:

estimation of this V matrix for Fiji was not possible
from published data - this was the major reason for not
using Miyazawa model for analysing static consistency of
income distribution).

The balance equation may now be rewritten as:
Q = AQ + CVQ + d

...(A.4)

where d is (nxl) vector of exogenous final demand; sum of basic
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consumption (C), investment K, and current government
expenditure (G).

(i.e. d = f - E + C)

Solving (A.4):

Q = (I - A - c v r ^ d

...(A.4)'

(A.4 ) 1 may be written alternatively as follows:
(i)

Q = (I - A - C V ) _ 1 . d

(ii) Q = B ( I - CVB) _ 1 . d
(iii)

■

...(A.4)'

Q = B ( I + CKVB).d

where B = (I-À)'1 , K = (I-L)'1, L = VBC.
To show (i) = (ii) in (A.4)':
(I-A-CV)'1 = ([I - CV {I-A)-1](I-A)~1

...(A.5)

= (I-A)'1 [I-CV(I-A)"1]'1
= B(I-CVB)'1
1
Call (I-CVB)

the "subjoined inverse" - the advantage of this

expression is that it reflects the effect of endogenous changes
in each income-group's consumption expenditure, as distinct from
the inverse reflecting only production activity (B).
Q = (I-A-CV)’1 .d
= B(I-CVB)"1 .d

(i) = (ii), Q.E.D.

To show (ii) = (iii) in (A.4)1:
Define:

L = VBC

,

K = (I-L)"1

and note I is (kxk) identity matrix in this definition).
Then by definition K(I-VBC) = I.
Premultiply this latter expression by C and postmultiply by VB:
CK(I-VBC)VB = CVB

...(A.6)
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L.H.S. of (A.6) may be written as:
CK{I-VBC)VB = CKVB - CKVBCVB
= CKVB(I-VBC)

Now subtract both L.H.S. and R.H.S. of (A.6) from the (nxn)
identity matrix:

I - CKVB(I-VBC) = I-CVB
I = (I+CKVB)(I-CVB)
.-. (I-CVB)'1 = (I+CKVB)

...(A.7)

/. Q = B{ I-CVB)~1 .d
= B(I+CKVB).d

(ii) = (iii) ,

The economic meaning of K and L is as follows.

Q.E.D.

Consider the

income propagation effect of any income group (x) on another
group's (w's) income:
Step 1:

Increase output of each industry = B.d

Step 2:

Increase income of group x = V

Step 3:

Increase consumption of group x = c

Step 4:

Increase output of each industry due to additional

X

consumption of group x = Be
Step 5:

X

v

X

Bd
x

v

x

Bd
~

Bd

^

Increase income of group w due to additional income of
group x = v Be vv Bd
3
r
w
x x „

Now, a coefficient showing how much income for group w is
generated by a one unit increase in income for group x (any w, x)
is given by:

wx

= Step 5
Step 2

v Be vv Bd
w
x x ~
~v Bd
x ~

v Be
w
x

...(A.8)

A matrix of all such coefficients would have dimensions (kxk) and
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may be called "the matrix of inter-income-group coefficients
Thus:
L = VBC

...(A.9)

The propagation process in matrix form would be as follows:
First round:

= Bd

Second round:

Q2 = BCVBd = BCVQ^

Third round:

Q, = BCVBCVBd = BCVQ2 = (BCV)2Bd

m-th round:

Q = BCVQ , = (BCV)
~m
~m-1

m-1

.Bd
~

= BC(BCV)m "2VBd
= BCLm '2VBd
The total propagation process gives
Q = E Q = Bd + BC ( E Lm '2 )VBd
~ m=l '“m
~
m=2
~

Now if

m-2
Lm“"

E

(i.e.

m=2

E

Lm ) is convergent, then we can write

m=0

Lm = I+L+L2+L3+... = (I-L)

E

...(A.10)

-1

...(A.11)

m=0
/. Q = B(I+C(I-L)-1VB)d
= B(I+CKVB)d

where K = (I-L)’1
(Note:

...(A.12)

this again demonstrates (ii) = (iii) in (A.4)1).

Thus, if L = VBC is an array of coefficients showing the
interrelationship among income-groups in the process of propagation
resulting from each income-group's consumption expenditure pattern,
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then K = (I-L)”1 may be called the "inter-relational multiplier
of income groups".

Note that the column sums of matrix L equal

the total consumption coefficient of each income-group:
L = ij* VBC = i ‘ (I-A)BC = V

C

...(A.13)

where i£, i^ are summation vectors of order k and n respectively
(i = (1, 1, 1, ..., 1)).
Finally, we project equilibrium output into equilibrium income:
from (A.3)

, Y = VQ

,

substitute (A.4)'(iii) for Q
Y = VB(I+CKVB)d
= (I+VBCK)VB£
= (I+LK)VBd
but (I+LK) = K

,

...(A.14)
(because (I-L)K = I
or

K-LK
K

= I
= I+LK)

So (A.14) becomes:
Y = KVBd

...(A.15)

KVB is (rxn) matrix which may be called the "multi-sector income
multiplier in matrix form", or simply the "matrix multiplier of
income formation".
(Note: (A.15) may be derived alternatively as follows:
- Income generated by exogenous expenditure = VBd
- Income generated through endogenous demand as a function
of income = VBCY
.*. Total income generated Y = VBCY+VBd
= {I-VBC)_1 VBd
= KVBd
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In partitioned matrix form, Miyazawa's model may be written as
fol1ows
From

Q = AQ^CY+d

and

Y = VQ+g

(where g is exogenous income), we have:

'

Q
—

Y

—

A
■

! C
1

d

Q

T ' ; T
j

+

Y

_ 9 _

soluti on:
-1
Q
Y

1-A

d

| -C

[ - V ' i ' r

•
__ g _

B(I+CKVB)
BCK
_____________I_____
KVB
!
K
—
i
—

d
...(A.16)
_

g__

In Miyazawa's first chapter explained above, there is no
international trade.

His chapter 3 does open the static input

output model to trade but does not consider income distribution.
Extension of the model outlined above to include imports and
exports is relatively straightforward.

Exports may be included

as an additional component of exogenous final demand vector d.
Since capital formation is exogenous in the static model, the
imported capital goods may be deducted from total requirements
for capital formation, so that investment component of d refers
only to domestic capital formation.

Imports of raw materials for

current intermediate production may be accounted for by a (nxn)
matrix of coefficients (M ) showing the amount of imported
commodity i required to produce a unit of domestic output j.
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Households expenditure on imported consumer goods may be accounted
for in a (nxk) matrix of coefficients (Mc ) showing the amount of
imported commodity i purchased per unit of expenditure by income
group w.

The balance equation for domestic output may then be

written as

Q = AQ+CTVQ - MCVQ - MRQ+d

where

is (nxk) matrix of consumption coefficients of households
in k income groups for both domestic and imported
consumer goods
d

is (nxl) vector of domestic components of exogenous final
demand.

Note that CTVQ-MCVQ = (CT -MC )VQ = CVQ
T C
where C = C -M = domestic commodities consumption coefficients,
as before.
,\ Q = AQ+CVQ-MRQ+d

...(A.17)
...(A.18)

Q = (I-A-CV+MR )"1 .d
Now define B = (I-A+MR)"'*'

...(A.19)

Then (A.18) may be alternatively expressed as:

(i)

Q = (I-A+MR-CV)_1.d

(ii) Q = B(I-CVB)_1d
(iii)

(A.18)'

Q = B(I+CKVB).d

The proofs (i) = (ii), (ii) = (iii) for (A.18)' are the same as
for (A.4)', always remembering that B = (I-A+M)"1 is different
to that for the economy closed to foreign trade, and where again
L = VBC, K = (I-L)

Note that with the consumption coefficient

matrix reflecting only that consumption of domestically produced
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output, the matrix of inter-income group coefficients (L = VBC),
and hence the interreiational multiplier of income groups
(K = (I-L)

only allows transmission of effects from one income

group to another to the extent that such consumption expenditure
generates domestic incomes and outputs, which is as it should be
- imports of consumer goods are properly regarded as a leakage
from the system.

Equilibrium income is still given by Y = KVBd

(where B includes raw material impprts necessary to sustain
production).

APPENDIX B :

Fiji Database for PSMG Simulation Model

The purpose of this Appendix is to explain the organisation
of data that was required to produce Figure 9.2.

The main data

sources used were the 1972 Input-Output Table, the 1972 Trade
Report, the National Accounts and the 1973 Urban Household Income
and Expenditure Survey.

All values refer to the year 1972 and are

expressed in Fiji dollars.
Modification of the Input-Output Table:
The published twenty-three industry Input-Output Table was
slightly modified in this study.

The industries "other private

services" and "private non-profit institutions" were aggregated
into one industry called "private services".

The "subsistence"

sector, which has no linkages with other industries in the table,
was excluded.

Its total imputed output was $31.1 million in 1972.

However, "ownership of dwellings", which had an imputed value of
output sold to households' final consumption expenditure of
$13.4 million, was retained in the study.

A value of $0.9 million

was taken from deliveries by the "building" industry to household
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consumption and was added to the exogenous D vector.

These

adjustments were made to facilitate the estimation of the household
consumption pattern and its operation in translating quartile
income changes into changes in effective demand for industry
outputs.
All components of final demand, except households' final
consumption expenditure, were aggregated to form the exogenous
D vector.

These included gross fixed capital formation, exports,

changes in stocks, consumption expenditure by tourists and
government final consumption expenditure.

The inter-industry

coefficients and primary input coefficients were taken directly
from the 1972 Input-Output Table.
Estimation of household income
In order to estimate the amount of income generated in each
industry which accrued directly to households it was necessary to
adjust each industry's value added for commodity taxes, company
taxes and depreciation.

The total factor income which accrued to

households was estimated as follows:
F$'000
108632

Gross Wages and Salaries
Plus:
Gross operating surplus of companies
Gross income unicorporated enterprise

34005
50968

Less:
Direct taxes paid by companies
Direct taxes unicorporated enterprise
Depreciation reserves

7139
7395
10954

Property/entrepeneurial income available
Total household income (before personal tax)

59485
168117

This calculation was made for each industry and the resulting
income estimates were expressed as coefficients of gross industry
outputs.

The value of property and entrepeneurial income available
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Table B.l

Derivation of Household Income Estimates by
Input-Output Industries

Operating
Industry Surplus
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
TOTAL

- l i L ..
5540
4266
1552
2595
2820
3282
1200
1124
64
2554
151
28111
4306
5438
1385
6762
23
359
13441
84973

Company
Tax
(b)
487
361
145
675
955
596
184
290
16
245
13
7587
579
611
257
1533
14534

Depreciation
(c)

Company
Income
Net (d)

Gross
Wages
(e)

Household
Income
(f)

741
583
274
993
992
740
342
139
10
255
83
1963
843
2175
63
407
351
-

4312
3322
1133
927
873
1946
674
695
38
2054
55
18561
2884
2652
1065
4822
23
8
13441

7313
7683
2820
4969
1991
3628
830
2177
1389
8901
6365
12182
3909
7692
1196
2801
7571
12057
9212
3946
-

11625
11005
3953
5896
2864
5574
1504
2872
1427
10955
6420
30743
6793
10344
1196
3866
12393
12057
9235
3954
13441

10954

59485

108632

168117

(a)

Op. surp. of companies and gross income of unicorporated
enterprises (excluding subsistence agriculture)

(b)

Direct tax on companies and unicorporated enterprises

(c)

Consumption of fixed capital by companies

(d)

= (a) - (b) - (c).
to shareholders

(e)

Gross compensation of employees

(f)

= (d) + (e).

Company income available for distribution

(Before personal income tax).

for distribution to individual shareholders was assumed to be
distributed to Fiji residents.

In fact an amount of $9.1 million

of property and entrepeneurial income was paid to overseas
residents in 1972, and a further unknown amount would have been

316

retained company earnings.

.

The value of household income was

therefore overestimated to some extent but it was not possible to
allocate this overestimate among industries.
Employment coefficients
The coefficients for "compensation of employees" were assumed
to reflect the relative labour intensity of industries.

Interest

lies in predicting changes in employment as a result of income
redistribution.

The percentage change in each industry's wage

bill corresponds to the percentage change in employment under
fixed wage rates, fixed labour-output ratios, and a constant
mapping system which translates the generation of factor incomes
into a pattern of household income distribution.
Income distribution shares:
This is explained in section 9.4.
Allocation of expenditure by quartile groups
The Input-Output Table shows households' final consumption
expenditure on domestically produced output by supplying industry,
as well as the total value of imported consumer goods and the
total indirect taxes and import duties paid on consumer goods.
Transport and commercialisation margin on consumer goods is also
shown.

For the simulation model it was necessary to disaggregate

these expenditures by quartile income groups.

The 1973 Urban

Household Income and Expenditure Survey was used as the basis of
this disaggregation.

The survey shows expenditure of 641 urban

households by quartile income groups on various commodities - it
makes no distinction between imported commodities and domestically
produced commodities, and does not identify distribution mark-ups
separately.
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A key for mapping imports of final consumer goods from the
Standard International Trade Classification (used in the Trade
Report) into the commodity divisions of the System of National
Accounts was given in Government of Fiji (1973a).

Using this key

it was possible to estimate the industry-composition of total
consumption expenditure (domestic plus imported plus mark-ups)
from the National Accounts and to compare this with the Household
Expenditure Survey.

It was necessary to devise a key for mapping

the commodity list from the Household Survey, and that from the
National Accounts, into the industries of the Input-Output Table.
This key is shown in Table B.2, and the allocation of resident
households' consumption expenditure by imports, domestically
produced output, indirect taxes and mark-up is shown in Table B.3.
The Industry composition of domestically produced consumer goods
was obtained from the Input-Output Table.

The industry

classification of imported consumer goods was derived from the
Trade Report;

the total value of imported consumer goods for

resident households differs from that shown in the Input-Output
Table by $0.16 million.

The values of import duties and indirect

taxes were derived from the National Accounts after adjustment
for indirect taxes paid by tourists;

their combined total

exceeded that shown in the Input-Output Table by $0.44 million.
The value of transport and distribution margin derived from the
National Accounts was also adjusted for mark-up on tourist
expenditure and the value shown in Table B.3 is $0.43 million
greater than the $20.26 million shown in the Input-Output Table.
Table B.3 also shows a comparison of the relative weights
for residents' consumption expenditure (in purchasers' values)

Table B.2

Napping of commodity classification in the National Accounts and Household Expenditure Survey
into Input-Output Industries (*)

Input-Output Industries

S.N.A. Commodities

Household Survey Commodities

1. Sugar Cane
2. Other agriculture

(1.1.6) Fruit and vegs;
(1.1.7) Potatoes, manioc, tubers.

(1) Fresh fish; (3) Fruit and vegs.

4. Sugar manufacturing

(1.1.8) Sugar

(4) Sugar

5. Other food manufacturing

(1.1.1) Bread & cereals; (1.1.2) Meat;
(1.1.3) Fish; (1.1.4) Milk, cheese,
eggs; (1.1.5) Oils & fats;
(1.1.9) Coffee, tea, cocoa;
(1.1.10) Other foods, preserves, conf
ectionery; (1.2)(1.3) Beverages;
(1.4) Tobacco.

(2) Eggs; (5) Baking products, pulses
and cereals; (6) Meat and canned fish;
(7) Milk, cheese and butter; (8) Oils
and fats; (9) Confectionery;
(10) Beverages; (11) Other food;
(12) Tobacco.

6. Textiles, wood, printing,
rubber and plastic products

(2.1) Clothing; (2.2) Footwear;
(4.1) Furniture, fixtures, carpet, etc;
(4.2) Household textiles; (4.2) Household
textiles; (4.4) Glassware, tableware;
(4.5) Household operation.

(14) Clothing and footwear;
(16) Furniture and furnishings

(3.2.3)(3.2.4) Fuels; (4.3) Heating and
and cooking appliances, refrigerators etc;
(6.1) Personal transport equipment;
(7.1) Equipment and accessories;
(8.1) Personal care and effects;
(8.2) Goods n.e.c.

(15) Kerosene; (17) Cleaning materials;
(18) Pottery & glass; (19) Other
household articles; (25) Petrol; and
80% of (29) Toiletries and medicine;
(31) Other.

3. Mining and quarrying

8. Other manufacturing
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7. Cement products

(Table B .2 continued)
(3.1.2) Water; (3.2.1) Electricity;
(3.2.2) Gas.

(20) Electricity, water.

13. Hotels, restaurants

(8.3) Expenditure in restaurants, cafes
and hotels.

(13) Meals.

14. Transport

(6.3) Purchased transport

(26) Public transport

15. Communications

(6.4) Communication

(32) Postage and telephone

16. Banking and insurance

(8.5) Financial services n.e.c.

(21) Household insurance

17. Other private services
including non-profit
institutions

(4.6) Domestic services; (6.2) Operation
of personal transport equipment;
(7.2) Entertainment, recreation,
cultural; (7.3) Books, magazines;
(8.6) Services n.e.c.

(23) Domestic services; (27) Vehicle
maintenance; (28) Licences;
(30) Stationery and books; (33) Repairs
and recreation; (36) Subscriptions

9.

Electricity, gas, water

10. Building
11. Other construction
12. Distribution

(24) City and town rates

18. Government services
19. Education

(7.4) Education

(34) School fees

20. Health

(5) Medical care and health expenses

(35) Medical fees; 20% of (29) Toiletries
and medicine.

21. Ownership of dwellings

(3.1.1) Gross rents*

(22) Rent

* Note:

This mapping was devised with reference to International Standard Industrial Classification.
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Table B,3

(a)
Ind. Domestic
Output
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

.

Residents1 Consumption Expenditure 1972

(b)
Imports
of Goods

Import
Duties

Indirect
Taxes

($*000)

(c)

(d)

Mark-up

Total

2740

13420

90

85

(e)
Weights
NA
HS

7759

2921

1491
13240
3713

40
18478
8312

4033
3227

5533

391
8121
5467

1922
49405
20719

13
333
140

305
152

122
1500

9229

3097

345

3853

16646
1500

112
10

72
44

7582
8383
413
569
7377
360
4925
1484
13441

51
57
3
4
50
2
33
10
91

18
48
2
2
42
9
41
3
166

148146 1000

1000

7

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

7582
8383
413
569
7005
360
4925
1143
13441

372

208

16

Tot.

71646

39560

10373

(a) in basic values

(b)

commercialisation margin
Accounts)

117
5878

20689

c. i.f. landed cost

n

(c ) transport and

(d) in purchasers values (National

(e) weights from National Accounts and Household Survey.

between the National Accounts and the Urban Household Survey
(using the key from Table B.2).

Although some error would be

introduced through aggregation of commodity groups in Table B.2,
the differences in weighting may be taken as a guide to the bias
involved in relying on urban expenditure patterns.

The weights

do not appear to be very different, except that urban households
appear to spend relatively more on rent and electricity (as would
be expected).
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Finally, the household consumption expenditure as shown in
the Input-Output Table was disaggregated by quarti le income
groups using the distribution shown in the Household Expenditure
Survey and the key from Table B.2.
Table B.4.

The results are shown in

The total values of the distribution margin, imported

consumer goods, and indirect taxes (including import duty) were
each allocated to quarti le groups in the same proportion as total
household expenditure.
Table B.4

Allocation of household income and expenditure by
quartile income groups 1972

Industry

Qi

1. Sugar cane
2. Other agriculture
2310
3. Mining, quarrying
4. Sugar manufacture
433
5. Other food manuf.
4732
6. Textile, furnit,etc 1811
7. Cement, earthenware
8. Other manufactures
54
9. Elect., gas, water
629
10. Building
11. Other construction
12. Distribution
8047
13. Hotels, restaurants 3847
14. Transport
2235
195
15. Communication
16. Banking
383
4398
17. Private Services
18. Govt, services
199
19. Education
1416
20. Health
476
21. Dwellings
5433
Total Domestic
36598
Imports
15816
6296
Duty, indirect tax
Direct tax
2059
Savings (residual)
21608
Total Income
82377
Income Share
.49

($ F 1000)

Q2

Q3

Q4

1982

2103

1364

7759

377
3207
947

374
3041
581

307
2260
374

1491
13240
3713

32
440

22
311

14
120

122
1500

5035
1779
1922
130
80
2395
123
830
220
3294
22793
9850
3921
1051
4414
42029
.25

4275
1229
2493
53
58
1178
26
522
289
2902
19457
8409
3348
714
-3348
28580
.17

2903
727
1733
35
48
864
12
327
158
1812
13058
5644
2247
0
-5818
15131
.09

20260
7582
8383
413
569
8835
360
3095
1143
13441
91906
39719
15812
3824
16586
168117

Total
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Total household expenditure was distributed much more evenly than
total household income in the Household Survey:
Income
Share (%)

Expenditure
Share (%)

First Quartile

49

40

Second Quartile

25

25

Third Quartile

17

21

9

14

Fourth Quartile

Direct personal income tax was also estimated as basic tax,
which is payable at 2.5% of taxable income over a certain threshold.
It was assumed that only the first three quartiles were liable to
basic tax and that their estimated household incomes were also
their taxable incomes.

The estimate of direct personal income

tax of $3,824 million compares closely with Internal Revenue
Department estimates:
F$'000
Total collections (I.R.D.)
less Direct tax paid by companies 7139
Direct tax unincorporated ent. 7395
Personal income tax

18328
14534
3794

Households' saving by quartile income groups was then
estimated as the residual after deducting all expenditures and
taxes from the income of each group.

With household income

distributed more unequally than household expenditure, the
estimated cross-section savings function showed a remarkably high
marginal propensity to save of 0.424.

This was associated with

the very high dissavings of the poorer two quartiles.

The

aggregate average savings propensity derived from Table B.4 was
0.099;

estimated aggregate household savings of $16,586 million

compared closely with other estimates from the National Accounts.

323.

For instance, the savings gap (investment less savings) should
equal the trade gap (imports less exports) ex post.

This is

verified below for 1972:

Imports of goods and
Exports_of goods and
Trade gap

services
services

(N.A.)
(N.A.)

144200
119900
24300

Net investment (N.A.)
Savings (est.)
Savings gap

40605
16856
"23749

The values in each column of Table B.4 were expressed as
coefficients of the corresponding quartile income level for use
in the simulation model.

APPENDIX C

Systems of Consumer Demand Equations

Input-Output models of the type discussed in this chapter
are designed to translate changes in the distribution of income
into changes in the pattern of demand for industry outputs.

The

connection is intuitively clear when one observes that the
market baskets of rich households are different from those of
poor households, so that a change in the distribution of income
will change the pattern of aggregate consumer demand.

The

empirical estimation method used to determine a system of consumer
demand equations for each industry output is

very important

to the interpretation of the simulation results.
The estimation of systems of consumer demand equations is one
area of applied economics which has produced a voluminous literature,
since the mid-1960's in particular (see, for instance, the review
by Barten (1977)).

Several different econometric specifications

have been developed, most often from the utility maximising models
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of microeconomic consumer behaviour.

It is not intended here to

review the several different types of systems (excellent
references on which this Appendix draws heavily are Phiips (1974),
Powell (1974) and the survey by Brown and Deaton (1972)).

Rather

it is intended to briefly explain the role of demand theory in
applied consumption analysis and to explain the reasons for
adopting a very simple specification of the demand equation system
for the simulation model of this chapter.
Applied consumption analysis has used neoclassical demand
theory in the past as a means of reducing the number of parameters
to be estimated (thus simplifying the model), and in order to
facilitate the economic interpretation of empirical results.
From the theory of consumer demand, the representative consumer
is supposed to maximise some twice differentiable utility
function
u = f(x1# x2 , ..., x )
subject to a budget constraint

y = z p i x,
i
where

y

(i = 1, 2, ..., n)

is income (assumed equal to total expenditure)

p. is price of commodity i
x.. is quantity purchased of commodity i
u

is an index of a preference ordering.

(Problems of aggregation across commodities and consumers are
considered below).

The solution to this constrained maximisation

problem gives a system of n demand equations showing optimal
consumption of each commodity for given prices and income
0
x
1

V).
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Any set of demand equations that is derived by constrained
maximisation of a well-behaved utility function will satisfy
three restrictions:
(i)

homogeneity of degree zero in all prices and income,

(ii)

symmetry of the matrix of compensated cross-price
substitution effects, and

(iii) the adding-up of expenditures on each commodity will sum
to total income.
By specifying the particular class of utility function, and then
deriving the set of demand equations which follow from the
constrained maximisation of that class of utility functions, it
is possible to derive further restrictions on the sign of the
income derivative and price derivatives, and even on their absolute
values.

This provides for more efficient parameter estimation in

applied work.

For example, Stone's (1954) linear expenditure

system is derived from a class of utility functions that is
directly additive (a special case of strong separability whereby
the utility derived from consumption of good i is independent of
that of any other good j).

The Rotterdam system (Barten (1964),

Theil (1967)) is derived from a weakly separable class of utility
functions in which there is assumed to be independence only
between major commodity groups.

The importance of separability is

that it obviates problems of aggregation across commodities.
It can be shown that particular restrictions are implied by
the adoption of one type of system in preference to another.
Therefore it is reasonable to ask whether it can be stated a priori
that one particular system is preferable to another.

One would

also want to know whether the lack of adequate data might force
the adoption of one type of system irrespective of its relative
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advantage.

Examination of the former question will give an

indication of the cost involved in adopting a "second-best" method
because of inadequate data.
Parks (1969) has examined three systems of demand equations:
the linear expenditure system of Stone (1954), Houthakker's (1960)
indirect addilog system, and the differential logarithmic system
of Theil (1967) and Barten (1964), (1967).

Each of these systems

is based upon the constrained maximisation of a utility function
and each satisfies the three general restrictions listed above.
Different sets of parameters are estimated by each system and the
parameters are restricted in different ways by the theory.

Parks

concluded that the theoretical properties of the models fail to
provide a basis for selecting the "best" model.

He then proceeded

to compare the empirical performance of the three systems with what
he called the "naive model".

This naive model is the same demand

equation system used in the PSMG simulation model in this chapter
(i.e. constant budget shares), but expressed in time series.
That is:

V it

-

“ it y t

where V.^ is expenditure on commodity i in period t and W.^ is the
predicted (constant) expenditure share of commodity i.

Parks'

comparison of the models was made on their ability to fit Swedish
demand data for the period 1861-1955.
below:

His results are listed
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Comparison of Demand Models on the Basis of Fit to the
Sample Data

Values of 1 _P2 = yT (yt-yt )2/z
K
Lt=l
i = i (v y > 2
Commodity

Naive

Agriculture
Manufacturing
Transport
Commerce
Domestic Service
Housing
Public Services
Imports

.06545
.00259
.01396
.00078
.01645
.01248
.00803
.08535

Source:

Rotterdam
.02195
.00158
.00722
.00054
.00795
.00207
.00538
.05156

Linear
Indirect
Expenditure
Addilog
Without Trend
.02969
.00176
.01331
.00064
.00934
.00171
.00823
.07359

Linear
Expenditure
With Trend

.01874
.00141
.01483
.00048
.00964
.00184
.00775
.07379

.01815
.00140
.01744
.00052
.00826
.00123
.00697
.07558

Parks (1969)

Parks was careful to re-evaluate the estimation procedures
involved in each model so as to enable a similar empirical
treatment, but recognised that his estimates based on the linear
expenditure system without trend and the indirect addilog system
are both disadvantaged in terms of the number of parameters
involved.

Nevertheless, the present author has drawn some comfort

from the observation that the proportion of unexplained variation
in the naive model is only serious for agriculture (.065) and
imports (.085), and that all models show relatively high values
of 1-R2 for imports in any case.
In a recent paper, Barten (1977) noted that the profession is
still far from a consensus on the issue of the ideal functional
form.

Under the present state of the art the nature of available

data prevents a clear decision about the empirical superiority
of any particular choice.

The criteria which tend to be used

instead include convenience, generality and theoretical relevance
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(the latter being also contentious).
A more fundamental problem arises in connection with
aggregation across consuming households.

The neoclassical demand

theory is written in terms of the individual consumer.

However

it can be shown that even if each consumer behaves according to
the axioms of the theory, the aggregate behaviour of all consumers
may not do so.

The usual approach in empirical work is to divide

aggregate expenditure data by the population and to interpret the
results as if they were given by one utility-maximising consumer
possessing average per capita income.

Gorman (1959) has shown

that if income distribution is constant then this may provide a
reasonable simplification, but since income redistribution is at
the centre of our problem this is of little comfort.

Dixon (1975)

has applied the theory of joint maximisation to solve the problem
of aggregation across households in consumer demand theory.
His approach uses constant household weights which is also not
sufficient for questions of varying income distribution.

The

author does not yet know whether the joint maximisation algorithm
can be solved with variable household weights.

Let us now consider the Engel curve, which is a special case
Pi
of the demand equations discussed above (i.e. x. = g(— , y) but
Pj
with relative prices constant). The Engel curve for each commodity
shows its demand response to income variations.

It would appear

to be a simple matter to multiply response parameters derived
from an Engel curve by the new income levels arising from a
redistribution (at each income level), and summing the result over
all households to find a new level of demand for each commodity
(i.e. a new pattern of aggregate consumption).

329.

The estimation of Engel curves usually proceeds using data
obtained from surveys of household income and expenditure
collected over a short period of time and from households of
widely different income levels.

The advantage of such data over

time-series data for the above purpose is that the incomeconsumption

relationship can be studied in isolation from

movements in relative prices.

It is then apparent that the

application of demand theory is very much simplified by the absense
of relative price variation - in particular, both the homogeneity
restriction and the restriction implied by the symmetry of
compensated cross-price elasticities are redundant.

This will

not, however, reduce the desire to provide a firm theoretical
foundation to the analysis of the consumption system.
Recall that a demand system of the type discussed above is
derived from a utility function with given preference ordering.
At the aggregate level this implies the assumption that each
individual has the same utility function.

The implications of

such an assumption have been discussed in chapter 7.

Here it is

noted that if preferences change then the demand system must be
redefined.

Therefore an empirical study which tries to estimate

the parameters of a given demand system must implicitly assume
that the utility function underlying it is constant over the
sample space.

The econometrician's approach to this problem is to

try and net out of the consumption-income relationship all
variations in factors which might have a significant effect on
preferences.

If one was being strict in the use of household

budget data, one would estimate the Engel curve for households
of the same cultural background, social status, place of residence,
and so on.

It is most important to account for variations in the
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size and age composition of households (usually by adopting some
adult-equivalent scale of consumption).
For Fiji the most obvious factor to be netted out of the
Engel curve relationship would be the variations in household
consumption patterns that are associated with the race of the
household head (Fijians and Indians).

It would also be recognised

that the consumption patterns of urban dwellers are different
from those of rural people, particularly with regard to food,
shelter and fuel which may be provided without recourse to the
market-place.

The 1973 Urban Household Expenditure Survey

(on which the consumption coefficients for the simulation model
were based) did collect information on non-market consumption of
the households surveyed.

The Survey collected information from

households of Fijian, Indian and other races roughly in proportion
to the population of each, and the age/sex composition of the
sample was shown to conform to the national population distribution.
However, the tabulation of data as published in the Survey report
is too aggregated to enable these factors to be taken separately
into account.

The present author did not have access to the

detailed Survey returns.
As noted earlier in the chapter, observations of commodity
expenditure by quartile income groups are shown in the published
report.

On the basis of these observations an attempt was made

to fit several alternative functional forms of the Engel curve.
This followed the approach to Prais and Houthakker (1971) and
amounted to an empirical exploration of various theoretically
plausible relationships including a linear function, a double
logarithmic function, a semi-logarithmic function and a hyperbolic
function.

Very good statistical fit was achieved by the double

logarithmic form, implying a constant income elasticity cf demand
for most commodities.

However the detailed results are not

reported here because this exercise was inadequate for use in
the simulation model.

The reason is that the "extraneous"

factors could not be separated, thus the estimated elasticities
would be biased (seriously biased in the author's opinion) and
the error term would also contain systematic bias.

These

econometric problems arose from my inability to account for
variations in preferences over the sample space.

The estimates

would also be inefficient because of the small number of
observations.

In the event, the "naive" system of consumer demand

relationships was the best available model for use in the
simulations of income redistribution.
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